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INTRODUCTION: AN “OWNERSHIP SOCIETY” THAT 
WE CAN CALL OUR OWN 
 
The idea of an “ownership society” is hardly new to American 
politics or law.  Indeed it might be called the seventeen year cicada of 
American domestic policy, emerging once per generation onto the 
national agenda, generating just a bit of buzz, then receding once again 
to leave a mass of empty husks and buried eggs behind.  Unlike the 
furtively flourishing insects, however, ownership-promoting proposals 
seldom have, upon emergence, crescendoed to a deafening din.  Nor 
have they sounded the same notes to everyone’s ears.1  Rather, 
“ownership solutions”2 and their cognates—“homesteading,”3 
“stakeholding,”4 “assets for the poor,”5 etc.—have been proffered to or 
 
 1 See Cameron W. Barr, Vanguard of Brood X Marks Its Spot: All Over, Cicadas Come of 
Age, Right on Schedule, WASH. POST, May 11, 2004, at A1.  From time to time, however—
particularly during periods of perceived national crisis—ownership-promoting proposals have 
grown noisy if nonetheless vague.  See Todd S. Purdum, The President’s Speech Focuses on 
Ideals, Not Details, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2005, at A1; Kenneth T. Walsh, Let the Horse Trading 
Begin, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 21, 2005, at 32. 
 2 See JEFF GATES, THE OWNERSHIP SOLUTION: TOWARD A SHARED CAPITALISM FOR THE 
21ST CENTURY (1998); see also JEFF GATES, DEMOCRACY AT RISK: RESCUING MAIN STREET 
FROM WALL STREET (2001). 
 3 See the present Article’s sequel: Robert Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic by Hamiltonian 
Means: Values, Constraints and Finance in the Design of an Authentic American “Ownership 
Society” (forthcoming 2006). 
 4 See BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY (1999). 
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on behalf of differing constituencies for differing reasons, and thus have 
tended to mean different things to different people.  It is tempting to 
hypothesize that it is just this fragmentation and this polyvalence that 
account, at least in part, both for the general idea’s recurrence and for its 
every time receding.6 
This Article is written with a view to synthesis and in the hope of 
permanence.  It is predicated on the premise that the notion of an 
“ownership society” is both so close and so important to us that we 
never have stepped back from it to view it as one whole.  We have yet 
to theorize it and pursue it as one comprehensive public project.  We 
have spoken more of “programs” than “societies,” leaving the ideal that 
animates the programs insufficiently articulated.  That ideal, in turn, by 
dint of both its being left implicit and its mythic resonance with who we 
like to think we are, often has prevented us from thinking through the 
detailed and pragmatic requisites of ownership.  And so it has resulted 
indirectly in some failures of some programs—and an undue pessimism, 
in the wake of failure, over what “society” can do to advance 
ownership.   
By drawing out explicitly the ways in which the mythos of an 
“ownership society” has made covert appeal to three distinct but 
overlapping strands that constitute our national self-understanding, and 
by illustrating how that rough ideal in turn recurs covertly in specific 
programs and proposals, we can lay the groundwork for a more 
coherent and enduring public project: the commitment to a broader 
ownership of value-productive and value-retentive assets by all of our 
citizens.  That commitment would seem all the more fulfillable today 
than in the past, in view of new finance technologies that scarcely could 
have been envisaged in the distant past.  All that is wanting, then, would 
seem to be the aforementioned synthesis and full articulation—and the 
institutional design that gives concrete, informed expression to it. 
If I am correct in this, then we are faced here—now that 
“ownership” and “society” are uttered in one breath, and now that 
“finance” can “engineer” what hitherto has not been engineerable—with 
a most extraordinary opportunity.  We face the chance at last to 
reconcile our longest-running, mutually antagonistic views of 
government and public policy.  We face the chance to usher in what 
might be called “a Jeffersonian republic by Hamiltonian means.”7 
 
 5 See MICHAEL SHERRADEN, ASSETS AND THE POOR: A NEW AMERICAN WELFARE POLICY 
(1991); ASSETS FOR THE POOR: THE BENEFITS OF SPREADING ASSET OWNERSHIP (Thomas M. 
Shapiro & Edward N. Wolff eds., 2001); see also RICHARD FREEMAN, THE NEW INEQUALITY: 
CREATING SOLUTIONS FOR POOR AMERICA (1999). 
 6 Perhaps such fragmented appeal and valence account even for the idea’s merely flickering 
appearance in one seminal work of political philosophy.  See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF 
JUSTICE 242, 245 (1999). 
 7 See Hockett, supra note 3.  The Jefferson/Hamilton clash figures into the discussion infra, 
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In Part I, then, this Article provides a brief elaboration of our three 
political self-understandings—what I will call the civic republican, 
classical liberal and pragmatic consequentialist traditions.  It 
emphasizes in particular the first two understandings’ shared and still 
compelling vision of a free—and freeholding—citizenry who jointly 
constitute a virtuous res publica, and the third tradition’s emphasis upon 
“results,” experimentalism, basic fairness and efficiency.  My claim is 
that these three traditions still, between them, add up to our vision of 
ourselves as a society, and that they are fully reconcilable for purposes 
of thinking through and bringing in an “ownership society.” 
Part II synthesizes one self-understanding from the three traditions 
laid out in Part I, with the aim of shifting from a retrospective and 
contemporary to a forward-looking point of view.  It braids the 
overlapping strands together into one coherent, systematic public 
understanding of what “ownership society” should broadly mean.  And 
in doing so it sketches two broad strategies for realizing that society. 
Part III then lays out the detailed contours, requisites, and full 
significance of “owning” in that “ownership society.”  In effect, it 
bridges broader policy to detailed program.  It does so by translating 
ethically intelligible “resource” and “opportunity” into legally and 
psychologically cognizable “asset” and “ownership.”  In effecting that 
translation, Part III arrives at more specific prescriptions and strategies 
for putting into place a distinctively American ownership society. 
Part IV translates Part II’s values and Part III’s constraints into a 
foundational financial engineering schema that amounts to the optimal 
method by which to foster the development of a recognizably American 
“ownership society.”  That schema, as the Article’s sequel will 
chronicle, is implicit in the most successful ownership-promoting 
programs that we have pursued to date—and now awaits is application 
in respect of spreading further asset types.  
The final Part concludes the Article and sets the stage for the 
sequel’s shift from ideological, legal and financial synthesis to policy 
and programmatic synthesis.  That shift finds its consummation in both 
(a) a consolidation and reinterpretation of past “ownership society” 
programs and proposals, and (b) a unified package of programmatic 
proposals of its own which share the strengths and skirt the weaknesses 
of those past attempts at realizing aspects of an ownership society. 
“Consolidation” and “reinterpretation,” “strength” and “weakness” there 
are understood by reference to those synthesized ideals and 
 
Part I.A, as well as in this Article’s sequel.  The idea here, in brief, is that while Jeffersonians 
favored a republic of freeholders of agricultural assets and Hamiltonians a commercial and 
industrialized society wrought in part through modalities of public finance, it now appears 
possible, in a way that it was not before, to engineer, financially, a republic of freeholders of 
commercial and industrial assets. 
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prescriptions that the present Article develops. 
The Conclusion also cautions against confounding “ownership 
societies” with polities in which we are simply “on our own.”  An 
efficient equal-opportunity republic, that is to say, is not to be confused 
with a banana republic.  My hope is that the earlier Parts’ full 
elaboration of our fully shared self-understanding, and of that 
understanding’s partial realization in informed institutional design, will 
have served to minimize the risk of that conflation. 
 
I.     OWNING UP TO WHO WE ARE: THREE POLITICAL 
SELF-UNDERSTANDINGS 
 
This Part briefly adumbrates three dominant traditions of 
American self-understanding.  In a crucial sense, these traditions 
constitute three comprehensive views of who we are.  Like others at 
least in respect of the first two, I call them the “Civic Republican,” 
“Classical Liberal” and “Pragmatic Consequentialist” traditions.  An 
American ownership society (OS) will have to be reflective of all three. 
 
A.     Civic Republicans 
 
Civic Republicanism (CR) and its late twentieth century 
rediscovery are well surveyed and discussed in the legal, historic and 
normative political-theoretic literatures.8  Here the focus is on CR’s 
basic tenets and enduring presence in American public policy.  
Ownership—or “freeholding”—figures prominently in those tenets and 
in that enduring presence. 
Like most ideological traditions, CR constitutes an integrated 
cluster of ethical, political and economic ideals.  It is the latter-day 
expression of an earlier-elaborated idealization of a particular form of 
life, lived by a particular segment of Roman society, prior to the coming 
 
 8 In the legal literature, see, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival, 
97 YALE L.J. 1539 (1988); Jerry Mashaw, As If Republican Interpretation, 97 YALE L.J. 1685 
(1988); Frank Michelman, Forward: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986); 
Frank Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493 (1988); see also other articles in 
Symposium, The Republican Civic Tradition, 97 YALE L.J. 1453 (1988).  Recent philosophic 
work with a republican cast includes PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM 
AND GOVERNMENT (1997); PHILIP PETTIT, THE COMMON MIND: AN ESSAY ON PSYCHOLOGY, 
SOCIETY, AND POLITICS (1993) [hereinafter PETTIT, COMMON MIND]; MICHAEL P. ZUCKERT, 
NATURAL RIGHTS AND THE NEW REPUBLICANISM (1994); MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM 
AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1982); see also infra note 21 (citations to the burgeoning literature 
on “deliberative democracy”). 
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of Empire from about 60 B.C.E. to 14 C.E.9  The idealization process 
began in earnest with the nostalgic Roman poets and historians of the 
late Republican and early Empire periods,10 then resurfaced in 
Renaissance Florence during the sixteenth century.  The loci classici are 
the philosophic and historic writings of Machiavelli and Guicciardini, 
who cast their city-state as a revived Roman republic.11  The 
Florentines’ elegiac theorization of republican Rome made its way 
northward, through the Netherlands and ultimately into Britain, over the 
subsequent century.  In Britain the most celebrated republican 
exponents were the Whig polemicists of the late seventeenth and early 
eighteenth century English “Country” opposition, notably Bolingbroke 
and Harrington, who deplored the era’s centralization of political and 
financial power in the Crown and in London.12  These writers 
assimilated the Roman and Florentine ideals to the “freedom-
vindicating” English common law, particularly in its storied Anglo-
Saxon form in which the local freeholder, as juror, played a conspicuous 
role in applying and sometimes nullifying, and thus developing, the 
law.13  The Whigs also assimilated the Roman/Florentine ideal to the 
agrarian way of life familiar to the English country squire.14 
Through Bolingbroke, Harrington and the pamphleteers and 
 
 9 See generally J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL 
THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975) [hereinafter POCOCK, MOMENT]; 
J.G.A. POCOCK, POLITICS, LANGUAGE AND TIME: ESSAYS ON POLITICAL THOUGHT AND 
HISTORY 80-147 (1960); J.G.A. POCOCK, VIRTUE, COMMERCE AND HISTORY (1985).  An 
entertaining recent iteration of this idealization is the Ridley Scott film, Gladiator. 
 10 See, e.g., POLYBIUS, ROMAN HISTORIES (W.R. Paton trans. & ed., 1960); TACITUS, 
ANNALS (R.M. Ogilvie trans. & ed., 1980); VIRGIL, ECLOGUES, GEORGICS (G.P. Goold trans. & 
ed., 1999). 
 11 See POCOCK, MOMENT, supra note 9, at 83-330; see generally NICCOLO MACHIAVELLI, 
FLORENTINE HISTORIES (Laura F. Banfield & Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr. trans., 1988); NICCOLO 
MACHIAVELLI, DISCOURSES ON LIVY (Harvey C. Mansfield & Nathan Tarcov trans., 1996); 
FRANCESCO GUICCIARDINI, DIALOGUE ON THE GOVERNMENT OF FLORENCE (Alison Brown 
trans. & ed., 1994); FRANCESCO GUICCIARDINI, THE HISTORY OF ITALY (Sidney Alexander 
trans. & ed., Collier-Macmillan Ltd. 1969) (1561); HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, MACHIAVELLI’S 
VIRTUE (1996); MACHIAVELLI AND REPUBLICANISM (Gisela Bock, Quentin Skinner & Maurizio 
Viroli eds., 1990). 
 12 See sources cited infra note 14.  On the centralization of political and financial power, see, 
e.g., NIALL FERGUSON, THE CASH NEXUS: MONEY AND POWER IN THE MODERN WORLD, 1700-
2000 (2001); JOHN BREWER, THE SINEWS OF POWER: WAR, MONEY AND THE ENGLISH STATE, 
1688-1783 (1988). 
 13 Juries, in this sense, of course constituted a form of partial self-government. 
 14 See HENRY ST. JOHN, VISCOUNT BOLINGBROKE, POLITICAL WRITINGS (David Armitage 
ed., 1997); JAMES HARRINGTON, THE COMMONWEALTH OF OCEANA (J.G.A. Pocock ed., 
Cambridge University Press 1992) (1656); JAMES HARRINGTON, A SYSTEM OF POLITICS (J.G.A. 
Pocock ed., Cambridge University Press 1992) (1700); see also ISAAC KRAMNICK, 
BOLINGBROKE AND HIS CIRCLE: THE POLITICS OF NOSTALGIA IN THE AGE OF WALPOLE (1968); 
JOYCE OLDHAM APPLEBY, ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND IDEOLOGY IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY 
ENGLAND (1978); J.C.D. CLARK, ENGLISH SOCIETY 1660-1832: RELIGION, IDEOLOGY AND 
POLITICS DURING THE ANCIEN RÉGIME (2d. ed. 2000); QUENTIN SKINNER, LIBERTY BEFORE 
LIBERALISM (1997); see generally POCOCK, MOMENT, supra note 9, at 333-505. 
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playwrights who popularized them,15 the images and ideals of the 
Anglo-European republican tradition exerted a critical formative 
influence upon the attitudes, the thinking, and the very self-conceptions 
of those radicals who led the American revolt against the British 
Parliament and Crown.16  Those same radicals included many who 
would frame and promote, as well as many who would oppose and 
resist, ratification of the United States constitution.17  Many of the same 
persons and their ideological descendents, in turn, prominently set or 
opposed much nationally formative public policy through the new 
American republic’s early decades as a nation.18  And as we shall see, 
many of their ideals continue, in only minimally altered form, as our 
ideals. 
Central to CR, again as to most ideological traditions, is a defining 
conception of human nature at its basest and most elevated.  And there 
is a corresponding view of the appropriate forms and roles of political 
and economic, therefore legal, organization.  To CR thinking, baser 
human nature seeks dominion, unchecked ownership.  It seeks dominion 
not just over nature for the satisfaction of one’s basic needs, but over 
more than what is needed.  Unchecked, the lust for power and property 
issues forth in tyranny, the grab for full control over resources, over 
one’s fellows—in essence, merely a species of resource—and indeed 
 
 15 Addison, Gordon, Sidney and Trenchard probably best known among them.  See JOSEPH 
ADDISON, CATO (William-Alen Landes ed., 1996); ALGERNON SIDNEY, COURT MAXIMS (Eco 
Haitsma-Mulier & Ronald Janse trans. & ed., 1996); JOHN  TRENCHARD & THOMAS GORDON, 
THE INDEPENDENT WHIG & CATO’S LETTERS: ESSAYS ON LIBERTY, CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS, AND 
OTHER IMPORTANT SUBJECTS (Ronald Hamowy ed., 1995). 
 16 On self-conception in this context, see, e.g., STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE 
AGE OF FEDERALISM 37 (1994) (“The sum of what [George Washington] was could be plainly 
seen in the appearance he made and the acts he performed.  And by the same token, ‘reputation’ 
had as much to do with his own judgment of himself as with that of his community.”) 
 17 The prominence of the name “Brutus” among the writings of the “Antifederalists” who 
opposed ratification of the U.S. Constitution, for example, is not fortuitous.  As slayer of the 
Roman Republic-desecrator Julius Caesar, Brutus, like Cato, enjoyed iconic republican status.  
See generally HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR (1981); THE 
ANTIFEDERALISTS (Cecelia M. Kenyon, ed., 1966); sources cited infra note 18. 
 18 See generally POCOCK, MOMENT, supra note 9, at 506-52; GORDON S. WOOD, THE 
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC: 1776-1787, at 1-124, 391-467 (1969) [hereinafter 
WOOD, CREATION]; GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 95-
225 (1991) [hereinafter WOOD, RADICALISM]; BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF 
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 1-54 (1967) [hereinafter BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS]; 
BERNARD BAILYN, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1970); JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL 
MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION (1996); ELKINS & 
MCKITRICK, supra note 16; see also DOUGLAS G. ADAIR, THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF 
JEFFERSONIAN DEMOCRACY: REPUBLICANISM, THE CLASS STRUGGLE, AND THE VIRTUOUS 
FARMER (Mark E. Yellin ed., Lexington Books 2000) (1964) (presenting nuanced accounts); 
JOYCE OLDHAM APPLEBY, ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND IDEOLOGY IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY 
ENGLAND (1978); JOYCE APPLEBY, CAPITALISM AND A NEW SOCIAL ORDER: THE REPUBLICAN 
VISION OF THE 1790S (1984) [hereinafter APPLEBY, NEW SOCIAL ORDER]; JOYCE APPLEBY, 
LIBERALISM AND REPUBLICANISM IN THE HISTORICAL IMAGINATION (1992) [hereinafter 
APPLEBY, LIBERALISM AND REPUBLICANISM]. 
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over all that one is able to acquire or subdue.19 
One’s fellows, however, offer one redemption of a sort.  Not only 
do they check the spread of one’s dominion; they constitute a means by 
which to check and to transmogrify one’s power-lust itself.  For one 
must reason—or at least must bargain—with one’s fellows if a constant 
state of wasteful war would be avoided.  One has, and to some 
unspecified Aristotelian degree is even naturally disposed, to cooperate 
with others to address the challenges posed to all by resource-scarcity 
and potentially wasteful, destructively competitive activity.  And one 
must deliberate, even come to share a common sense of purpose, with 
one’s fellows if one would work effectively with them through time.20 
The acts of deliberation, cooperation and coordination in 
communion with others transmute one’s baser human nature into 
something nobler in the CR story.  The desire for dominion over 
resources becomes productive economic activity and conduces to 
nongluttonous self-sufficiency—a partial liberation from, rather than 
obliteration of, the natural environment.  The desire for dominion over 
one’s neighbors becomes the sense of self-worth and fundamental 
dignity essential to effective, while not overreaching, action, and 
therefore to effective self-government.  Rather than a world of one or 
several power-maddened tyrants owning all and lording over everyone 
such as each person’s boundless will, unchecked, would seek, CR sees a 
world of many virtuous and sober nobles.  Each such noble holds a 
humbler realm—his “estate”—and each regards the others as rough 
equals in shared thought and action.  Will is modulated into “virtue”—a 
critical republican watch-word—which in turn is seen at least in part in 
 
 19 See BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS, supra note 18, at 55-93; WOOD, CREATION, supra 
note 18, at 1-83. 
 20 See POCOCK, MOMENT, supra note 9, at 462-505; WOOD, CREATION, supra note 18, at 46-
65.  On the importance of deliberation and community to contemporary CR, the title of one recent 
republican monograph is suggestive.  See PETTIT, COMMON MIND, supra note 8.  The literature 
on “deliberative democracy,” its self- and society-constitutive roles, its political virtues and vices 
have grown prodigiously in recent years.  See, e.g., DEBATING DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 
(James S. Fishkin & Peter Laslett eds., 2003); AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, 
DEMOCRACY AND DISAGREEMENT (1996); DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (Jon Elster ed., 1998); 
CARLOS SANTIAGO NINO, THE CONSTITUTION OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (1996); see also 
cites to SUNSTEIN, infra note 62.   An interesting, if modest proposal aimed at bringing a greater 
degree of reasoned deliberation back to American electoral politics is BRUCE ACKERMAN & 
JAMES FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY (2004).  In a similar though more ambitious vein, see 
ETHAN J. LEIB, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA: A PROPOSAL FOR A POPULAR 
BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT (2004).  Probably the most influential precursor of and contributor to 
the revived interest in deliberative politics and rationality is Jürgen Habermas.  See, e.g., JÜRGEN 
HABERMAS, REASON AND THE RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY (Thomas McCarthy trans., 
Heinemann Educational Books 1984) (1981); JÜRGEN HABERMAS, LIFEWORLD AND SYSTEM: A 
CRITIQUE OF FUNCTIONALIST REASON (Thomas McCarthy trans., Polity Press 1987) (1981); 
JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY 
OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1996) 
(1992). 
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social terms—in this case, the value of a social equilibrium of roughly 
equal, moderated wills and equal, moderated spheres of human action. 
Society and individual, then, are mutually dependent in a 
fundamental symbiosis to the CR way of thinking.  And both as cause 
and as effect, in turn, of the virtuous republic, CR sees each citizen as 
owning some proportional allotment of the aggregate of substrate 
resources—the stuff on which the peoples’ lives are made.21  As effect, 
because one crucial reason for and product of the binding together of 
persons into society is the stable apportionment of life-sustaining 
materials among potentially competing claimants.22  And as cause, 
because in order truly to participate responsibly on equal terms in 
shared public life, one must both hold a stake in the aggregate of 
resources with which public life is fundamentally concerned, and 
possess that dignity and self-respect and partial independence which 
such stakeholding confers. 
It is not surprising, then, that the idealized Virgilian or Virginian 
“yeoman farmer”—and that polity which he and counterparts had 
seemed to constitute in republican Rome, in post-Magna Carta England, 
and in parts of British North America—came to occupy a hallowed role 
in the CR imagination.  Arable land, at least until a century ago, was the 
productive, autonomy-conferring resource par excellence.  And it bound 
the owner to his community: the freeholder was a more noble and 
accountable, less exploitative and irresponsible figure than the 
“absentee landlord.”23  The early Roman citizen-soldier-farmer, 
beneficiary of Greek learning yet free of corrupting Athenian urbanity, 
was the very prototype of sober-minded, nature- and natural law-
respecting Stoic dignity.  And he was, of course, the prototype of the 
American “Minute Man.”  The Roman Senate was in turn the prototype 
of purposeful and public-spirited deliberation—as well, of course, as of 
the U.S. Senate.  And the seizure of power by, and the subsequent 
imperium and “mob”-dependence of, Julius Caesar and his successors 
constituted a mythic “Fall” of nearly Biblical proportion.24  It illustrated 
both the constant vulnerability of virtue to lust, immoderate acquisition 
and corruption, and the ever-present danger that virtuous republican 
political-economy and self-government might degenerate into 
 
 21 See, e.g., BOLINGBROKE, supra note 14, at 83-86; KRAMNICK, supra note 14, at 114-17; 
HARRINGTON, supra note 14, at 27-56; POCOCK, MOMENT, supra note 9, at 385-87, 539-45. 
 22 There is of course an anticipation here of the fictitious “social contract” more commonly 
associated with the Classical Liberal (CL) tradition adumbrated in the next Subpart.  I suggest 
below that this is probably no accident. 
 23 See William H. Simon, Social-Republican Property, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1335, 1343 (1991) 
(“It is the possession of land . . . which, linking the possessor to the State, constitutes true 
citizenship” (quoting nineteenth century French Republican Anne Robert Jacques Turgot)). 
 24 See note supra 17; see also BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS, supra note 18, at 23-26; 
WOOD, CREATION, supra note 18, at 35-36; POCOCK, MOMENT, supra note 9, at 52-54.   
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plutocracy, demagoguery and dictatorship.25 
Before turning to the enduring appeal of CR thinking in American 
political and economic life, we will do well to take explicit note of the 
ambivalent role that rough material equality plays in that tradition.  On 
the one hand, the place of egalitarian thinking in CR seems manifest.  It 
is the rough equality of human capacities, along with the rough identity 
of human interests and corruptibility, that render mutual support rather 
than mutual antagonism so well-advised.  And the coordinately 
idealized image of “every man [as] a king”26 (his home being his 
“castle”) implicit in the vision of that “sturdy yeomanry” which serves 
as backbone to republican self-government bears obvious egalitarian 
significance.  It is doubtless partly for this very reason that the 
ascendancy of “Jeffersonian democracy” in early nineteenth century 
America is seen both as a triumph of CR—Jefferson having been the 
arch-republican of early American politics—and of democratic 
egalitarianism.27 
Yet on the other hand, to remain with Jefferson for a moment, that 
arch-republican also held aristocratic pretensions, as did many of his 
peers including that other great republican icon, George Washington.28  
Both men actually owned human beings, moreover, and saw themselves 
as members of an almost “natural” ruling class.  That class’s lot—worn 
ostentatiously as “burden”29—was periodically to serve the people 
notwithstanding the alleged distastefulness of public life, then retire in 
noble dignity to their “ranches” or estates once national emergencies 
were past.30  Beyond that, what was to be done once all new lands were 
appropriated?  Were we then to take from the over-endowed to give to 
the under-endowed if ownership imbalances came to afflict the republic 
and threaten effective self-government?  This faultline over who should 
be “equal” and how equity should be maintained, possibly the product 
 
 25 There is an alternative take on Caesar, wherein he figures as the egalitarian hero.  See, e.g., 
MICHAEL PARENTI, THE ASSASSINATION OF JULIUS CAESAR: A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF ANCIENT 
ROME (2003). 
 26 The allusion is to Huey Long, the Louisiana Governor and presidential candidate whose 
egalitarian depression-era “Share Our Wealth” campaign so worried Roosevelt (and others) 
during the lead-up to the 1936 election.  See FRANK FREIDEL, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: A 
RENDEZVOUS WITH DESTINY 241-57 (1990); HUEY P. LONG, EVERY MAN A KING: THE 
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF HUEY P. LONG (Harry Williams ed., 1996). 
 27 See, e.g., DREW R. MCCOY, THE ELUSIVE REPUBLIC: POLITICAL ECONOMY IN 
JEFFERSONIAN AMERICA (1980); LANCE BANNING, THE JEFFERSONIAN PERSUASION: 
EVOLUTION OF A PARTY IDEOLOGY (1978); ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN 
(1970); SEAN WILENTZ, CHANTS DEMOCRATIQUES: NEW YORK AND THE RISE OF THE 
AMERICAN WORKING CLASS 1788-1850 (1984); see also ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 16, 
at 750-54. 
 28 See, e.g., ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 16, at 37; see also APPLEBY, NEW SOCIAL 
ORDER, supra note 18, at 125 (discussing the “elitism” of many Federalist republicans). 
 29 See, e.g., ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 16, at 37. 
 30 Id. 
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of incompletely worked-out ideals, possibly that of an incomplete 
commitment, runs throughout the CR tradition as it unfolds through 
American political and economic history.31 
Present-day historians are broadly united in attributing the 
essentials of CR to the political-psychological and interpretive 
predispositions of those late-eighteenth century Americans who led the 
revolt against the British Parliament and Crown and founded one of the 
first modern republics.32  The vocabulary, style of thinking, even style 
of dress of the American founders all were quite self-consciously 
republican in nature.  CR attitudes and thinking also are quite prominent 
in early policies and controversies advocated, implemented and/or 
argued over during the first decades of the American republic. 
Of greatest consequence for present purposes are early American 
land, trade and industrial policy.  One of the first American changes to 
the English common law was the abolition of fee tail and primogeniture, 
this with a view to broadening the incidence of freeholding across the 
population.33  Early efforts to restrict the franchise to land-holders also 
are well noted, if not indeed notorious. 34  And these need not be thought 
as inegalitarian as they are simply stakeholder-voter-oriented.35  The 
Northwest Ordinance, in turn, immediately opened federal lands to 
westward migrants.  The aim in this case was not simply to subject 
those lands to productive cultivation—a pragmatic consequentialist aim 
 
 31 See WOOD, CREATION, supra note 18, at 70-75 for more on CR ambivalence over equality; 
see also Simon, supra note 23, at 1347-48 (“Historically, republicans have been ambivalent as to 
whether just distribution of property should be treated as a subject of politics or as a prerequisite 
to it.”).  Simon notes one common form of resolution: “A frequent republican strategy of 
compromise—common to ancient Rome, revolutionary France and America, and nineteenth 
century America (as reflected in the minor land reform efforts of the Reconstruction and the 
Homestead Act)—has been to focus efforts to achieve economic equality on the distribution of 
land conquered from outsiders or confiscated from the losing side in civil wars.”  Id. at 1348.  
This strategy reappears at Part II, infra, as well as in the sequel. 
 32 See BERNARD BAILYN, PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1975); see also 
BAILYN, IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS, supra note 18, at 1-54; WOOD, CREATION, supra note 18, at 1-
124; WOOD, RADICALISM, supra note 18; POCOCK, MOMENT, supra note 9. 
 33 See, e.g., LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 230-57 (1973); MORTON 
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 31-62 (1977); C. WILLARD 
HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED 
STATES (1956). 
 34 See CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE 
UNITED STATES (The Free Press 1986) (1913); see also FORREST MACDONALD, WE THE 
PEOPLE: THE ECONOMIC ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION (1958); ROBERT A. MCGUIRE, TO 
FORM A MORE PERFECT UNION: A NEW ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION (2003). 
 35 Those who wished to restrict the franchise to landowners justified their positions by 
reference to the need for voters to hold “stakes” in the republic in order to vote responsibly.  See, 
e.g., MACDONALD, supra note 34, at 358-99.  Many of the same people advocated easy land-
credit policies in order to ensure that all who wished to work could acquire such stakes.  See 
Hockett, supra note 3.  Such people can be fairly described as both egalitarian and franchise-
restricting. 
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which I discuss below—and certainly not, in conception, to enable 
existing land-owners simply to enlarge their estates.  The aim was, 
rather, to foster the expansion of a populace of responsible republican 
freeholders.36  Jefferson’s Louisiana Purchase, of doubtful 
constitutionality but a perceivedly exigent opportunity, was actuated by 
essentially the same ideological vision—simultaneously egalitarian, 
national resource-expanding, and broad, productive ownership-
fostering.37 
Similar understandings prompted the Jeffersonians’—including 
Madison’s—opposition to tariffs on imported manufactured goods.38  
The republicans rejected tariffs not as early, pre-Ricardian exponents of 
the efficiencies of free trade, or as prophets of an early nineteenth 
century WTO.  Rather, they opposed them because tariffs appeared 
likely both to harm the interests of American farmers and to foster 
American industrialization and consequent urbanization—both of which 
the Jeffersonians rejected on CR ideological grounds.39  Jefferson and 
his many influential followers simply sought a different America than 
that sought by Hamilton and his allies.  Hamiltonians saw a more or less 
autarkic, independent state with a well developed internal division of 
labor and advanced industrial capacity, able to participate on equal 
terms with other economically advanced states on the world stage.  
Jeffersonians saw a nation of autarkic households, all of whom owned 
enough land to support themselves and purchase inexpensive 
implements from the “slave house” manufactories of Europe.  Those 
households therefore would possess sufficient productive autonomy and 
leisure to take part on more or less equal terms with one another in the 
strictly limited affairs of collective self-government.40  Yet both sides 
argued their positions in similar terms—the terms of CR self-
sufficiency.41 
In the end, of course, neither Hamilton’s nor Jefferson’s vision of 
America decisively edged-out the other.  And this, as we will see below, 
is because those visions actually are complementary.  Jefferson was 
more than magnanimous, he was in a way prophetic, when in his first 
inaugural he announced that “we are all republicans—we are all 
federalists.”42  What is more immediately relevant to present purposes is 
how Jeffersonian visions—even as the trajectory of economic 
development steadily rendered America more Hamiltonian and urban-
industrial than Jeffersonian or rural-agrarian—continued to resonate in 
 
 36 See MCCOY, supra note 27, at 185-208. 
 37 Id. at 76-119. 
 38 ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 16, at 133-62. 
 39 Id. at 375-449; MCCOY, supra note 27, at 75-124. 
 40 MCCOY, supra note 27, at 75-124. 
 41 See ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 16, at 133-62, 357-402. 
 42 Id. at 753. 
  
2005] OWNERSHIP SOCIETY  13 
American political discourse and public policy.43 
Perhaps most conspicuous among latter-day Jeffersonian national 
policies has been the Homestead Act of 1862, discussed at greater 
length in this Article’s sequel.  At a time when the United States already 
had begun to rival Britain as the most thoroughly industrialized society 
among the community of nations, and when the urban-industrial 
North—under the new “Republican” Party’s first president, Abraham 
Lincoln—was decisively and Hamiltonianly federalizing the nation in 
disciplining the ersatz-Jeffersonian, “anti-federalist,” plutocratic 
plantation-based agricultural South,44 national policy aimed nonetheless 
to take population pressure off of the cities, develop internal lands, and 
in so doing broaden the class of independent, responsible, productive 
freeholding citizens.45  The terms in which this legislation was 
advocated could have come from Jefferson or Harrington or Tacitus 
himself.46  Similar actuating aims prompted early proposals to afford 
each freed slave in the U.S. “forty acres and a mule,” these latter 
resources to be derived from the break-up of the large, extended 
Southern haciendas.47  CR thinking also is evident in the continual 
romanticization, to this day, of “the family farm,” “the small farmer” 
and his simple virtues in connection with federal farm and even estate 
tax-reduction policies.  And this is notwithstanding that such policies 
tend actually, nowadays, to benefit agricultural conglomerates and 
dynastic families rather than the humble Stoic free-holder. 
Chords similar to those sounded by nineteenth century land and 
trade policy continued to resonate, until early in the twentieth century, 
in labor and industrial policy debate.  While it is by now commonplace 
to associate labor and wage income in near Pavlovian fashion, that 
association was hotly contested through most of the nineteenth 
century.48  Much of the agenda of the labor movement up until the 
1890s did not concern itself with raising wages, shortening the work 
week or improving working environments.  Rather, that agenda aimed 
at abolishing the wage system altogether and replacing it with a system 
 
 43 See generally PAUL K. CONKIN, PROPHETS OF PROSPERITY: AMERICA’S FIRST POLITICAL 
ECONOMISTS 136-255 (1980);  see also RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY 
OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIALIZATION, 1877-1900 (2000). 
 44 See generally RICHARD FRANKLIN BENSEL, YANKEE LEVIATHAN: THE ORIGINS OF 
CENTRAL STATE AUTHORITY IN AMERICA, 1859-1877 (1990). 
 45 See id.; CONKIN, supra note 43.. 
 46 CONKIN, supra, note 43. 
 47 Id.  On the significance of the source of the lands, see supra note 31; see also infra Parts 
III.A.3, III.B.2. 
 48 See generally ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE 
REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR (1970); ERIC FONER, POLITICS AND IDEOLOGY IN 
THE AGE OF THE CIVIL WAR (1980); BRUCE LAURIE, ARTISANS INTO WORKERS: LABOR IN 
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1989); see also WILENTZ, supra note 27; CONKIN, supra note 
43; MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC 
PHILOSOPHY 168-249 (1996). 
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of worker ownership and consumer/producer cooperatives—early 
prototypes of today’s ESOPs.49  The displacement of artisanal and craft 
production by highly centralized, bureaucratically organized modes was 
seen, and constantly described, as a threat to the dignity of work and the 
independence of the citizenry—hence, to the enduring of republican 
self-government itself.50  Though it seems to be forgotten now, today’s 
Republican Party during its early years in the late 1850s—as well as, 
again, its first successful U.S. presidential candidate, Abraham 
Lincoln—were as opposed to “wage slavery” in the North as they were 
to chattel slavery in the South.51  And the most influential labor 
organization in America up into the 1880s, the Knights of Labor, both 
devoted itself to the abolition of wage labor and articulated its positions 
in starkly CR terms.52 
The same terms figured into late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century industrial policy, sometimes simply as advocated by sizable 
numbers of Progressive and Democratic Party-members and platform-
formulators, sometimes as actually implemented.  Woodrow Wilson’s 
“New Freedom,” for example, sought to diminish the size of at least 
non-”natural” business concentrations53 on grounds that, on the whole, 
less concentration meant more business-owners, hence more CR 
citizens.  Louis Brandeis, an architect of Wilson’s early policies, 
advocated business-fragmentation on the same grounds even where 
economies of scale might render concentration “natural” or efficient.54  
The early history of American antitrust policy featured arguments along 
the same lines, even to the point of permitting some forms of 
 
 49 See sources cited supra note 48.  For more on how the ideology of the cooperative 
movement finds expression in enterprise-organizational form, see HENRY HANSMANN, THE 
OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE 66-226 (1996).  For contemporary defenses and further economic 
analyses of cooperative and worker-owned firms, see, e.g., DAVID P. ELLERMAN, THE 
DEMOCRATIC WORKER-OWNED FIRM: A NEW MODEL FOR THE EAST AND WEST (1990); 
JAROSLAV VANEK, THE GENERAL THEORY OF LABOR-MANAGED MARKET ECONOMIES (1970). 
 50 See sources cited supra note 48. 
 51 See Abraham Lincoln, Speech at Cooper Institute, New York City, Feb. 27, 1860, in 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859-1865, at 111-29 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 
1989).  Some Southern political economists, in an irony attributable to the strange bedfellow-
making wrought by political disputation, found common cause with Northern advocates of free 
labor in their defenses of the life-conditions of southern chattel slaves as compared to those of 
northern wage laborers.  See CONKIN, supra note 43, at 135-67.  It is perhaps partly for this very 
reason that more purist northern abolitionists, anxious to broaden northern opposition to chattel 
slavery as widely as possible, sought to decouple chattel slavery from “wage slavery” as a 
national issue. 
 52 See sources cited supra note 48. 
 53 In the jargon of the time, “natural” business concentrations were integrated firms or 
conglomerates whose size could be accounted for on the basis of increasing returns, network 
effects or scale economies rather than collusion or predation alone. 
 54 The thought was that while horizontal integration might result in higher prices, the gains in 
dispersed ownership that it facilitated were politically worth that cost.  See generally THOMAS K. 
MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION: CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, JAMES 
M. LANDIS, ALFRED E. KAHN 80-142 (1984). 
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integration—resale price maintenance arrangements, for example, 
which resulted in higher consumer prices.  The reason was that such 
arrangements nonetheless facilitated republican freedom by ensuring a 
larger number of independently owned and operated retail 
establishments.55  Consumer interests—hence, lower prices and perhaps 
therefore greater social efficiency in the form of aggregated welfare—of 
course ultimately became the sole touchstone of antitrust policy.  But 
“producer” interests—at any rate, shop-owner interests—for a long 
while figured prominently, both in legislative argument and in court 
decisions, again for explicitly articulated, CR-grounded reasons.56 
We find CR thinking and its exaltation of nonurbane simplicity, 
plain-spokenness, moderation, hard work, productive virtue, 
independence and self-sufficiency in more than land-talk, farm-talk, tax-
talk and early labor and antitrust talk.  We find it in the continuing 
deploring of “dependency,” “indignity” and “laziness” which some have 
claimed to find associated with U.S. welfare programs prior to the “end 
of welfare as we [knew] it.”57  We find it in attacks upon “the special 
interests in Washington” and “beltway thinking” by the self-styled 
“outsiders” who run for (Washington, beltway) office.  We find it in 
some calls for campaign finance and electoral reform, and for an 
associated return to a more “deliberative democracy.”58  We find it in 
calls for “restorative justice” and “alternative dispute resolution” to 
replace “liberal” rights- and rules-oriented litigation, on grounds that the 
former, in contrast to the latter, foster shared understanding and civic 
cohesion.59  We find it in advocacy and implementation of term limits 
 
 55 Id. 
 56 See, e.g., Hubert Humphrey, Senate Debate, CONG. REC., 82nd Cong., 2d Sess., 98 (July 1-
2, 1952), 8741m 8823: 
Do we want an America where . . . all we have is catalogue houses? . . . Or do we want 
an America where there are thousands upon thousands of small entrepreneurs, 
independent businessmen, and landholders who can stand on their own feet and talk 
back to their government or to anyone else? . . . [The small enterprise] produces good 
citizens, and good citizens are the only hope of freedom and democracy.  So we pay a 
price for it.  I am willing to pay that price. 
Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315-16, 344 (1962) (“[W]e cannot fail to 
recognize Congress’s desire to promote competition through the protection of viable, small, 
locally owned businesses.  Congress appreciated that occasional higher costs and prices might 
result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and markets.  It resolved these competing 
considerations in favor of decentralization.”); United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 
526, 541-43 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring in part): 
Control of American business is being transferred from local communities to distant 
cities where men on the 54th floor with only balance sheets and profit and loss 
statements before them decide the fate of communities with which they have little or 
no relationship. . . .  A nation of clerks is anathema to the American antitrust dream. 
 57 See generally JOEL SCHWARTZ, FIGHTING POVERTY WITH VIRTUE: MORAL REFORM AND 
AMERICA’S URBAN POOR, 1825-2000 (2000); ALAN F. ZUNDEL, DECLARATIONS OF 
DEPENDENCY: THE CIVIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION IN U. S. POVERTY POLICY (2000). 
 58 See sources cited supra note 20. 
 59 See, e.g., ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION: 
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for legislators and executives, and the correlative deplorings of a 
“professional political class.”60  We find it still enshrined in our very 
constitution, in the Guaranty Clause.61  (Some find it in the First 
Amendment too.62)  And we find somewhat attenuated CR thematics at 
work in a great many proposals of recent years advocating 
“stakeholding” in the forms of employee-owned enterprise, “privatized” 
Social Security “personal retirement accounts,” ever more tax-
advantaged “individual retirement accounts,” matching-funded 
“individual development accounts,” “universal savings accounts,” and 
even lump-sum transfers to all newborn children or adults upon 
attainment of adulthood.63 
What most if not all of these disparate proposals and rhetorical 
posturings have in common are their idealizations of individual 
responsibility, self-sufficiency, civic participation, and in many cases 
greater relative equality on the one hand; their associations of these 
virtues with a secure, healthy, well-functioning, self-governing 
democratic-republican polity on the other.  Probably for this very 
reason, most of these proposals also exert a certain attraction over the 
thinking of “capital letter” Republicans and Democrats alike.  Again, 
Jefferson was prescient in proclaiming that, at least in one sense, “we 
are all [Civic] Republicans.”  I will exploit that fact below and in the 
sequel, in a synthesis of national self-understanding that can animate a 
distinctively American “ownership society.” 
 
B.     Classical Liberals 
 
Before the relatively recent revival of interest in CR and its role in 
the American political tradition, the role of classical liberalism (CL) had 
figured prominently in the work of an earlier generation of historians.64  
 
RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION (1994); MARY ANN 
GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991); GERALD N. 
ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? (1991); Carrie 
Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem-Solving, 
31 UCLA L. REV. 754 (1984); ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING 
AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN (1981). 
 60 See, e.g., JOHN MCCAIN, WORTH THE FIGHTING FOR (2002). 
 61 U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a 
Republican Form of Government . . . .”) 
 62 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH, at xvi 
(1993) (“Madisonian First Amendment” intended to foster a “deliberative democracy.”); CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION 162-64 (1993) (same); see also sources cited supra note 
20—ACKERMAN & FISHKIN in particular. 
 63 See Hockett, supra note 3. 
 64 See generally LOUIS HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA (1955); see also 
APPLEBY, LIBERALISM AND REPUBLICANISM, supra note 18; JOHN PATRICK DIGGINGS, THE 
LOST SOUL OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1984); STEVEN M. DWORETZ, THE UNVARNISHED 
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CL and its modern variants might in fact constitute the only ideological 
tradition more discussed, defended and elaborated through the years in 
the periodic legal and philosophic literatures than CR itself.65  Once 
again, then, we can here confine ourselves to laying out the broader 
contours, highlighting some inner tensions, and indicating some 
ownership-pertinent currents in American public policy that are readily 
appreciable as CL in spirit. 
CL has little—though certainly something—to do with 
“liberalism” understood in that pejorative sense employed by self-styled 
“conservative”66 pundits and politicians.  Again like CR and other 
ideological traditions, it constitutes an integrated cluster of ethical, 
political and economic understandings—understandings largely held in 
common by present-day “liberals” and “conservatives” alike.  As with 
CR, we find in CL a view of human nature, a coordinate view of the 
proper role of social organization, and thus a view about appropriate 
political, economic and legal arrangements.  Also as with CR, we find 
an ambivalence—now sharpened—toward equality.  Indeed we might 
view CL as a sharpened, streamlined version of CR itself, a successor to 
that earlier tradition in societies that have moved from being 
homogeneously agricultural to heterogeneously commercial and 
industrial in nature. 
On the question of human nature, CL is more subtle than CR.  In 
keeping with its relative modernity, it purports to be noncommittal on 
the metaphysics or psychology of the subject.  Yet CL would seem to be 
committed nonetheless to some conception of the self by virtue of what 
it demands on selves’ behalves.67  Central to CL is the concept of 
autonomy, the fundamental right of individuals to shape their lives, their 
destinies, their very personalities or selves.68  Hence the canonical CL 
rights to “life,” to “liberty,” to “the pursuit of happiness” and 
“property.”69  The first is the self’s organic substrate, the second its 
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 65 See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE (1980); RONALD 
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 66 The problematic relations between CL and today’s pejorative use of “liberal” is mirrored 
by problematic relations between classical (Burkean) conservatism and today’s “conservatism.”  
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AMERICAN RICH (2002); MICHAEL LIND, UP FROM CONSERVATISM (1997); GEORGE F. WILL, 
STATECRAFT AS SOULCRAFT (1983); PETER VIERECK, CONSERVATISM REVISITED (rev. ed. 
1962). 
 67 See SANDEL, supra note 8. 
 68 See sources cited supra note 65. 
 69 See THOMAS JEFFERSON, A Declaration by the Representatives of the United States of 
America, in General Congress Assembled, July 4, 1776, in THOMAS JEFFERSON: WRITINGS 19 
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sphere of unconstrained activity.  The third connotes the self’s self-
chosen ends in acting—in contemporary terms, its “plan of life”70—and 
the fourth is that material which selves must use in seeking ends and in 
becoming, shaping or determining themselves.  The notion of an 
“ownership society,” we will see, requires that we think about the 
proper boundaries of and relations among these four CL autonomy-
related rights. 
The only restriction of autonomy typically recognized as 
legitimate by pure CL finds expression in the proverbial kicker, “as 
consistent with the freedom of others.”71  Drawing the line of 
demarcation between legitimate autonomy and externality implicit in 
this formula of course has proved to be conceptually and practically 
perplexing.72  But intuitively the notion strikes one—at any rate the 
typical American—as more or less “natural.”  It is implicit in the 
familiar ideas that “what you do in your own home—though not in 
public—is your own affair”;73 that “my right to swing my fist ends at 
your nose”; that “I have the right to control my own—but not your—
body”; that “with freedom comes responsibility—the responsibility to 
respect the equal freedom of others”; and so on.   
The CL shrinkage of the locus—as it were the beneficiary—of 
autonomy from the CR household to the individual, and its counterpart 
expansion of the sphere of autonomy to all materials that might go into 
fabrication of the self—as distinguished from the autarkic familial 
estate—results in a metamorphosis of the CR conceptions of virtue and 
value.  Value in the CR tradition is that which is valued by jointly 
deliberating and cooperating freeholders sharing a more or less 
common, agricultural, form of life.  Ends, and with them value, 
accordingly are more or less homogeneous among CR’s constituent 
households.  It unproblematically makes sense to speak of “social 
value” in the CR tradition.  Value to unadulterated CL, by contrast, is, 
like CL’s constituents and their forms of life, more disaggregated and 
various.  “Social” value, in so far as the phrase bears meaning, therefore 
 
(Martin E. Segal ed., 1984); see also JOHN LOCKE, Second Treatise of Government, in TWO 
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 299 (Peter Laslett ed., 1960). 
 70 See RAWLS, supra note 6, at 79-80, 358-65 (rev. ed. 1999). 
 71 See, e.g., id. at 171-227 (discussing a “four stage sequence” for attainment of system of 
“equal liberty”). 
 72 Particularly illuminating mappings of the boundaries of self, responsibility and externality 
are Samuel Scheffler, Responsibility, Reactive Attitudes and Liberalism in Philosophy and 
Politics, 21 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 299 (1992); Arthur Ripstein, Equality, Luck, and Responsibility, 
23 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 3 (1994); and David O. Brink, Utilitarian Morality and the Personal Point 
of View, 83 J. PHIL. 417 (1986). 
 73 Billie Holiday’s formulation is particularly compelling: “T’aint nobody’s business if I do.”  
BILLIE HOLIDAY, ‘Tain’t Nobody’s Bizness If I Do, on GOD BLESS THE CHILD (MCA Special 
Products, January 1, 1995).  Compare to the CR counterpart referenced at Part I.A: “A man’s 
home [though only his home] is his castle.”) 
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comes to be seen as a dynamic composite of or shifting equilibrium 
among many distinct individual valuations.  Markets therefore ought, 
though oddly seldom do, to figure prominently as preferred sites of 
valuational expression and allocation in at least a thorough-going CL 
thinking.74  (Part II will exploit this role.)  They are sites where the 
aggregation of relative valuations of disparate goods traded by disparate 
persons potentially provides, in the form of relative prices, the only 
ethically cognizable relative “social” valuation of goods.75 
In the less market-oriented idiom more familiar to Rawlsian 
liberals, a “thick” conception of the good—i.e., a widely shared, more 
detailed specification of what constitutes the good life76 —yields in CL 
to a “thin” conception.  Under the latter, “the” good life is simply any 
life that is rationally planned in accordance with the autonomous 
agent’s view of what constitutes a good life.  “Comprehensive views”—
conceptions of “the” good life—are restricted to like-minded 
individuals, hence to the “private” realm.  “Public” life, by contrast, is 
governed only “thinly” by such minimal principles as conduce to each 
person’s roughly equal capacity to formulate and pursue her own 
“thick” conception of the good life.  It is as though the CR respect for 
the rough equality of “power” among freeholders has been modernized 
to respect for the rough equality of individuals’ “life-planning” or 
“happiness-pursuing” autonomy. 
One aspect of the CL respect for equal life-planning or happiness-
pursuing autonomy—at least where it is thorough-going and 
consistent—is respect for every person’s equal claim upon the stock of 
resources exogenously available for such pursuit.77  Full solicitude for 
CL’s right to liberty, that is, requires that special attention be paid CL’s 
right to property.  This takes us to the importance of the aforementioned 
liberty/externality boundary to the realm of ownership itself, not just to 
the realm of action: What one may own, not just what one may do, 
becomes a politically critical question.  The material implications of 
equality thus come to constitute yet more acute a matter for CL even 
than for CR.  Part II seeks to work a resolution to the problem in 
synthesizing CL with CR and with the other dominant American 
political tradition.  For the moment I simply wish to highlight the 
 
 74 See infra Part II.C; see also Robert Hockett, The Deep Grammar of Distribution: A Meta-
Theory of Justice, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1179 (2005) [hereinafter Hockett, Deep Grammar].  The 
first liberal-justice theorist to have called attention to the utility of markets as metrics for 
purposes of just distribution appears to have been Dworkin.  See RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN 
VIRTUE 65-119 (2000);  see also FREIDRICH A. HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 
(1948). 
 75 See infra Parts II.C, II.D; Hockett, Deep Grammar, supra note 74. 
 76 See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 6, at 347-50. 
 77 By “exogenous” here I mean what Part II.B, infra, defines as “ethically exogenous.”  
Roughly, that which is ethically exogenous is that for the holding or non-holding of which one is 
not responsible.  Holdings of such items are “windfalls,” not holding them “hard luck.” 
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importance of the problem to CL in its “sharpened” form. 
The liberal conception of the self as work of art can grow 
particularly nettlesome when attention turns to the artist’s materials.  
For CR the matter was in some ways simpler than it is for CL.  
Worthwhile life took essentially one form, namely agrarian.  
Households accordingly sought ownership of a more or less 
homogeneous good: arable land.  Rough equality in holdings of that 
resource was both a predicate and a goal of successful republican self-
government.  What to do, then, in theory was clear: Allocate land more 
or less equitably.  And rough equality in holdings of land, in view of its 
relative homogeneity, would have presented but minimal measurement 
difficulties.  It was only in practice that problems might have arisen—
problems rooted in the psychology of ownership charted infra, Part III. 
For CL, by contrast, where many forms of worthwhile life, not just 
agrarian life, are pursued, a greater variety of resource-types go into 
happiness-pursuit.  Those resources are heterogeneous, perhaps 
incommensurable.  Thus it is no longer immediately apparent what 
roughly “equal claims” to such resources can mean.  Add to this the fact 
that CL historically has emphasized community, hence mutual 
responsibility, less heavily than has CR, and it grows particularly 
puzzling just what “we” are required to do, if anything, about disparities 
in happiness-pursuing opportunity.  State action to redistribute resources 
in keeping with fair distribution principles, moreover, would involve 
organized coercion—the abusive use of which is something against 
which both CR and CL counsel that the citizenry remain ever-vigilant.  
In view of uncertainty, then, in addition to traditional CL suspicion of 
authority and CL down-playing of responsibility, concerted 
egalitarianly-motivated action can seem, superficially at any rate—
especially to those from whom the state might confiscate—an affront to, 
rather than a vindication of, liberal autonomy itself.  CL therefore bears 
within itself in practice, if not in theory, an ambivalence toward equality 
quite counterpart to that displayed by CR.  That ambivalence finds 
expression in the divide between self-professed “libertarian” and 
“egalitarian” adherents to the liberal tradition.78 
On the other hand, by CL’s own lights, it cannot be the case that 
we are required to do nothing about resource inequities.  It is “self-
evident” that one’s successful “pursuit of happiness” depends critically 
upon her holdings of “property.”  What sense is there in the claim that 
 
 78 Those commonly classed as egalitarian liberals include ACKERMAN, supra note 65; 
DWORKIN, supra note 74; and RAWLS, supra note 6.  There are of course many others.  The best-
known libertarian liberal is Nozick.  See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA 
(1974).  Again there are others, including, on some understandings of “libertarian,” Epstein and 
Fried.  See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985); CHARLES FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG (1978). 
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“all men are created equal,” and in the consequent exaltation of each 
person’s equal right to pursue happiness, if the practical capacity to 
realize that right might differ quite dramatically from individual to 
individual according to one’s birth, altogether faultlessly and arbitrarily, 
to different parents, into different educational and social opportunities, 
and so on?  For liberalism not to degenerate into mere libertinism, then, 
and for the freedom of one to be consistent with the equal freedom of 
others, some degree or form of “initial” opportunity- or resource-
equalizing must be advocated by the thoroughgoing liberal.  It is the 
counterpart, in the realm of material ownership, to the CL “fist and 
nose” question that arises in the realm of action.  Unearned inegality is 
externality as surely as is legally discouraged, tortious behavior. 
The CL tradition, complete with inner tensions, figures 
prominently in many of the seminal writings and debates that, in tandem 
with the CR tradition, both stamped and reflected the thinking of the 
American founders.  Most American secondary school or university 
students are exposed to the CL notion of a voluntarist “social contract” 
that has so influenced our society’s self-understanding from its earliest 
days.79  Most students probably also have been exposed to the writings 
of those sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth century CL philosophers 
from whom the notion derives, and are familiar with the influence that 
those writings—particularly those of Hobbes, Locke, possibly Rousseau 
and certainly Montesquieu—directly exerted over the minds of the 
American founders.80  Indeed, the best known product of the mind of 
that most celebrated of American civic republicans—Jefferson’s 
Declaration of Independence, from which the earlier mentioned 
enumeration of rights to life, liberty, etc. derives—is widely observed to 
read nearly as an abstract of Locke’s Second Treatise on Government, a 
classic liberal sourcebook.81 
The “individualism,” as distinguished from CR “solidarism,” that 
is characteristic of the CL sensibility also has been a commonplace 
among the “ordinary people” of America from early on in the republic’s 
social history.  That feature finds expression to this day in, among other 
places, the fact that our most frequently encountered interpretations of 
the aforementioned “social contract” seem to involve more conditions 
that we impose upon “society” in return for our “consent” to join, than 
conditions to which we agree to subject ourselves in return for society’s 
protection.  Probably the most authoritative historical observer of this 
American liberal individualism was, of course, de Tocqueville, who 
 
 79 Our written constitution and constitutional traditions themselves appear to have sprung 
from the contracts—or “compacts”—that were the early colonial charters.  See, e.g., KERMIT L. 
HALL ET AL., AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY: CASES AND MATERIALS 10-23 (1991). 
 80 See sources cited supra note 64. 
 81 Id.; see also sources cited supra note 69. 
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both charted the rootedness of individualism—hence, CL—in American 
communal localism—CR—and drew attention to the ever-present 
danger that the former might subvert the latter.82  We find this very 
tension singled-out and worried-over to this day, most recently in a 
spate of Tocquevillian-ringing critiques of contemporary American CL 
sensibility.83 
Probably those great American public debates in which CL and its 
tensions have figured most prominently have been legal—above all, 
constitutional—in nature.  Much of First Amendment jurisprudence can 
be read as an attempt by judges to demarcate classic CL boundaries—
the boundary between “public” and “private,” and the boundary 
between legitimate liberty and impermissible cost-externalization 
broadly defined.  With respect to the public/private divide, one 
conventional view of the courts’ Religion Clauses jurisprudence is that 
it is aimed simultaneously at safeguarding individuals’ right to form and 
live-out their “comprehensive views” of “the good life” free of state 
coercion, and at preventing the state from favoring some such 
comprehensive views over others.84  With respect to the 
liberty/externality divide, the courts have famously judged the 
proverbial shouting of “Fire!” in the crowded theatre to fall squarely on 
the externality side of the divide.85  But they of course struggle to this 
day over where “hate speech,” some forms of commercial speech and 
pornography, and political campaign expenditure fall.86 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment “substantive” due process 
jurisprudence tracks First Amendment jurisprudence in its puzzling over 
where to draw the line of demarcation between private and public, 
liberty and externality.87  Lochner infamously favored libertarian-liberal 
freedom of contract over egalitarian-liberal equalizing of de facto 
bargaining power and consequent opportunity.88  Those decisions of the 
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1930s circumventing or implicitly repudiating Lochner—not 
surprisingly through the collectivity-concerning Commerce Clause—
emphasized effects beyond the farm wrought by the farmer, so to speak.  
They did so at the forthrightly acknowledged cost of individual farmers’ 
more immediate and uncoordinated freedoms.89  The “civil libertarian” 
decisions of the later 1950s through the early 1990s90 resurrected 
substantive due process, this time on behalf of so-called “civil” as 
opposed to “economic” rights.  The latter, oddly, were—and oft still 
are—said to have been “discredited,” rather than simply incorrectly 
demarcated, by Lochner.91  Quite like Lochner itself, however, certain 
of these civil libertarian decisions arguably strengthen the autonomy of 
some by permitting perceivedly unjust cost-externalization onto others.  
To some abortion rights opponents, for example, it seems a mother’s 
rights to liberty and the pursuit of happiness since Roe v. Wade92 may 
inappropriately trump a living child’s—an “unborn person’s”—right to 
life itself.93 
It is of course not to present purposes to attempt a definitive 
solution to all public/private and liberty/externality CL conundra.  What 
matters for the present is to recognize that, in so far as we continue to 
struggle with these problems, we are classical liberals, sometimes with a 
touch of civic republicanism added to our mix.94  And we sometimes 
find our CL struggle taking place within the context of ownership 
itself—e.g., in debates over tax policy and in continuing constitutional 
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controversy over takings and “unconstitutional conditions.”95  What will 
prove more helpful in the subsequent portions of this Article is that 
nonetheless, where ownership is our interest, there is much room for a 
broad overlapping consensus among classical liberals and civic 
republicans alike as to how we should understand and foster ownership.  
We will also see that that consensus is wide open to our other 
constitutive political tradition. 
 
C.     Pragmatic Consequentialists 
 
Not all public policies need be advocated or defended by reference 
to systematic ideologies.  Probably most distinct proposals advocated in 
America—if not indeed in most English-descended societies with their 
empiricist, experimentalist intellectual traditions—can by dint of their 
simple instrumental purposes be argued to conform to any number of 
sophisticated normative visions.  They are simply “good ideas” in any 
number of senses, are value-wise overdetermined.  And this value-
overdetermination can itself be advertised as a value—a sort of meta-
value rather in the way that tolerance constitutes the CL meta-virtue.  It 
therefore would be convenient to recognize a residual or second order 
value-space in American public policy, additional to those determined 
by CR and CL even were “pragmatism” or “results-orientation” not a 
critical part of our American self-understanding. 
As it happens, however, pragmatism or results-orientation does 
constitute a critical part of our self-understanding.  We have prided 
ourselves precisely on our being a “practical,” as distinguished from a 
“doctrinaire,” “closed-minded” or “ideological” people.  And indeed the 
so-called “school” of “pragmatism,” as a philosophic orientation, 
commonly is said to have originated in America in the nineteenth 
century—among others, in the thought of Dewey, Pierce and James.96  
Americans’ best-known intervention in the realm of legal theory—so-
called “American Legal Realism”—in turn, for its part can be, and often 
is, viewed as a kind of “legal pragmatism,” or “instrumentalist” 
orientation toward the law itself.97  In the realms of law and policy 
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alike, then, Americans are thought to care about “results.”  We 
consistently have looked to likely consequences “on the ground” in 
addressing legal controversies and public policy proposals, and have 
prided ourselves for that.98 
Even self-described pragmatists, however, require some criterion 
or criteria by which, implicitly or otherwise, to judge results as good or 
ill.  Meta-values are not helpful absent values.  One place to look for 
such criteria on the American scene, of course, would be the CR and the 
CL traditions just discussed.  In practice, however, the style of thought 
that I shall call “pragmatic consequentialist” (PC) in the Anglo-
American tradition—including both the legal and the legislative 
traditions—has tended toward two simple, stripped-down focal points as 
“goodness” determinants.  It is these tendencies—both the tendency to 
settle upon simple rules of thumb, and the contents of those simple rules 
themselves—that most (though only somewhat) distinguish PC from 
CR, CL, and other policy-evaluative traditions.  We shall see in the next 
Part, however, that the PC rules of thumb are reconcilable with one 
another.  And we will see that, in so far as each is modulated by the 
other, both are consonant with CR and CL where the notion of an 
“ownership society” is concerned.  In fact, it looks as if the PC focal 
points are simply stripped-down versions of CL values themselves, 
rather in the way that CL can be viewed as a “streamlined” version of 
CR. 
The first PC focal point is aggregated wealth or welfare.  The rule 
of thumb associated with that aggregate is to maximize it.  The degree 
of success that a polity attains in seeking to maximize is the degree of 
“efficiency” that it achieves.  In its earliest formulations, this rule of 
thumb was proffered simultaneously with the second PC rule of thumb, 
considered infra, namely equalization.  As articulated by the first 
consequentialists in the Anglo-American policy tradition—Bentham 
and his “Utilitarian” followers—appropriate legislation and adjudication 
were such as would maximize “the greatest good for the greatest 
number.”99  Strictly speaking, of course, that formulation is incoherent; 
absent one particular happy accident that I shall in a moment specify, it 
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cannot guide.  For it imports two analytically distinct optimanda100 
while providing no instruction as to how we are to rank-order in 
circumstances—if any—where they cannot both be optimized.  As it 
happens, however, the divergence between optimanda is more stark 
where wealth rather than welfare is what would be maximized. 
Where welfare, not wealth, is maximandum,101 it often has been 
thought that a fair degree of equalization among persons’ consumptions 
is consistent with the maximization of aggregate “welfare,” 
“satisfaction,” “happiness” or “utility.”  Bentham and his immediate 
followers evidently believed so.  The guiding thought is that the more or 
less familiar phenomenon of diminishing marginal utility implies that 
“total happiness” is maximized if all consume a gracious plenty of 
consumables rather than if some consume a great deal while others 
consume little.102  “Fairness,” then, in at least a simple-minded, equal-
holdings sense, could be efficient in a pre-Paretian or Paretian, welfare-
maximizing sense.103  Hence some English PC-predecessor advocates—
including Bentham in the nineteenth century, Pigou and Lerner in the 
early- to mid-twentieth century—as well as some exponents of the 
“optimal taxation” movement in the later twentieth century, have 
advocated some degree of income-equalization as a means to utility-
maximization.104  But of course not everyone has agreed upon the 
implicit definitions here of “fairness” and “efficiency.”  Nor have all 
agreed upon the empirical question of the shapes of our utility 
functions. 
As it happens, there has not proved much enduring occasion to sort 
these matters out for purposes of mainstream American public policy, at 
least not in connection with utility-maximization.  For more 
fundamental difficulties attending utility-measurement and interpersonal 
comparison—difficulties we shall treat of more in Part II—themselves 
resulted in rapid movement, by the early middle twentieth century, on 
the part of consequentialists from Utilitarian aggregation to another 
form of aggregation—that of “wealth”—and thus to a new criterion of 
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efficiency, namely so-called Kaldor-Hicks efficiency.105  Roughly, the 
idea here was that dollar (or pound sterling) value is a close enough 
proxy for happiness, while being more readily measurable both in 
aggregate and as between persons in the holding, as to constitute a more 
appropriate maximandum for purposes of policy. 
For a number of reasons and in a number of ways, this shift from 
welfare to wealth has proved ethically and indeed conceptually 
unsatisfactory, though that has not deterred some PC advocates.  First, 
the continued focus upon aggregate-maximization subjects wealth-
maximization to the same potential distributive fairness and ethical 
intelligibility problems that plague strict Utilitarianism.106  But second, 
the shift to wealth as maximand severs the link between equality and 
efficiency that Utilitarianism could boast, at least given certain 
properties of utility functions.  For while diminishing marginal utility 
might mean that more equitable distribution yields higher aggregate 
utility, it does not mean that more equitable distribution yields higher 
wealth.  Relatedly, the shift from welfare-maximization to wealth-
maximization renders maximization more overtly fetishistic; we’re 
maximizing a physical substance, not a spuriously personified 
“society’s” purported “pleasure.”  And it invites analytic incoherence, 
as manifest in the notorious proof that two distributions can be Kaldor-
Hicks superior to one another.107  We will address such problems 
squarely, with a view to solving them for the American OS, in the next 
Part.  For present American tradition-mapping purposes, it suffices 
simply to highlight this fact: that a conspicuous strand of the American 
PC tradition in legal and policy discussion is what we can call the 
“wealth-maximizing,” or “GDP-max” strand.  Lawyers of course will 
recognize the prominence of this strand in the “law and economics” 
movement.108  Followers of policy debate more generally will recognize 
the presence of such thinking in the oft-encountered justifications of 
policies or proposals in terms of their effects upon aggregated 
“economic growth.”  And they will find it implicit in constant 
recitations of GDP, DJI, “productivity” and other aggregate-related 
figures in both policy debates and daily news reports. 
The second PC focal point in the American legal and policy 
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of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939); John R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 
ECON. J. 696 (1939); John Hicks, The Valuation of the Social Income, 7 ECONOMICA 105 (1940). 
 106 More on this infra, Part II.D. 
 107 See Tibor De Scitovszky, A Note on Welfare Propositions in Economics, 9 REV. ECON. 
STUD. 77, 88 (1941); see also HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 405-07 (3d ed. 
1992). 
 108 See Richard Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics and Social Theory, 8 J. LEG. STUD. 487 
(1979); Richard Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency Norm in Common Law 
Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 487 (1980) [hereinafter Posner, Ethical Basis], in which Posner 
acknowledges that “wealth-maximization” is policy made pursuant to the Kaldor-Hicks criterion. 
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tradition is fairness.  Even aggregationists often seek to justify, or 
mitigate, their maximizing prescriptions by reference to fairness-
importing or other distribution-germane observations.  We saw this 
already in connection with egalitarian utility-maximizers.  Examples in 
the realm of wealth-maximization include such wearying adages as that 
“a rising tide lifts all boats”; that maximized wealth “trickles down”; 
that “the poor are lazy” or otherwise fault-worthy; that those who are 
paid most are those who contribute most (i.e., that they are paid 
according to their marginal product); that all persons “would” consent 
to wealth-maximization as social choice rule were they selecting such 
rules from behind a veil of ignorance; and so on.109  All of these familiar 
claims suggest that aggregationists are aware, however obliquely, of the 
ethically objectionable fetishism that characterizes maximization when 
employed as a rule of thumb when that rule is stripped of distribution or 
fairness considerations as co-operative constitutive concerns. 
But even apart from such fairness-hedging of the aggregationist 
position, we find fairness-oriented or prioritarian110 legislation and 
jurisprudence themselves as principal kinds additional to those geared 
toward wealth-maximization.  Indeed, probably the most long-
remembered, epoch-making court-decisions and legislation of recent 
decades are of this type—or of the type that can be viewed as 
simultaneously maximizing and equalizing.  The social insurance 
programs put into place during the New Deal, the Employment Act of 
1946, the “War on Poverty” and “Great Society” legislation of the 
1960s, and much of the civil rights and anti-discrimination legislation of 
the 1940s through the 1990s are among the best-known cases in point. 
We shall see in the next Part that maximization of any wealth that 
is conceptually cognizable—rather than simply labeled—as wealth is 
complementary with the equalization of—i.e., the fair distribution of—
wealth-creating opportunity.  That complementarity is central to 
showing PC’s rules of thumb as CR- and CL-resonant norms. 
 
 
 
 109 See, e.g., Posner, Ethical Basis, supra note 108.  The veiled-consent argument has of 
course appeared (rather earlier) in the writings of utility-maximizers as well.  See John Harsanyi, 
Cardinal Welfare, Individualistic Ethics, and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 63 J. POL. 
ECON. 309 (1955); John Harsanyi, Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory of 
Risk-Taking, 61 J. POL. ECON. 434 (1953); William Vickrey, Utility, Strategy, and Social 
Decision Rules, 74 Q. J. ECON. 507 (1960). 
 110 “Prioritarian” policies are such as would benefit the perceivedly worst-off.  Rawls’s 
“difference principle” is prioritarian in this sense, as are the U.S. Internal Revenue Code and the 
Social Security system.  See generally Derek Parfit, Equality or Priority?, The Lindley Lecture, 
University of Kansas (1991).  Rawls’s “difference principle,” pursuant to which only such 
departures from inequality of holdings as inure to the benefit of the “worst off” are to be 
permitted, is elaborated in RAWLS, supra note 6, at 65-73. 
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II.     DRAWING OUT THE COMMON CORE: OUR EFFICIENT 
EQUAL-OPPORTUNITY REPUBLIC 
 
An ownership society that we can call our own should give 
expression, in so far as it is possible, to the three political traditions that 
constitute our national self-understanding.  With a view to that end, this 
Part synthesizes a unified political self-understanding from the three 
traditions of American self-understanding laid out in Part I.  It does not 
pretend to find agreement among the three traditions in respect of all 
points that matter to them.  The claim is simply that the three traditions 
can be seen as one on the question of what an American “ownership 
society” (hereinafter “OS”) should be.  What is needed is first to show 
that this is so, and second, for purposes of mutual intelligibility, to forge 
a neutral vocabulary, usable by all, which prevents misunderstanding 
and incorporates the synthesis. 
The synthesis proceeds by attending carefully to three constitutive 
“variables” that any normative political tradition, if it is to be complete, 
must fill.  In particular, a tradition must assign values to those three 
variables if it is to specify the basic contours of an OS.  The variables 
that must be filled are the gaps opened by the questions (a) “who owns,” 
(b) “what is owned,” and (c) “by what general principle or principles are 
ownership rights determined.”111 
I claim that the three American political traditions adumbrated in 
Part I do in effect fill the gaps, albeit with differing degrees of 
explicitness, and that there is broad agreement among them in respect of 
their filling.  That means that the values assigned to the variables are 
effectively invariant among traditions, meaning in turn that my 
synthesis’s values are “our”—American—values where an OS is 
concerned.  The American OS is in that sense the joint product of the 
three traditions.  It is what we might call, borrowing from the language 
of all three of those political self-understandings, an “efficient equal-
opportunity republic” (EEOR). 
 
A.     Autonomy as Responsible Liberty 
 
All three American political self-understandings effectively 
construe citizens as autonomous, boundedly responsible agents.112  That 
 
 111 The variable-filling approach to theory-mapping also figures into Hockett, Deep Grammar, 
supra note 74. 
 112 In this connection, the recent work of historian James Block is both interesting and 
corroborative.  See JAMES E. BLOCK, A NATION OF AGENTS: THE AMERICAN PATH TO A 
MODERN SELF AND SOCIETY (2002); see also Hockett ,supra note 74, at 138-41 (construal of 
“distribuees” as agents said to be the modern trend in theories of distributive justice).  We find the 
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is what “liberty,” when fully thought-through, connotes.  Responsible 
agents effect or affect their own well-being.  But they also are 
constrained, to indeterminate degree, in so doing by features of the 
environments into which they are born.  Their inherited capacities—
themselves features of those environments—permit them wide, but 
nonetheless limited, latitude in altering or exiting their environments. 
As an empirical matter, this construal of citizens as agents is 
consonant with our own experience of action—of our “moral 
experience,” so to speak.  We experience ourselves and others as free 
and as freely choosing.  That experience itself is reflected in our 
familiar capacities to experience feelings of guilt, shame, frustration 
with self, resentment of others, and cognate emotions the reasonability 
of which presupposes the proposition that people often can choose other 
than as they do.113  Yet we also know that we and others are bounded—
constrained and affected—by our backgrounds and environments.  
Hence we also sometimes experience, again reasonably, feelings of 
mercy, forgiveness, and charity toward self and toward others. 
As a conceptual matter, the view of citizens as agents underwrites, 
or is coordinate with, our belief that others are to be respected.  It hangs 
together with our belief that others bear dignitary interests and certain 
fundamental rights—including that to liberty or autonomy—which are 
coordinate with such interests.  It is because we see others as agents, 
and respect them as such, that we hold them self-evidently endowed 
with rights not only to life, but to liberty and the pursuit of happiness—
the rights to build “prosperous” or “meaningful” lives.  That it is “their” 
pursuit stems from their agency. 
It is critical to note in this connection, though it seems to be oft-
overlooked at least in the CL tradition, that respect for others’ agency 
entails more than respect for their freedom to choose and to act.  It also, 
and equally, entails respect for their living with many of the 
consequences of their choices and actions.  It entails, that is, our holding 
others—again, boundedly—responsible.  To let others too often “off of 
the hook,” for example, with the observation that “they cannot help it,” 
would be to view them not as agents—active forgers of fate—but as 
patients or addicts—passive objects of fate.114  To let them never off of 
 
perceived value of agency reflected in popular culture via the increasingly common, though 
strictly speaking redundant, notion of the “free agent.”  That term of course figures frequently in 
descriptions of sports figures, but also, increasingly, in the popular business literature.  See, e.g., 
DANIEL H. PINK, FREE AGENT NATION: THE FUTURE OF WORKING FOR YOURSELF (2002). 
 113 See, in this connection, BERNARD WILLIAMS, SHAME AND NECESSITY (1993); Peter F. 
Strawson, Freedom and Resentment, 48 PROC. BRIT. ACAD. 1 (1962);  see also Scheffler, supra 
note 72. 
 114 See Hockett, Deep Grammar, supra note 74; see also Robert Hockett, Three (Potential) 
Pillars of Transnational Economic Justice: The Bretton Woods Institutions as Guarantors of 
Global Equal Treatment and Market Completion, 36 METAPHILOSOPHY 1 (2005); DWORKIN, 
supra note 74, at 285-303; Daniel Markovits, How Much Redistribution Should There Be?, 112 
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the hook, of course, also would be unreasonable.  Mercy or charity, in 
this connection, can be viewed as a kind of compromise, a reasonable 
compromise, which as agents we make with our recognition of the 
limitations of our own agency.  In circumstances that we recognize to be 
beyond the agency of nearly any among us save heroes, we “cut”—or 
recognize—“some slack.”  But to allow such exceptions to swallow the 
rule—to let the whole rope go slack—would be to eschew the category 
of responsibility, hence of respect and of agency, altogether. 
The appreciation of bounded, responsible agency ultimately 
underwrites the CR view of citizens as independent and acquiring but 
nonetheless corruptible and hyper-acquisitive beings whose 
corruptibility and hyper-acquisitiveness are modulated as they 
respond—and are thus rendered responsible—to others who are their 
rough equals in capacity and vulnerability.  It also underlies the CL 
view of citizens as autonomous but potentially over-reaching selves 
who impermissibly externalize costs in so far as they take more than 
their legitimate shares of benefits—selves who must therefore be held to 
account.  Responsible agency does not, on the other hand, figure 
prominently into the PC tradition.  But neither is there anything in that 
ad hoc and minimalist tradition that need contradict agency.115  Indeed, 
it will be apparent below that the only intelligible accounts to be given 
the familiar PC fairness and efficiency must be understood by reference 
to responsible agency.  Responsible agents are the only beings in 
connection with whom it makes sense to speak of “wealth” as bearing 
“value” and of “allocations” as being “fair.” 
 
B.     Responsible Liberty as Equal Opportunity 
 
The consensus view of citizens as responsible agents suggests a 
view of ethically and politically salient assets—what we shall see in 
Part III to constitute the stuff of ownership—as anything which citizens 
themselves autonomously value.  Assets are what citizens use in seeking 
their self-chosen ends, in “pursuing happiness.”  Salient liabilities, in 
turn, are just the converse.  If citizens are agents whose autonomy in 
defining and pursuing happiness is to be respected, then the assets that 
will be of concern to the laws and policies of the CR, CL or PC polity—
the EEOR—will be such distributable items as concern those citizens 
 
YALE L.J. 2291 (2003). 
 115 Utilitarianism, on the other hand, at least in its non-veiled, non-Harsanyian form, would 
contradict it by treating citizens as patients or addicts, i.e., as passive objects of policy or as needy 
desirers wishing that they were free of their desires.  See Hockett, Deep Grammar, supra note 74, 
at 191-205; DWORKIN, supra note 74, at 11-64 (“addicts”).  But PC merely borrows a 
maximizing imperative from Utilitarianism; it is not coextensive with it. 
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themselves. 
For purposes of a shared civic vocabulary in the EEOR or 
American OS, the best way to designate such items of concern—at least 
the desired ones (assets), so as both to denote them in agent-neutral 
terms and to render transparent the fact that their political cognizability 
is dependent upon their relevance to life-building agents—is as generic 
“resources,” or “opportunities.”  Those are the stuff of which 
worthwhile lives—as judged by independent, valuing citizen-agents 
themselves—are made.  Citizens do the life-making, and resources and 
opportunities are the materials with which they do that making.  
Resources and opportunities, then, are the material correlates of agency 
itself.  Construing citizens as agents commits us to the view that 
resources and opportunities are the “assets” that a political society of 
agents like the American EEOR must view as ethically or politically 
relevant.  They are that in which ownership rights should inhere.116 
It is critical—though again, seemingly oft-overlooked in this 
connection—that just as agent-relevant autonomy or liberty is 
responsible and accountable autonomy or liberty, so is agent-relevant 
resource or opportunity equitable resource or opportunity.  
Opportunity-equality is the material correlate of agent-responsibility, 
just as opportunity shorn of equality is liberty shorn of responsibility, 
which is libertinism.117  One is not responsive to the agency of others—
one does not think, opine or act responsibly toward or “account” to 
them—in so far as one, explicitly or implicitly, demands greater 
exogenously given opportunity than they.  One does not respect them as 
agents, as one’s moral equals—one does not even recognize them as 
agents at all, rather than as resources themselves—in so far as one 
makes or effectively commits oneself to such demands.118  Call this the 
“equal opportunity principle” (EOP). 
As abstract propositions, these claims, like the construal of citizens 
as agents, all are consonant with the constitutive valuations of the CR, 
CL and PC traditions, hence of the American tradition.  CR is 
inchoately rooted, as observed in Part I.A, in an equilibrium of roughly 
equally empowered persons who would grab all the land that they 
physically could were they not constrained by others’ equal grabbing.  
CL in turn is rooted, as observed at Part I.B, ultimately in the notion of 
an equilibrium of equal freedoms—practical, not just theoretic 
freedoms—held by equal agents.  And PC, as noted at Part I.C, settles 
 
 116 Part III, infra, is devoted to the more precise legal contours and psychological significance 
of ownership in the EEOR or American OS. 
 117 “Libertarianism,” as articulated by such as NOZICK, supra note 78, and EPSTEIN, supra 
note 78, is libertinism—irresponsible liberalism, attending to liberty while ignoring responsible 
liberty. 
 118 Nor of course does one respect one’s self, or act responsibly toward oneself or toward 
others, in so far as one does not honor one’s own equal right to equal opportunity as well. 
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on the focal points of fairness and efficiency in its assessments of such 
public policies as effect distributions of benefit; while fairness and 
efficiency, we shall see, in turn are best construed as properties of 
distributions that reflect equality of opportunity and differential result of 
differential responsible diligence.  In theory, then, all three American 
political self-understandings effectively commit themselves to equal 
“real” or “material”—not just formal—opportunity. 
It might be thought that there cannot be a consensus view among 
CR, CL and PC on the matter of responsible liberty’s entailing equal 
opportunity, at least in so far as the latter term is taken to embrace 
material resources.  For there does not appear to be an easy consensus 
even within each of these traditions on the appropriate distribution of 
the latter.  Did not Part I, in fact, take explicit note of “ambivalence” in 
CR, CL and PC over equality?  In fact, however, the appearance of 
disagreement within traditions is misleading.  That appearance owes to 
two related factors. 
The first and more easily dispatched factor is a semantic ambiguity 
in the term “resource”—an ambiguity that also can afflict the term 
“opportunity,” though it tends not to do so owing to the more common 
“default” understanding of the term.  “Resource” or “opportunity” can 
be taken to denote anything that enters into a “production function,” 
irrespective of the circumstances under which the producer has acquired 
that “input.”  Or it can be taken to denote only such inputs for the 
possession of which the producer is not actually responsible.  We tend 
generally to understand “opportunity” in the latter sense, “resource” 
often in the former sense, though it is not strictly incorrect to understand 
either word in either sense. 
In order to eliminate the semantic ambiguity, I generically 
employ—and hereby propose that the EEOR or American OS employ—
the modifier “ethically endogenous” to designate resources and 
opportunities for the enjoyment or holding of which agents can 
reasonably be held responsible.  I propose “ethically exogenous” to 
designate those for which they cannot.  Ethically exogenous 
opportunities or resources are “windfalls”; ethically exogenous deficits 
are “hard luck.”  Ethically endogenous opportunities, resources or 
deficits therein have been “earned,” or are “deserved.”  The ethically 
endogenous component of one’s holdings, then, is that component for 
the holding of which the citizen, conceived as a responsible agent, is 
appropriately credited or debited—held ethically deserving or 
accountable.  So far as we know or are led by our experience of agency 
to suppose, she could voluntarily have acted or felt, and thus held, 
differently.  And it is profoundly to disrespect her fundamental 
agency—to treat her as a passive object of fate rather than as an active, 
fate-altering agent—to hold otherwise. 
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The ethically exogenous portion of one’s holdings is that portion 
for which she is not responsible—that portion over the holding of which 
there is good reason to suppose, in view of our experience of agency, 
that she bore no choice, or for which she deserves no credit or blame.  
And it is profoundly disrespectful of her equal ethical standing, prior to 
acting, not to regard her unequal holdings of this material, vis-a-vis 
other citizens, as actionable absent some compelling countervailing 
consideration.  It is disrespectful of citizens’ responsible agency, then—
their equal self-constitutive rights, their equal liberty, their equal worth, 
their equal moral autonomy and equal accountability—not to work to 
equalize, so far as this is possible, their ethically exogenous resources or 
opportunities.  And it is equally disrespectful of citizens’ responsible 
agency not to respect variations—inequalities—in their holdings of 
ethically endogenous opportunity or resource—i.e., opportunities or 
resources that they have opened or created or squandered for 
themselves, items that they have earned or forgone.119 
The second, more difficult factor that sometimes gives rise to an 
appearance of disagreement is implicit in the just-drawn 
endogeneity/exogeneity divide itself.  And it is indeed implicit in the 
earlier characterization of agency itself as “bounded.”  That factor is the 
difficulty, at least at the margins, of drawing the boundary.  We might 
call this the “tracing” problem—the problem of tracing portions of 
one’s holdings separately back to ethically endogenous choice and 
ethically exogenous circumstance.  Where the problem gives rise to 
disagreement, we might call that disagreement, borrowing the 
suggestive language of the American Homesteading era, the “boundary 
dispute.”  (I shall employ both locutions.)  It is, in fact, simply the 
difficulty noted above, at Part I.B, in connection with CL’s conundra 
over the private/public and autonomy/externality divides.  The same 
difficulty, in fuzzier form, we observed in the CR and PC traditions.  
The EEOR or American OS must face it head-on. 
The tracing problem bears both a conceptual and an empirical 
aspect, though both aspects intermeld.  The conceptual aspect of the 
problem comes in part with our uncertainty, in “borderline” cases, over 
what it is appropriate to hold people responsible for.  There is 
uncertainty first over whether responsibility should be understood by 
reference to choice or to what might be called “ratification.”120  And 
 
 119 See Hockett, Deep Grammar, supra note 74, at 1318, for more on the trend among those 
there labeled “responsibility-tracing” justice-theorists to alight upon functional equivalents to this 
divide.  Those functional equivalents take the form of (a) particular characterizations of 
distribuenda—that which is distributed—(b) particular characterizations of the appropriate 
distribution principle, or (c) both. 
 120 I adopt the term “ratification” here from the law for what I think will be obvious reasons.  
The choice versus ratification controversy is rooted in the perceived disrespect of agency entailed 
by not holding someone responsible for such conditions as she might not have chosen but with 
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there is uncertainty second over, if the answer be choice, what choices 
truly are “freely” made.  In so far as choice is made the touchstone, the 
conceptual aspect of the tracing problem mingles with the empirical 
aspect of the same.  The problem is that there appear to be differing 
degrees of freedom inhering in differing choices.  One is not simply free 
or unfree; rather, one is more free or less free in making one’s choices.  
The concept of responsibility is thus subject to problems in the 
application familiar to students of the “logic of vagueness” since the 
time of the Sorites paradox at latest.121 
Compounding the Sorites-side of the empirical aspect of the 
tracing problem is the fact that most resources or opportunities that one 
enjoys are the product of concatenated occurrences involving both 
chance and choice.  Thus, even were it easy, in a binary manner, to 
describe any one choice simply as either freely made or forced, it 
nonetheless would be daunting to parse out, say, some fraction f of 
one’s holdings attributable solely to her responsible choices and a 
complement 1– f of that fraction attributable simply to fortune.  Add to 
this concern the fact that it might be difficult or even impossible—
owing to interpersonal utility-comparability and inter-item 
commensurability difficulties of the sort flagged above at Part I.C and 
 
which she nonetheless identifies.  Forcing an equal distribution upon an ascetically minded 
cripple, for example, notwithstanding his belief in the virtue of a life of self-denial, is thought by 
some to be disrespectful of the ascetic cripple’s agency even if he did not choose his handicap and 
even if his belief in the virtue of self-denial be in the nature of a “virtue made of necessity”—a 
convenient rationalization or endogenous preference.  Dworkin and Scanlon probably are the best 
known adherents to what I am calling the ratification view.  See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 74, at 
285-303; T. M. Scanlon, The Significance of Choice, in 8 THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN 
VALUES 149, 151 (Sterling McMurrin ed., 1988); T. M. Scanlon, Preference and Urgency, 72 J. 
PHIL. 655 (1975).  Well-known anti-ratificationists include G. A. Cohen and Amartya Sen.  See 
G. A. Cohen, On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice, 99 ETHICS 906 (1989); AMARTYA SEN, The 
Standard of Living: Lecture I, Concepts and Critiques, in THE STANDARD OF LIVING 11 (1987).  
We need not resolve the choice versus ratification dispute to proceed with the EEOR.  For one 
thing, the problem is restricted in scope.  For another thing, it seems fair enough simply to regard 
ratification in most circumstances as itself a choice; certainly that would seem to be the view 
most in harmony with the construal of citizens as agents, though we might make allowances in 
marginal cases similar to those we make for addiction.  For more on endogenous preferences, on 
which there is a vast amount of literature but about which I shall say no more in this Article, see, 
for example, Hockett, Deep Grammar, supra note 74; GARY BECKER, ACCOUNTING FOR TASTES 
(1996); JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS (1979) [hereinafter ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE 
SIRENS]; JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES (1983); ROBERT FRANK, LUXURY FEVER: WHY MONEY 
FAILS TO SATISFY IN AN ERA OF EXCESS (1999); DAVID GEORGE, PREFERENCE POLLUTION: 
HOW MARKETS CREATE THE DESIRES WE DISLIKE (2001). 
 121 The Sorites problem is the well-known conundrum concerning how many grains of sand it 
takes to constitute a beach, how few hairs Socrates must have on his pate before he will be 
considered bald, etc.  Logicians have by now developed sophisticated techniques for handling 
predicates with vague contours, including so-called “fuzzy logics,” which now are proving 
fruitful in artificial intelligence and other cybernetic fields.  For the usability of such non-standard 
logics for purposes of welfare economics and justice theory, see Robert Hockett, Primary Goods, 
Interpersonal Comparisons and Nonstandard Logics (unpublished manuscript, under revision for 
ECON. & PHIL.). 
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elaborated below at Part II.C—to attach a specific dollar value to such 
portions for purposes of determining adequate compensation for the 
exogenously underendowed, and it grows quickly unsurprising that 
there is at least some degree of surface disagreement not just in the 
American, but in most political traditions over who should own what. 
Such difficulties should not, however, obscure the fact that there is 
broad agreement within and among the American political traditions 
over the basic principles here stated.  As Americans, we are nearly if not 
fully unanimous in our belief that citizen-agents should both enjoy 
equal opportunity and be entitled to keep what they legitimately earn.  
Our disagreements are, in significant if not in full measure, over the 
empirics of what actually is earned.122  Immediately below I shall 
exploit that fact, on behalf of the American OS, in two ways: First I 
shall specify some classes of holdings that we broadly agree to be both 
measurable and ethically exogenous in the holding, and rest EEOR 
ownership prescriptions in part on that range.123  And second, I shall 
sketch a Walrasian market mechanism, set in motion within that range 
of agreement, which, by honoring citizens as agents and the EOP as 
allocation principle, further addresses the measurement difficulties that 
are in large measure responsible for the magnitude of the tracing 
problem as we currently find it. 
 
C.     Sidestepping the Boundary Dispute 
 
This Subpart seeks to quarantine the boundary dispute.  It does so 
by sidestepping the tracing problem that has afflicted each of the three 
American political traditions and that therefore threatens, by extension, 
our “core” tradition, the EEOR.  Three intuitions guide the effort.  Each 
one is manifest in its own section within this Subpart.  The first intuition 
is that there is an overlapping consensus both within and among our 
three traditions not only that ethically exogenous opportunity 
endowments should ideally be allocated equitably, but also that several 
easily ascertained classes of readily measured endowment 
 
 122 There is significant empirical corroboration of this claim itself.  See, e.g., NORMAN 
FROHLICH & JOE A. OPPENHEIMER, CHOOSING JUSTICE: AN EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH TO 
ETHICAL THEORY (1992); TOM R. TYLER ET AL., SOCIAL JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY (1997); 
ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL: EVOLUTIONARY PSYCHOLOGY AND EVERYDAY LIFE 
(1994); PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS (Barbara A. 
Mellers & Jonathan Baron eds., 1993); Kjell Törnblom, The Social Psychology of Distributive 
Justice, in JUSTICE: INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 177 (Klaus R. Scherer ed., 1992). 
 123 We can simply bracket those on which we disagree.  A similar strategy is employed, to 
helpful effect, by John E. Roemer, A Pragmatic Theory of Responsibility for the Egalitarian 
Planner, 22 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 146 (1993); see also JOHN E. ROEMER, EQUALITY OF 
OPPORTUNITY (1998). 
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unambiguously qualify as ethically exogenous.  Bracketing the more 
difficult cases, we can move ahead together on the ground that we 
share.  The second intuition is that much of the magnitude of the tracing 
problem is attributable not only to chance- and choice-melding 
opportunities that we can bracket pursuant to the first intuition, but to 
three measurement difficulties that hinder efforts to quantify and 
compare, in an ethically salient way, disparate holdings of all of the 
heterogeneous benefits and burdens that can be held by separate persons 
in the EEOR.  A market mechanism well known to economists 
specializing in fairness, I claim, enables us to sidestep those 
measurement difficulties not sidestepped by the first, bracketing 
strategy.  It thereby enables us to diminish substantially the magnitude 
of the tracing problem.  The third intuition is somewhat more technical 
in fleshing out, but is fleshed out nonetheless in Subparts C.3 and D.  It 
is that the ordered set of “second best” markets falling short in their 
completeness and neutrality of the ideal (“first best”) market sketched in 
Subpart C.2, is ordinally equivalent to the ordered set of “second best” 
opportunity allocations falling short in their fairness and efficiency of 
that ideal (“first best”) market.  The upshot is that even incomplete 
progress in the direction here advocated is ethically appreciable 
progress.   
 
1.     Core Opportunity-Endowments 
 
Here I begin the process of sidestepping the boundary dispute and 
thus moving farther away from ambivalence, and closer to univocality, 
on the matter equal opportunity.  I list and briefly characterize four 
classes of basic opportunity endowment that all or nearly all Americans, 
whether they consider themselves adherents primarily of the CR, CL or 
PC traditions, are likely to agree to be ethically exogenous in the 
holding. 
The first such class is that of opportunities for early education.  
Agent-citizens begin their lives as children.  The younger a child, the 
less responsible she is for her opportunities to learn, to develop her 
capacities to learn and do more, and to develop a sense of control over 
and responsibility for her own future.  As a matter of unadulterated 
principle, such opportunity should be equitably enjoyed by all children.  
Inequalities of such opportunity are to be deplored or regretted, and so 
far as possible to be mitigated or eliminated.  If San Antonio 
Independent School District v. Rodriguez124 was correctly decided as a 
 
 124 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (holding that inequalities in school financing traceable to differential 
wealths of families living in different school districts does not violate Equal Protection Clause of 
14th Amendment to the US Const.). 
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matter of law, then the “law” applied there is not in keeping with 
American values.  And if some parents believe that they bear a 
fundamental right to seek to advantage their children over others, then 
they are mistakenly interpreting fundamental right as not conferring 
equal agency rights upon either those other children or even their 
own.125  Their preferences are preferences for externalities, for wrongs, 
and are inconsistent with the American tradition of responsible liberty.  
This is not to say that equity need—or even ought—be sought by 
“leveling down.”  Rather, the guiding idea should be to maximize the 
level of provision that is providable to all.126 
The second class of exogenous opportunity endowment comprises 
genetic determinants, in so far as we are able to determine them, of 
successful life-planning, wealth-making and happiness-pursuit.  Such 
determinants include all—but only—such aspects of basic human health 
and functioning as are not attributable to decisions for which we 
reasonably hold ourselves and others accountable.  Birth with a 
handicap or predisposition to debilitating illness warrants everybody’s 
chipping-in to mitigate such handicaps’ or illnesses’ debilitating 
effects.127  Debilitation wrought by smoking, drunken driving, etc., does 
not—though of course it may elicit charitably provided assistance.  This 
is not to advocate a “rescue policy”—another instance of “leveling 
down”—whereby all must sacrifice near everything to attempt futilely 
to compensate “100%” those born severely underendowed, any more 
than the EOP dictates “leveling down” in connection with fair access to 
educational opportunity.128  The amount with which to address such 
disadvantage should reflect the aggregated and averaged social 
valuation of contingent claims payable to self-insurers against such 
disadvantage; such is the amount entailed by our agency.  That 
valuation in turn is determined either by simulating or by actually 
providing markets in such claims that bear the features laid out in Part 
II.C.2, markets in which uncertainty about such handicaps’ emergence 
is, in effect, shared.129  For present purposes the point is simpler.  It is 
simply that the American tradition of equal opportunity regards these 
resources as ethically exogenous.  And the advance of medical 
knowledge can be expected to grant greater clarity as to which of our 
 
 125 This is not to say that such is the motivation prompting higher education expenditures in 
wealthier school districts.  Moreover, as argued at Part II.B, the EOP does not condone 
equalization by “leveling-down.” 
 126 Part II.D explains why this is the only ethically intelligible form of maximization. 
 127 This value bears a venerable pedigree in the American self-understanding, as expressed, 
e.g., in the image of the Westward travelers’ allowing the old, the very young and the infirm to 
ride in the wagons while the able-bodied walked beside. 
 128 The “rescue policy” idea figures in DWORKIN, supra note 74, at 307-50; Ronald Dworkin, 
Sovereign Virtue Revisited, 113 ETHICS 106, 123-25 (2002) 
 129 See infra Part II.C.2. 
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infirmities, and to what degree, are beyond control.130 
Health, basic functional capacity and education can be regarded as 
elements of “human capital.”131  Equalizing early educational and basic 
health endowments is equalizing access to ethically exogenous human 
capital.  A third range of broad American agreement as to what is 
ethically exogenous can be characterized as access to non-human 
capital.  We can think of the right to equal access to such capital as the 
equal right to capitalize upon one’s own diligence, an equal right to 
wealth-creating opportunity.132  An equal right to wealth-creating 
opportunity, to work diligently in satisfying others’ wants and to profit 
thereby, is, trivially, a right to productive capital.  Human capital is of 
course productive in the requisite sense; that is the sense in which it is 
“capital.”  But it is doubtful that individually held human capital 
constitutes the principal portion of capital with which individual agents 
produce and profit.133  Access to ownership of or participation in firms 
and networks—the varyingly integrated institutional arrangements in 
which productive synergies of pooled and organized human and 
nonhuman capital result in wealth-production—surely is at least as 
important.134 
It is potentially more difficult to trace out the ethically exogenous 
and ethically endogenous elements of non-human captial holdings than 
of human capital holdings.  For unlike genetic endowments and early 
 
 130 For more on the opportunities, as well as some of the challenges, now being opened by 
genetic research, see generally FROM CHANCE TO CHOICE: GENETICS & JUSTICE (Allen 
Buchanan et al. eds., 2000). 
 131 For a wide-ranging study of the importance of at least educational capital to agents’ long-
term earning prospects, see GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL: A THEORETICAL AND 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO EDUCATION (3d ed. 1993). 
 132 “Wealth” in this context is characterized somewhat narrowly: The right to wealth-making 
opportunity would be the right to produce as to satisfy others’ wants and to be remunerated 
therefore and thus profit thereby.  “Wealth” could of course also be understood more broadly, 
such that a right to equal wealth-creating opportunity would be an equal right not only to produce 
remunerably for others, but also to produce the happiness in one’s self that results from the 
exercise of one’s capacities—a very “Greek” form of happiness.  See generally JULIA ANNAS, 
THE MORALITY OF HAPPINESS (1995).  I emphasize the remuneration understanding of wealth 
here pursuant to this Part’s aim to identify an overlapping consensus among the three traditions of 
American political self-understanding.  For that is the understanding of wealth that all three 
traditions share in common, while what I have labeled the “Greek” form figures more 
prominently in the CL than in the CR and PC traditions. 
 133 Assuming that such apportionment is possible.  See Part II.C.2, infra, on measurement. 
 134 There is no need to resolve disputes between followers of the heterodox “economists” 
Simon on the one hand, Kelso on the other, as to whether “knowledge capital” or “machine 
capital” represents the “larger” portion of the value created through productive organization.  See 
JULIAN L. SIMON, THE ULTIMATE RESOURCE (1996) (“human imagination” the “principal” 
productive factor); LOUIS O. KELSO & MORTIMER J. ADLER, THE CAPITALIST MANIFESTO 36 
(1958) (“Technological improvements shift the burden of production from workers to capital 
instruments.”).  Obviously both are critical, and what matters most is access on equal terms 
(“equal” understood by reference to ethically exogenous endowments) to productive relations 
themselves. 
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education, most non-human capital holdings are held by adults, and 
adults have lived and acted long enough for both responsible choice and 
non-responsible circumstance to concatenate and intermeld over time.  
Nevertheless, there are some elements of non-human capital holding 
that all can agree to be attributable to fortune, not effort.  Large non-
human capital inheritances or bequests are an obvious example.  They 
are non-human capital counterparts to genetic endowments.  Moreover, 
to recognize that many large holdings of non-human capital are 
attributable to luck in the birth lottery need not commit us to attitudes of 
envy or even to plans of confiscation.135  We can view the recognition 
instead as minimally committing us to channeling newly discovered, 
opened or openable pools of capital toward those who have not been 
born to large holdings already.  Examples here would include, among 
others, newly usable segments of the electromagnetic spectrum; 
minerals found on the seabed or under public—even some private—
lands; new resources eventually found off of the earth through publicly 
financed space exploration; and, once again closer to home, new social 
cost-saving and wealth-creating opportunities opened through the public 
facilitation of new forms of insurance against risks that antecedently 
impede enterprise- and wealth-development.  Such opportunities are 
counterparts to the “new” resources distributed widely and equitably to 
the previously less resourced by, e.g., the Homestead Act and the 
National Housing Act.136  The sequel to this Article elaborates on these 
and other precedents, some actually implemented, others thus far but 
proposed.  Part III foreshadows that tactic by designing policy strategies 
that capitalize upon endowment heuristics—in particular, our greater 
willingness to channel perceivedly “new” exogenous resources to the 
exogenously underendowed than to redistribute accumulated resources 
from the exogenously overendowed. 
The fourth and final category of opportunity/resource that we all 
can agree to be ethically exogenous is the opportunity to share ethically 
exogenous risk—a manner of “backhanded,” or “negative” benefit.  The 
idea here is that some misfortunes which strike after birth and that are 
not reasonably foreseeable during adulthood are misfortunes for which 
the victims are not responsible.  Such misfortunes are regarded, under 
the EOP, as joint misfortunes, at least until there is opportunity for 
equally exogenously endowed agents voluntarily to trade their shares of 
such misfortunes in keeping with their differential disvaluations of 
them—or the differential valuations, ex ante, of claims to compensation 
contingent upon their occurrence.  The intuition finds expression in the 
venerable American tradition of the neighbors’ sharing, before the 
 
 135 The envy charge is leveled in Elizabeth Anderson, What Is the Point of Equality?, 109 
ETHICS 287 (1999). 
 136 See Hockett, supra note 3, for detailed treatment of these and other programs. 
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widespread availability of farmers’ insurance, in “barn-raising” for one 
among them whose farm has been struck by lightning. 
Such “all chip in” arrangements, it has been well observed, are in 
the nature of rudimentary insurance arrangements.137  And a more fully 
developed and fine-grained insurance arrangement will reflect different 
participants’ differing valuations of the varying compensations that 
might be afforded in return for varying insurance contracts, which 
would incorporate varying risk-assessments and varying premia-
exactions.  Collective political action to distribute risk-mitigation 
opportunity in keeping with the EOP in the present day, then, ought 
ideally to facilitate the development of actual or simulated markets in 
such risk.138  But in doing so it must also, of course, impose or simulate 
ethically exogenous informational symmetry—fairness—among market 
participants.  Such information—that which cannot be had simply by 
exercise of diligence—is itself part of the ethically exogenous 
endowment that the EOP recommends be equitably shared.139  Under 
these circumstances, assessments and payouts will reflect, in effect, the 
averaged social valuation of the risks and payouts in which valuation 
process each citizen-agent has exercised an equal “vote.” 
Among the core endowments just discussed, human capital 
presents the least theoretic and practical intractability, at least where 
early education and unambiguously genetic incapacity are the focus.  
The non-human capital and risk-trading, as well as later education and 
mixed genetic-and-behavioral health outcomes, present somewhat more 
challenge because they involve adults, who have lived long enough to 
mix responsible choice with non-responsible circumstance in arriving at 
their present endowments.  But we nonetheless can agree over portions 
even of these latter endowments which involve only non-responsible 
circumstance—e.g., inherited non-human capital or entirely 
unforeseeable accident.  And we can expect advances in the medical 
sciences, particularly now that the human genome is mapped, to enable 
us to assign weights to comparative chance and choice factors in 
debility.  The same can be said of other forms of chance disadvantage 
which the physical sciences and refined statistical techniques 
increasingly will enable us to foresee and thus both head-off and 
 
 137 See, e.g., PARTHA DASGUPTA, AN INQUIRY INTO WELL-BEING AND DESTITUTION 189-217 
(1993); DEBRAJ RAY, DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS 591-619 (1998); KAUSHIK BASU, 
ANALYTICAL DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS: THE LESS DEVELOPED ECONOMY REVISITED 267-80 
(1997). 
 138 See Hockett, supra note 3, on programmatic means; see also Robert Hockett, Just 
Insurance Through Global Macrohedging, 25 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 107, 203-57 (2004) 
[hereinafter Hockett, Macrohedge]; Robert Hockett, From “Mission-Creep” to Gestalt-Switch: 
Justice, Finance, the IFIs and the Intended Beneficiaries of Globalization, 98 PROC. AM. SOC. 
INT’L L. 69 (2004) [hereinafter Hockett, Gestalt-Switch]; Robert Hockett, From Macro to Micro 
to “Mission-Creep,” 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 153 (2003). 
 139 See Hockett, Macrohedge, supra note 138, at 183-203. 
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attribute to the information accounts of our citizens.140  And we likely 
will be able to do so with no less precision than is attained even today 
in, for example, comparative fault determinations in courtrooms. 
In so far as we work to equalize core endowments, we advance the 
cause of our own American EOP.  We also facilitate the creation and 
operation of that complete and neutral market described in the next 
Subpart, which further diminishes the tracing problem and thus enables 
our opportunity-equalizing efforts to yield a “multiplier effect” in 
realizing the EOP and advancing the cause of responsible agency.  Such 
is the rough, practical goal that we all can agree to be in furtherance of 
the political-ethical consequences of our American commitment to 
equal opportunity. 
 
2.     Market, Measurement & Distribution Mechanism 
 
The next step in our quest for univocality is to specify means of 
diminishing measurement difficulties that exacerbate the tracing 
problem, while doing justice to the EEOR’s understanding of citizens 
and material opportunities.  This Subpart accordingly describes an 
opportunity-allocation mechanism, readily constructible in theory and 
approximable in practice, by which to do so.  We will see in the next 
Subpart that the mechanism realizes the only ethically cognizable form 
of “efficiency” as well.  It therefore serves as an engine for realizing a 
truly efficient, equal-opportunity republic. 
Begin by distinguishing three measurement challenges that 
historically have constrained answers to the constitutive questions 
raised by the EEOR-valued “variables” enumerated at the beginning of 
this Part.  Those questions, again, were: Who is to own; What is to be 
owned; and According to what basic principles such ownable things 
should be allocated.  For the generic purposes of this Subpart, which 
require that we consider what agents disvalue as well as what they 
value,141 this Subpart will call that which is owned a desired 
“distribuendum” (plural “distribuenda”).  Call the principles according 
to which such things are to be owned “distribution principles.”  (Recall 
that our owners are responsible citizen-agents.)  The American EEOR 
tradition views resources and opportunities as the appropriate desired 
distribuenda, and the EOP as the appropriate distribution principle.  But 
it has not always been agreed that these should be the values filling 
those variables.  And the reason is measurement.  Three distinct 
 
 140 See id. at 212-57. 
 141 Below we will translate disvalued contingencies back into valued items: specifically, 
claims to compensation contingent upon those disvalued contingencies themselves—in effect, 
insurance policies. 
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measurement concerns historically have influenced at least CL’s and 
PC’s treatments of appropriate distribuenda and distribution principles.  
Call them the simple quantifiability, interpersonal comparability, and 
commensurability concerns.142 
Simple quantifiability historically has stood in the way of 
settlement, in the CL and PC traditions, upon mutually agreeable 
distribuenda and distribution principles in the following way: On the 
one hand, resource, opportunity and the like are not intelligible as such 
apart from some person’s actual or idealized preference for or valuation 
of these items—hence, apart from the items’ yielding some manner of 
“satisfaction,” “value,”  “happiness,” “utility,” “welfare” or “well-
being,” conceived in some suitable manner, to the person who values 
them.  Resources and opportunities must, that is to say, be understood as 
resources or opportunities for something, and for someone.  To suppose 
otherwise is, in effect, to fetishize the distribuendum and render 
mysterious why citizen-agents, hence the polity, would or should be 
concerned with its ownership or distribution at all.143 
On the other hand, these latter states—welfare, utility, happiness, 
etc.—as noted at Part I.C, do not lend themselves to cardinal 
measurement in the attainment, certainly not as a practical matter, and 
perhaps not even as a conceptual matter.  Relatedly, they cannot be, so 
far as we appear to have reason to suppose, directly distributed to 
anyone.  They are experienced only as subjective outputs of utility 
functions the inputs to which must be some objective item or items, 
rather than some subjective state or states.144  And while these objective 
inputs—resources or material opportunities—are, by and large, 
cardinally quantifiable, so long as the outputs that render them ethically 
significant are not, it is difficult, even for a Utilitarian who views the 
utility-yield as the only relevant factor, to determine how much of any 
of them anyone ethically ought to have. 
What is more—and now we move from Utilitarianism to more 
responsibility-concerned CR and CL—bounded agents are in part 
responsible for, and in part not responsible for, their own utility 
functions.  One can be innately more difficult to satisfy than others, but 
 
 142 See Hockett, Deep Grammar, supra note 74, at 1223-27 for fuller, including formal, 
treatment of the subjects of the next several paragraphs; see also Claude d’Aspremont, Axioms for 
Social Welfare Orderings, in SOCIAL GOALS AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION: ESSAYS IN MEMORY 
OF ELISHA PAZNER 19, 19-76 (Leonid Hurwicz et al. eds., 1985) (especially pages 42 to 43) 
[hereinafter SOCIAL GOALS AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION]; JOHN E. ROEMER, THEORIES OF 
DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 16 (1996); A.K. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 
(1970); A.K. Sen, On Weights and Measures: Informational Constraints in Social Welfare 
Analysis, 45 ECONONOMETRICA 1539 (1977). 
 143 It would also, of course, be to fail to respect distribuees as valuing agents.  See Hockett, 
Deep Grammar, supra note 74, at 1220-27; see also Robert Hockett & Mathias Risse, Primary 
Goods Revisited (under revision for ECON. & PHIL.). 
 144 See sources cited supra note 143. 
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one can also in a manner choose to be more difficult—or expensive—to 
satisfy than others.145  So the difficulty of cardinally measuring 
happiness intractably afflicts the already, independently difficult task of 
separately tracing the ethically endogenous (responsible) and the 
ethically exogenous (non-responsible) grounds of one’s utility 
function—of one’s translating objective inputs into subjective outputs. 
Now consider the interpersonal comparability problem.  Even were 
welfare cardinally quantifiable as a state of any given person, it is 
unclear whether it would be interpersonally comparable as a state-type 
enjoyed among multiple persons.  For there can appear to be, intuitively, 
something radically distinct as between P1’s happiness and P2’s 
happiness, presumably owing in some manner to there seeming to be 
something radically separate, distinct, or unique about every sentient 
being’s subjectivity, or consciousness, itself.146  One might reasonably 
feel hesitant, that is to say, about declaring P1 to be “as happy” as P2 
even were one able, say by analogy to the operation of a pool of 
mercury in a capillary tube, to associate happiness with quanta of 
endorphins in P1’s or P2’s bloodstream and assign cardinal measures to 
P1’s or P2’s individual states of happiness.  And this problem is not 
solved simply by moving to “objective” wealth, from “subjective” 
welfare, as distribuendum.  For again, it is only the welfare-yield that 
renders wealth ethically intelligible as “wealth” rather than inert, insipid 
matter in the first place.147  And differing persons, both responsibly in 
part and accidentally in part, can derive differing degrees of welfare 
from the same material items. 
Now the commensuration problem: The fact that there are multiple 
material inputs—call them benefits and burdens for present purposes—
that appear to affect, differentially, utility and disutility, coupled with 
the difficulty attending cardinally measuring the utility and disutility 
afforded by such benefits and burdens, would render it difficult, even 
were interpersonal comparability somehow unproblematic, to determine 
how much of benefit B1 would compensate P1 for a shortage of, say, 
B2 relative to person P2.  Unless the appropriate distribution formula 
were to mandate a distinct distribution of each good and ill over all 
agent-citizens independent of the distribution of the other goods and 
 
 145 See Kenneth J. Arrow, Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian Notes on Rawls’s Theory of Justice, 70 
J. PHIL. 245 (1973); see also Dworkin, supra note 74, at 48-59. 
 146 See, e.g., DAVID J. CHALMERS, THE CONSCIOUS MIND: IN SEARCH OF A FUNDAMENTAL 
THEORY (1996); THOMAS NAGEL, OTHER MINDS: CRITICAL ESSAYS 1969-1994 (1995); THOMAS 
NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS (1991); see also Brink, supra note 72. 
 147 See Hockett, Deep Grammar, supra note 74, at 155-73.  The intuition receives particularly 
memorable expression in, of all places, a novel by Sartre.  See JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, NAUSEA 127 
(Lloyd Alexander trans., 1949) (“[T]he diversity of things, their individuality, were only an 
appearance, a veneer.  This veneer had melted, leaving soft, monstrous masses, all in disorder—
naked, in a frightful, obscene nakedness.”). 
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ills—a seemingly implausible suggestion148—we require “rates of 
exchange” between goods and ills themselves in order to derive an 
index suitable to determining how much “good-or-ill-stuff in total” any 
citizen holds.  But since utility or happiness-yield is the touchstone of 
some objective item’s beneficial or burdensome status to an agent, and 
since, as we have observed, measuring this happiness-yield is 
problematic, it is not clear how we are to commensurate disparate 
benefits and burdens in a manner pertinent to distributive propriety.  
Our would-be numéraire—happiness-yield—is itself cardinally non-
quantifiable. 
Happily, however, as noted before, there is one mechanism which 
simultaneously solves—or, better, circumvents—all three measurement 
problems.  And it does so while—indeed, by—doing justice to the three 
constitutive values assigned by our synthesized EEOR political self-
understanding to the three ownership-pertinent “variables” (viz., again, 
responsible citizen-agents, all benefits and burdens adjudged as such by 
such agents, EOP-consistent allocation).  The same mechanism 
addresses, at least in part, the problem posed by bounded agents’ being 
responsible in part, while not in whole, for their own utility functions.  
To the degree that we can realize this mechanism “on the ground,” then, 
we can simultaneously realize the EEOR and facilitate the principal 
measure-theoretic problems’ “taking care of themselves,” so to speak.  
And in so doing we diminish the tracing problem and largely sidestep 
the boundary dispute.  Here, in idealized form, is the mechanism: 
Assume a “complete” market—a forum in which all desired, voluntary 
trading—and only such trading—occurs.149  Assume first that that 
trading is in all goods and services that can practically be made 
available and that anyone values—hence, that are politically cognizable 
as ethically interesting distribuenda.  Assume second that the trading is 
in contingent claims to compensation upon the occurrence of any 
eventuality that anyone disvalues, payable by anyone willing to take the 
opposite sides of what amount to “bets” on the disvalued contingencies.  
 
 148 Implausible save in the case of the core endowments, as explained infra, Part III.C.3. 
 149 Market “completeness” in this sense—all and only desired trading—of course includes 
trading in contingent claims.  I will describe this more over the course of the next several 
paragraphs.  The classic sources on the role of contingent claims in completing markets are JOHN 
R. HICKS, VALUE AND CAPITAL (1939); Maurice Allais, Généralisation des Théories de 
L’Equilibre Economique Général et du Rendement Social au Cas du Risque, 11 ECONOMETRIE, 
COLLOQUES INTERNATIONAUX DU CENTRE NATIONAL DE LA RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE 81 
(1953); Kenneth J. Arrow, Le Rôle de Valeurs Boursières par la Répartition la Meilleure des 
Risques, 11 ECONOMETRIE, COLLOQUES INTERNATIONAUX DU CENTRE NATIONAL DE LA 
RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE 41 (1953); GERARD DEBREU, THEORY OF VALUE (1959).  
Completeness is of course a technical concept, bearing many ramifications, only some of which 
are treated here.  For fuller treatment, see Hockett, Macrohedge, supra note 138.  For state of the 
art comprehensive treatment, see 1 MICHAEL MAGILL & MARTINE QUINZII, THEORY OF 
INCOMPLETE MARKETS (1996). 
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Assume further that this market is “neutral.”  It is neutral in the sense, 
first, that each participant enters it with an ethically exogenous initial 
endowment of—and largely in the nature of ownership rights to—
ethically exogenous desired assets equal to that with which everyone 
else enters it.  It is neutral in the sense, second, that regulatory norms 
effectively prevent such collusively, strategically or expropriatively 
opportunistic behaviors as would result in some participants’ coming to 
possess greater or lesser holdings or “price-affecting effective demand 
powers” than would be traceable to such ethically exogenous initial 
endowments and their ethically endogenous transaction histories 
alone.150  This mechanism strait-forwardly instantiates in broad outline 
the ownership régime prescribed by our synthesized American EEOR 
tradition.  It satisfies the prescriptions entailed by the three above-
offered sample ownership-pertinent “variables,” and simultaneously 
addresses the three critical measurement concerns.  Here, more 
precisely, is how: 
The mechanism honors citizen-participants as responsible agents.  
They transact voluntarily pursuant to their own, autonomous relative 
valuations of items and contingencies that they prefer and disprefer in 
keeping with their pursuits of happiness.  The mechanism treats as 
distribuenda whatever goods or services—which latter include risk-
bearing services—those agents themselves value or disvalue.  Those 
goods and services are the material resources or opportunities from 
which citizen-agents’ utilities, happinesses or lifeplan-satisfactions 
derive.  And the mechanism, via the neutrality imposed upon it at the 
outset and retained throughout, equalizes what is ethically exogenous—
that which is not traceable in the holding directly to a responsible 
choice—while allowing holdings over time nonetheless to vary with 
ethically endogenous responsible transactional decisions.  Holdings at 
time Tn, that is to say, are traceable to equalized holdings at T0 and to 
voluntary choices thereafter. 151 
The mechanism sidesteps, in an ethically satisfactory way, the 
problem of cardinal “happiness” or utility measurement.  It does so by 
allowing citizen-agents, via voluntary trading activity—by dint of the 
“first fundamental theorem of welfare economics”152—to “maximize,” 
presumptively, utility in a manner consistent with (a) ethically 
exogenous endowment equality among market participants and (b) 
consequently equally shared scarcity of the exogenously given 
 
 150 Please set aside, for the moment, first the question of the means by which endowment-
equalization would be effected, and second the “problem of future generations.”  We will get to 
that in III.C.3, infra. 
 151 It should be borne in mind that those latter include labor-expending decisions. 
 152 See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, An Extension of the Basic Theorems of Classical Welfare 
Economics, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND BERKELEY SYMPOSIUM ON MATHEMATICAL 
STATISTICS AND PROBABILITY 507 (1951). 
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resources from which agents “produce” their own utility.153  It does not 
matter for OS purposes, that is to say, what sort of number—cardinal or 
ordinal—that we might assign to citizens’ happinesses or utilities, or 
whether or how we manage to scale such numbers, so long as we know 
that the utilities are the “highest” possible consistent with the correct 
distribution principle—the EOP—and the consequently equally 
shouldered, exogenously given constraints posed by the material 
environment. 
Similarly, the mechanism—again unobjectionably—sidesteps the 
problem of interpersonal happiness or utility comparison.  For so long 
as the resource-components—i.e., the ethically exogenous 
components—of “utility-manufacture” or “happiness-pursuit” itself—
endorphins, C-fibers, etc. (sometimes called “personal,” or “internal” 
resources)—are themselves counted—in the form of drugs, 
supplements, or contingent claims to compensation—among the 
exogenous endowments that must be equalized over participants, then 
whatever the absolute or comparative quanta of happiness or utility 
enjoyed by citizens, we shall know that these are the “highest” that they 
can be while being consistent with the appropriate distribution 
principle—again, the EOP—and the consequently equally shouldered 
constraints posed by the exogenously given environment. 
Finally, the mechanism “automatically,” as it were, commensurates 
distribuenda in the only way that ethically matters, i.e., via the 
autonomous implicit comparative valuations of autonomously 
transacting citizen-agents.154  We need not worry ourselves over how 
much of B2 “would” or will compensate P1 for a deficit of B1, let alone 
construct a “perfectionist” index of all goods and ills.155  Our citizen-
 
 153 In essence, we are describing an economy characterized by so-called “equal division 
Walrasian equilibria.”  For more on such equilibria, their fairness and efficiency properties, and 
ethical interpretations thereof, see Hockett, Deep Grammar, supra note 74, at 1296-317.  The 
technical literature on the theory of fair allocations is vast, though oddly ignored by economically 
oriented legal academics.  For a canonical sampling, see, e.g., Terrence. E. Daniel, A Revised 
Concept of Distributional Equity, 11 J. ECON. THEORY 94 (1975); Duncan K. Foley, Resource 
Allocation and the Public Sector, YALE ECONOMIC ESSAYS 7, at 45-98 (1967); E.A. Pazner & 
David Schmeidler, Egalitarian-Equivalent Allocations: A New Concept of Economic Equity, 92 
Q.J. ECON. 671 (1978); Elisha Pazner & David Schmeidler, A Difficulty in the Concept of 
Fairness, 41 REV. OF ECON. STUD. 441, 441-43 (1974); Hal R. Varian, Equity, Envy and 
Efficiency, 9 J. ECON. THEORY, 63, 63-91 (1974); Hal R. Varian, Two Problems in the Theory of 
Fairness, 5 J. PUB. ECON. 249 (1976).  See generally WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, SUPERFAIRNESS: 
APPLICATIONS AND THEORY (1986); William Thomson & Hal R. Varian, Theories of Justice 
Based on Symmetry, in SOCIAL GOALS AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION, supra note 142, at 107.  A 
useful recent synthesis of these results is HERVÉ MOULIN, FAIR DIVISION AND COLLECTIVE 
WELFARE (2003).  The work from which these studies take their departure is of course LÉON 
WALRAS, ELEMENTS OF PURE ECONOMICS (William Jaffé trans., 1954) (1844).  Walras appears 
to have anticipated, even to have intended, precisely such developments as these.  See WILLAM 
JAFFÉ’S ESSAYS ON WALRAS 17-52, 326-42 (Donald A. Walker ed., 1983). 
 154 See Hockett, Deep Grammar, supra note 74, at 1220-33; Hockett & Risse, supra note 143. 
 155 See sources cited supra note 154.  The claim that the need to index disparate resources 
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participants themselves will, in effect, construct, autonomously and with 
equal voice, the index—a spontaneously emergent price index—which 
amounts to an aggregated comparative “social” valuation of goods and 
ills, in the construction of which each participant has exercised an equal 
“vote.”156  (Again, provided that there exist market completeness and 
neutrality in the senses explicated above.)  And so yet again, in a 
manner that reflects the constraints both of relative environmental 
scarcities and of the appropriate distribution principle—equal allocation 
of all and only that which is ethically exogenous—we find the 
mechanism allowing the measurement question to “take care of itself” 
to precisely the degree that the EEOR itself demands that care be taken 
at all. 
 
3.     Measuring the Core Endowments & Realizing the Market 
 
Insofar as it can be realized, then, the mechanism—in part, 
precisely by equalizing the core opportunity-endowments enumerated in 
II.C.1 over its participants—simultaneously assists in realizing the 
EEOR that forms the three tradition-synthesizing, theoretic basis of the 
American OS and in large part quarantines the tracing problem.  Three 
challenges, however, might appear to stand in the way of that 
realization.  Here I note and dispel them. 
The first challenge is the matter of equalizing the aforelisted core 
endowments.  If we have to equalize holdings of those, one might think 
we have to commensurate them.  But how are we to do that prior to the 
operation of the equal-endowment grounded market mechanism, when 
it is that mechanism itself that affords ethically satisfactory 
commensuration—i.e., social valuation pursuant to a process in which 
each citizen bears an “equal vote” by dint of her entering that market 
with an equal initial endowment?  Market neutrality might be rendered 
self-perpetuating once attained, but how is it to be attained when the 
market itself affords the measure of market-antecedent neutrality? 
Were we able to start all over, of course, this problem would be 
diminished.  We would simply give each citizen an equal allotment of 
coupons with which to bid on unowned resources.157  But of course we 
are not able to start all over, and significant portions of what each of us 
already owns presumably are traceable, in theory, at least in part to our 
 
commits one to perfectionism—i.e., the position that some goods simply are inherently worth 
more than others—figures into a prominent criticism of Rawlsian primary goods leveled by 
Richard Arneson.  See Richard Arneson, Primary Goods Reconsidered, 24 NOÛS 429 (1990).  
The criticism is addressed in Hockett & Risse, supra note 143. 
 156 See citations listed supra, note 154. 
 157 Such is envisaged in Dworkin’s “clamshell” auction.  See DWORKIN, supra note 74, at 65-
71. 
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ethically endogenous efforts.  Nonetheless, there is a plausible “second 
best” solution at hand.  First, note that the core endowments enumerated 
at II.C.1 are limited in number, relatively easily quantified and equitably 
distributed, and in little need of commensuration.  If we distinguish 
between “beneficial” and “burdensome” core assets, we see that this is 
particularly so of the beneficial ones—early education and inherited 
non-human capital.  The burdensome ones, by contrast, are a bit more 
difficult, since they include “internal resources,” but still far from 
impossible.  The hardest one is genetically poor health or handicap.  
Some such deficiencies can themselves be valued by reference to 
current prices affixed to their mitigation—prostheses, medicines, etc.  
There seems no harm in beginning to address such deficits with 
compensation equal to the going rates.  Other such deficits are not so 
readily mitigated.  There the best that we can do is estimate the 
compensation that would be afforded by insurance policies that 
typically are or would be purchased against such contingencies if such 
are or were available.158  Clearly there’s more guesswork here, but it 
need not be an arbitrary whistling in the dark.  We do the best we can to 
repair the ship at sea.  The more repairing that we do, the better able the 
mechanism will grow to fix itself. 
The second challenge is rooted in “completeness” as the first was 
rooted in “neutrality.”  It is this: Is it reasonable to require that “all and 
only desired trading” occur?  Is that possible, and do we even want it?  
Wouldn’t we have to abandon our market-inalienability norms and 
“commodify” everything?159  And if we don’t do that, can the 
mechanism do what has been charged to it? 
This challenge is more easily addressed than that directed to 
neutrality.  Again we look first to the core opportunity endowments of 
Part II.C.1.  All of these are subject, in principle, to unobjectionable 
market-valuability already.  Next we consider what else might be 
traded—“all that enters into agents’ happiness-pursuit.”  It is easy 
enough simply to bracket out of market transactions such things as we 
should not wish to see commodified—babies or organs, for example.160  
 
 158 See Hockett, Deep Grammar, supra note 74, at 1296-306; DWORKIN, supra note 74, at 
307-50.  Real, rather than “hypothetical” such insurance is proposed in Hockett, Macrohedge, 
supra note 138; and in Alexander Tabarrok, Trumping the Genetic Tarot Card, 9 
CONTINGENCIES 20 (1997); see also J.H. Cochrane, Time-Consistent Health Insurance, 103 J. 
POL. ECON. 445 (1995). 
 159 The classic contemporary objection to “commodification” is of course Margaret Jane 
Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987).  See generally MARGARET JANE 
RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES (1996); see also ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS 
AND ECONOMICS (1993).  Contemporary protests of commodification revive concerns raised 
repeatedly in the past.  Two classic Victorian-era objections are THOMAS CARLYLE, PAST AND 
PRESENT (Robert Thorne ed., 1890), and JOHN RUSKIN, UNTO THIS LAST AND OTHER WRITINGS 
155-228 (Clive Wilmer ed., 1985). 
 160 The allusion is of course to Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of 
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There will of course be disagreement as to some of these.  It might 
appear to be an affront to liberty, for example, to prohibit autonomous 
agents’ trading in what ever they wish to trade, at least when the trading 
really is consensual and uninfected by objectionable inequities in 
comparative bargaining power, and does not itself impinge upon any 
third party’s equal liberty.  It might especially seem so against a more 
equitably spread opportunity backdrop, before which implicit 
exploitation fears are less likely to be operative.  But the real point here 
is that we need not worry over these disputes at the margins of 
commodifiability.  The mechanism does its work quite well through 
trade of those many more goods and services that all agree ought to be 
tradable. 
That is the desirability side of this challenge.  The feasibility side 
comes in the transaction- and information-cost barriers to market-
completion in the technical sense.  Is it really reasonable to suppose that 
all parcelings of ownable and tradable goods, and that payment-claims 
defined in terms of all specifiable contingencies, can be tradable?161  
Here the problem, the guise of which is more technical than the guise of 
alienability, can be handled in two ways.  The first way is to note that it 
is by now a well established theorem of general equilibrium- and 
stochastic calculus-rooted financial theory that complete markets can be 
simulated through a comparatively small number of hedging and 
insurance strategies.162  That fact is exploited in the present Article’s 
more programmatic sequel, as well as in a predecessor article devoted to 
the subject of proposed global hedging markets.163  The second way is 
more immediately satisfying.  It is to note that the problem has no real 
“bite” here, for as the answer to the third challenge shows, more 
complete and more neutral always means more consistent with the 
EEOR’s constitutive values.  There is, that is, an ordered set of “second 
bests” that is ordinally equivalent to the set of “more” complete and 
“more” neutral markets.  So all we have to do is to move further in the 
right direction to become the best that we can be. 
The third challenge, just presaged, is this: If you cannot achieve 
full completeness and neutrality of the sort that characterizes the 
mechanism that assists in realizing the EEOR, might it be that seeking 
 
the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978), one of the bugbears that prompted Radin, supra 
note 159. 
 161 This question reemerges below, in connection with Part III’s discussion of the legal 
dimensions of owning. 
 162 See Robert C. Merton, Lifetime Portfolio Selection Under Uncertainty: The Continuous-
Time Case, 51 REV. ECON. & STAT. 247 (1969); Robert C. Merton, Optimum Consumption and 
Portfolio Rules in a Continuous-Time Model, 3 J. ECON. THEORY 373 (1971); Robert C. Merton, 
Continuous-Time Portfolio Theory and the Pricing of Contingent Claims, Working Paper No. 
881-76, A.P. Sloan School of Management, MIT (1976); Stephen A. Ross, Options and 
Efficiency, 90 Q. J. ECON. 75 (1976); STEPHEN A. ROSS, NEOCLASSICAL FINANCE 24-25 (2005). 
 163 Hockett, Macrohedge, supra note 138. 
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more completeness and more neutrality than you presently have could, 
ironically, take you farther from the ideal goal?  Hasn’t Hart, for 
example, proved that such might be the case at least in respect of 
completeness?164  I will reply here intuitively, reserving technical 
treatment for another venue.  The intuitive reply is that the claim that 
there is no second best trades on an ethically uninteresting conception of 
efficiency.  The only politically cognizable conception of efficiency, by 
contrast, is one in respect of which it happens that any forward 
movement on the completeness or neutrality fronts results in forward 
movement on the only ethically intelligible “welfare” front.  I complete 
the argument in the next Subpart, for it is best made in connection with 
a fuller treatment of the other value that is constitutive of our EEOR, 
namely efficiency. 
 
D.     Equal Opportunity as Efficiency 
 
Parts II.A & B established, respectively, that CR and CL are 
committed, with differing degrees of explicitness, to the conception of 
citizens as responsible agents and of appropriate ownership as 
ownership consistent with the EOP.  PC, in turn, was shown not to be 
committed to the contrary of either of those propositions.  Part I.C, for 
its part, established that PC does commit itself more or less explicitly to 
two other propositions: First, that public policies ought generally either 
to promote or at least not to offend fairness.  And second, that such 
policies ought generally either to promote, or not unnecessarily to 
inhibit, “efficiency” or economic “growth.”  Part I.C also noted that 
these two desiderata can appear, superficially, in some circumstances to 
be at odds.  And it noted that CR and CL for their parts do not, at least 
on the surface, take positions contrary to the PC rules of thumb.  This 
Subpart shows that PC fairness and efficiency, non-superficially 
understood, are not at odds.  Moreover, PC fairness properly construed 
is a rule of thumb to which CR and CL themselves are committed by 
dint of their commitment to the EOP.  And efficiency properly 
understood is a material entailment of success in the pursuit of properly 
understood fairness.  One upshot is that CR, CL and PC readily reduce 
to one political understanding—our EEOR—at least where ownership is 
concerned.  Another upshot is that ordered sets of variably complete and 
neutral markets, and the ordered set of variably efficient markets, are 
ordinally equivalent. 
First, CR and CL are committed to PC fairness.  “Fairness,” both in 
 
 164 See Oliver D. Hart, On the Optimality of Equilibrium When the Market Structure is 
Incomplete, 11 J. ECON. THEORY 418 (1975). 
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its everyday connotation and in its denotation of the salient attributes of 
“fairness-promoting” PC legislation, means impartiality or even-
handedness.  To render circumstances fair is to “level the playing field,” 
to remove barriers that people face through no fault of their own.  
Common synonyms of “fair” in this sense are “equitable,” “just,” 
“equivalent,” and so on.165  But “fairness” in this sense, then, means 
nothing more and nothing less than conformity with the equal 
opportunity principle.  To treat parties impartially is to treat them as 
equals for purposes of the treatment—i.e., to eliminate inequities that 
are exogenous to the purposes of the treatment.  And to be even-handed 
with people is to treat them impartially. 
Second, fairness in the equal opportunity sense is efficient in the 
only sense in which “efficiency” bears ethical significance.  The 
argument here bears both a negative and a positive aspect.  First we will 
explicate the term “efficiency,” then we will consider the negative and 
positive sides of the argument that efficiency on any understanding, if 
stripped of fairness considerations, is ethically uninteresting. 
“Efficiency,” in the everyday sense of the word, connotes the 
maximization of output given a stipulated input, or the minimization of 
input given a stipulated output.  It means “more” for “less.”  The more 
technical understandings of “efficiency” familiar to welfare economists 
are reducible to variations on that theme.  Pareto-efficient distributions 
of goods or ills to persons are best understood, intuitively, as 
distributions the aggregate utility deriving from which cannot be raised 
without lowering the individual utility of at least one person.166  Pareto 
efficiency is utility-maximization as constrained by, thus consistent 
with, the “veto” power wielded by anyone who stands to suffer a utility 
loss in the event of some departure from some status quo.  It is this 
intuition, at any rate, that renders the Pareto criterion ethically salient.  
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency is yet closer to the workaday understanding of 
“efficiency.”  Distributions are efficient in the Kaldor-Hicks sense if 
there is no departure from them that would render some parties’ 
aggregated gains greater than other parties’ aggregated losses.167  The 
 
 165 See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 595 (6th ed. 1990). 
 166 Of course the Pareto principle is intended to afford technical means of sidestepping 
interpersonal utility comparison and with it, therefore, the standard argument runs, aggregation.  
But leaving aside for present purposes the standard argument’s running aggregation and 
comparison together, the Pareto criterion trades for its ethical salience upon an intuition which 
implicitly imports aggregation.  There is no reason for “society” to be interested in a Pareto-
efficient social choice rule dictating increases in the utilities of some so long as no one else’s 
utilities are diminished thereby, unless “society” itself is seen as thereby benefiting in some sense.  
That sense, if such there be, is the only sense in which the principle can be ethically interesting, 
and it is of course an aggregative sense—as indeed the terms “society” and “social choice” should 
indicate right from the start.  On the analytic distinction between interpersonal comparison and 
aggregation, see sources cited supra note 142. 
 167 The aggregation—and assumed interpersonal comparability imported thereby—enter via 
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guiding intuition, then, again is that the welfare output of a given 
distributive input is, given the welfare functions that we have to work 
with, the “highest” that it can be.168 
Now efficiency on any of these understandings is normatively 
uninteresting unless it be understood by irreducible reference to 
fairness.  This is absolutely crucial, yet surprisingly oft-ignored.  First, 
from the “negative” side, it is well established—though still, 
mysteriously, insufficiently observed—that our merely maximizing an 
aggregate, be it of welfare or of wealth, without attending to the fairness 
of the means by which that aggregate is maximized, would involve us in 
fetishism.169  The claim here is not that maximization shorn of fairness 
is not good enough.  It is that it is not good at all; it is not so much as 
cognizable as “good.”  Nobody—CR, CL, PC or otherwise—would 
maintain that to render all save one inhabitant of the world miserable in 
order to render that one remaining inhabitant, possessed of an eccentric 
utility function, so ecstatically happy as to exceed the aggregated 
happiness of all others under some other distribution, would be to 
“maximize” anything cognizable to normative concern.170  To do so 
would be ethically on all fours with an argument that all public policy 
should be framed with a view to maximizing the amount of blue-colored 
surface space in the universe.  It just is not “good,” in any sense, to 
enlarge something that has nothing to do with anybody’s equal agency.  
Wealth and welfare, then, must be understood by reference to principles 
of fair opportunity to engage in wealth- or welfare-creation before they 
can be intelligible as values at all.  They are “wealth” or “welfare,” as 
 
the “compensation principle.”  Note the shared root—“com,” i.e., “with”—shared by both 
“comparison” and “compensation.” 
 168 One “produces” welfare, in the Pareto and the Kaldor-Hicks senses, by distribution 
operations.  Those are the variable inputs, so to speak, while persons’ utility functions are the 
fixed inputs. 
 169 See Hockett, Deep Grammar, supra note 74, at 1276-83.  A classic articulation of the 
argument is found in Ronald Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEG. STUD. 191 (1980), and 
Ronald Dworkin, Why Efficiency?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 563 (1980); see also Amartya Sen, 
Equality of What?, in 1 THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 12 (S. McMurrin ed., 
1980).  I hope to render the claim yet more intuitively appreciable here than is the case in those 
sources, in hopes of thereby avoiding continuing incomprehension such as once appears to have 
been manifest, among other places, in Posner, sources cited supra note 108, and now is manifest 
in LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002), the very title of 
which registers a category error (fairness is a distribution principle, welfare a distribuendum).  It 
bears noting that Posner has come to give distribution something closer to its due.  See, e.g., 
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 374-81 (1990); RICHARD A. POSNER, 
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 13-15 (5th ed. 1998).  But see his blurb aback KAPLOW & 
SHAVELL, supra, op. cit.  Shavell also appears to have given distribution something more like its 
due in STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 2-3 (2004). 
 170 Herewith of course a variation on Nozick’s “utility monster” objection to utilitarianism.  
See NOZICK, supra note 78, at 110 (“Utilitarian theory is embarrassed by the possibility of utility 
monsters who get enormously greater sums of utility from any sacrifice of others than these 
others lose . . . the theory seems to require that we all be sacrificed in the monster’s maw, in order 
to increase total utility.”). 
  
54 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 27:1 
distinguished from a large endorphin count or a vast blue-colored 
surface space—an insipid and lifeless material substance—only in so far 
as such is the case.171 
Second, from the “positive” side, recall that the EOP requires not 
only that ethically exogenous holdings of that from which satisfactions 
are derived—opportunities—be equalized, but also that ethically 
endogenous such holdings be permitted to vary with responsible effort.  
But this means that “satisfaction,” “welfare,” or “wealth” will be 
“maximized” in the only ethically intelligible sense of those words 
precisely in so far as the inputs of “satisfaction-functions” are 
distributed in accordance with the equal opportunity principle.  Agent-
citizens are permitted to, and face all incentive to, “produce” and indeed 
“maximize” their own satisfactions under the EOP, which requires that 
they be permitted to retain that which they produce by their own efforts 
out of exogenously given resources.  So “aggregate” satisfaction will be 
“maximized” in the only sense in which satisfaction-maximization is 
ethically noteworthy.  Every agent’s satisfaction will be the highest that 
it can be consistent with the EOP.  That is all that is intelligible as 
“efficient” where it is satisfaction that would be efficiently or 
inefficiently produced.  Ethically intelligible efficiency just is what 
results from distribution of happiness-inputs in accordance with the 
EOP. 
Once we see this, we see that the third challenge raised to Part 
II.C.2 is dissipated.  Proofs that sets of markets which are rank-ordered 
in terms of degrees of completeness that fall short of full completeness 
are not ordinally equivalent to sets of markets rank-ordered in terms of 
their welfare-optimality trade on a conception of welfare-optimality that 
is ethically uninteresting.  The only welfare that matters—indeed, that 
can be viewed as well-faring (by agents capable of faring well) rather 
 
 171 Compare the inert matter considered above in connection with the measurement 
challenges, supra note 147 and accompanying text.  It is the same story here.  It is agency—
usefulness to valuing agents—that infuses any substance with value.  (A variation here, perhaps, 
on the adage that “man is the measure of all things.”)  And it is only equal agency that renders the 
valuation of such a substance a valuation effected legitimately by us all, hence “value” in a sense 
cognizable to “us” all and hence to ethics.  The belief that at least aggregated welfare, as 
distinguished from wealth, is a value, since it is pleasure or some such humanly experienced 
magnititude rather than mere money, does not escape this stricture.  For again, welfare, 
satisfaction, pleasure, etc. as such do not engage “us” as items to be valued apart from the 
propriety of their apportionments.  The belief that “aggregated” such magnitudes constitute values 
results, I think, from a subconscious elision from thinking in terms of one agent experiencing 
welfare, to an “agential” aggregation of persons, conceived inchoately as one person, 
“experiencing” such welfare.  Once one becomes conscious that one is doing this, one escapes the 
illusion.  Much the same illusion, incidentally, appears to underwrite Harsanyi’s aggregation and 
impartial observer theorems, cited supra note 109.  These turn out to be representation 
theorems—representations of ordinal measures in cardinal form—rather than theorems “proving” 
utilitarianism to be a dictate of rationality itself.  See ROEMER, supra note 142, at 138-50, who is 
particularly good on this point. 
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than as inert substance-growing—is that which is produced by equally 
exogenously endowed agents who consume or trade that with which 
they are endowed and/or that which they receive through trading when 
they are so endowed.  There is no reason to suppose that offering more 
such trading opportunities to all, or effecting greater equity among the 
holdings of ethically exogenous opportunities to all, would result in any 
ethically cognizable diminution of the happiness of any.172  Formal 
proof can be had elsewhere.  I trust for the present that the intuition is 
clear enough. 
 
E.     The Efficient Equal-Opportunity Republic is the 
Template of Our “Ownership Society” 
 
It should be at least roughly apparent already that the EEOR which 
is our American political self-understanding is, in effect, some kind of 
OS.  Independent and responsible citizens, as agents whose autonomy in 
fashioning their lives and pursuing happiness with exogenous 
opportunities and resources is to be honored, are owners.  They own 
their own lives, so to speak, in that they hold exclusive rights to control 
and develop those lives, as consistent with the equal self-owning rights 
of others.173  And those agents must be recognized to own—rightfully to 
control the disposition of—the material correlates of the opportunities 
and resources that go into building those lives as well.  The fruits of 
those resource and opportunity inputs, in turn—what we have called the 
ethically endogenous element—also must be owned.  Such are what our 
agent-citizens bring to, and take from, the idealized market sketched 
above.  All of these are entailments of the construal of citizens as 
responsible agents whose holdings can be ethically assessed in keeping 
with the EOP. 
But this is of course only to begin to explicate the sense in which 
the EEOR is an OS.  For ownership is more than holding and 
controlling.  It is psychologically experienced, and legally protected, 
holding and controlling.  And there are many differing forms and 
gradations—many variations on the themes—of holding and 
controlling, and experiencing and legally vindicating such holding 
controlling, in American psychology and law.  Putting flesh on the bare-
 
 172 This is not to say that such trading itself cannot bear third-party effects such that over time 
ethically exogenous resources come to be centralized in undeserving, overendowed hands.  But 
that is why market-neutrality above is defined not only in initial endowment terms, but in ongoing 
regulatory terms as well. 
 173 The equal rights qualifier spares the thesis of self-ownership from such objections as Jerry 
Cohen raises against such as Nozick.  See G.A. Cohen, Self-Ownership, World-Ownership, and 
Equality, in JUSTICE AND EQUALITY HERE AND NOW (Frank S. Lucash ed., 1986); G.A. Cohen, 
Self-Ownership, World-Ownership, and Equality: Part II, 3 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 77 (1986). 
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bones of ownership in an American OS, then, requires more than simply 
saying that ownership and what is owned are to be understood by 
reference to responsible agency, efficiency and equal opportunity.  
Those are the broad features of our ownership society.  Filling in the 
more specific details requires that we take into account both the more 
detailed material entailments of those conceptions, and the “path-
dependent” features of American sensibility and law themselves. 
 
III.     OWNING AT THE CORE: ASSETS, OPTIONS & ENDOWMENTS IN THE 
EFFICIENT EQUAL-OPPORTUNITY REPUBLIC 
 
Part II of this Article might be said to constitute the theoretic 
“engine” meant to drive concerted and coherent effort toward an 
American OS.  Part I supplied that engine’s parts, showing that the 
engine’s content is domestic, so to speak.  The sequel to this Article 
provides the “wheels” which get that OS “rolling” on the ground.  If 
these similes are fair, then this Part might be called the “clutch” or 
“drive” through which the theory must specifically engage with what it 
ultimately recommends.  The law of ownership and the psychology of 
owners mediate between articulated policy and well implemented 
program.  They thus require care in their own right if an OS is 
realistically to be instantiated.  This Part is intended to supply that care.  
It translates the Part II notion of a “resource” or “material opportunity” 
into a legally and psychologically cognizable “asset” whose 
“ownership” is defined, delimited and vindicated by an “ownership 
society” of responsible agents who cooperatively promote and protect 
their free pursuits of happiness through the rule of law. 
Three particularly noteworthy upshots emerge below.  The first is 
that many more items, abstract and concrete, can in principle and should 
be legally cognized as “assets” and ownable in the contemporary 
American OS than could have been in an earlier CR, CL or PC polity.  
Call this the “abstraction effect.”  It yields both (a) specific 
consequences pertinent to policy and (b) additional political salience to 
the market mechanism sketched above in Part II.C.  The second 
noteworthy upshot is that in view of the much broader range of 
resources that should count as assets in the contemporary American OS, 
assets’ autonomy-conferring attributes are in significant and complex 
measure dependent upon both the independent tastes and the 
cooperative action of agents other than the agent who holds the asset in 
question.  That too yields additional political salience to the market 
mechanism sketched in Part II.C, and bears consequences for the 
delineation of responsible ownership below at III.B.  The third 
noteworthy upshot is that there is a real, practical distinction to be 
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drawn between perceivedly “hard-owned” and “accumulated” assets on 
the one hand, “merely entitled,” “income”-streams on the other.  That 
distinction, of course, does not register at the higher level of theoretical 
abstraction encountered in orthodox financial economics, and thus 
might well surprise practitioners who practice in that orthodox tradition.  
But the distinction will not surprise heuristics psychologists or theorists 
of “behavioral” finance.  And it likely will not surprise many lawyers.  
Indeed, the distinction appears to be rooted in the “endowment effect” 
and cognate dispositions familiar to behavioral economists, thus to be 
rooted in the empirical psychologies of persons not just in the U.S., but 
in other jurisdictions as well.  In the U.S., however, the effect might 
also be grounded partly in the doctrines and the path-dependence of 
American law, in this case constitutional and property law—to pun a 
bit, a manner of “endowment effect” in its own right.  Once again, this 
bears policy and programmatic consequences. 
Before elaborating upon these results, we must prepare the way by 
taking notice of several broad parameters constraining legal ownership 
in any OS.  “Ownership,” of course, is more than mere possession, even 
if the latter really be “nine-tenths of the law.”  An asset is “owned” 
precisely to the degree that a society through its law vindicates the 
asset’s possession and disposition.  And “vindication,” of course, takes 
not only varying degrees, but varying forms.  The law, in turn, will be 
reflective of its enacting society’s constitutive “substantive” values as to 
what rights and responsibilities its citizens hold for themselves and in 
relation to one another.  But the law also will reflect its society’s more 
“procedurally” oriented values as to how the law should be fashioned, 
changed and enforced. 
The “substantive” guidance that the American EEOR’s core values 
afford to the law of an American OS will ring familiar in light of Part II.  
“Ownership” of an “asset” should, for purposes of delimitation and 
instantiation in keeping with the constitutive values of the EEOR, 
conduce to citizen-agents’, or households of such agents’, capacities 
freely to make life-planning or happiness-pursuing choices.  They 
should conduce to citizen-agents’ capacities to make such choices both 
independently and in keeping with the EOP, which latter equilibrates 
the independence of all ethically equal agents.  Owned assets should 
conduce to citizens’ capacities to make such choices without undue 
subordination to the preferences of others, but not without due regard 
for the equal agency rights of others.  “Undue” subordination and “due” 
regard, of course, are understood by reference to the EOP honored by 
the EEOR as described in Part II.  Once the sphere of legitimate 
independent agency is delimited in keeping with the equal opportunity 
principle, an asset—an ownable resource—will be something the 
possession of which realizes, enhances or secures that legitimate sphere 
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of choice as a practical reality. 
Those general substantive principles direct us toward a number of 
more particular, “procedurally” oriented features of what should count 
as ownable assets in the American OS.  We draw those features out first 
by examining the variety of ways in which asset-holding realizes 
practical autonomy.  That is the focus of Subpart A, in which the stress 
is on liberty.  Subpart B then focuses upon autonomy’s delimitation by 
the EOP; the stress there is on that form of liberty which is valued in the 
American OS—responsible liberty. 
 
A.     Ownership & Liberty 
 
First, then, on liberty.  We will begin with formal legal liberty—
simple legally permissible action—then see how asset-holding enhances 
the sphere of autonomy beyond mere legal permissibility.  For purposes 
of policy we will emphasize in particular how both the law and 
ownership-psychology appear to manifest the endowment heuristic 
familiar to theorists of behavioral economics and behavioral finance.  
And we will draw some programmatic consequences from this in 
anticipation of the sequel’s detailed blueprint of the full American OS. 
 
1.     In Theory & In Law 
 
Begin with a simple hypothetical.  Mr. A might as a formal legal 
matter be free to till or not to till the soil of Ms. B, his neighbor.  He 
might, that is, face no penalty imposed or recognized by any formally 
constituted authority for not so tilling.  He is not, legally, a chattel slave 
or an indentured servant.  If B is the only possible source from whom or 
which A might acquire a basic livelihood—minimal caloric intake, 
shelter from the elements, etc.—however, he will of course not as a 
practical matter be free not to work for B for food or shelter.  He will 
not “really,” or “pragmatically” be free.  If by contrast A holds 
substantial livelihood-conferring assets, he will not be practically 
required to till for B, though of course he might contract to do so 
nonetheless for additional income.  And presumably that will be for 
more income than he could have held out for had he not held any 
livelihood-conferring assets other than his labor.  An asset, then, first 
and most simply is something that will practically widen an agent-
citizen’s sphere of politically or legally—“formally”—permitted choice.  
It will be a resource or material opportunity, in Part II’s terms—the 
material correlate of agency itself.  Ideally it will afford the owner some 
degree of ongoing material self-sufficiency, by generating a continuous 
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stream of sustenance or “income.”  It will prove useful to single out this 
latter quality—call it the “fecundity” or “generativity,” perhaps the 
productivity—of an asset. 
A’s right to his own labor in the previous example is itself an asset 
in as much as it permits A at least to choose to work for B rather than to 
starve or steal.  But A might also hold more specialized or well 
developed talents—skills, or human capital, per the terms of Part 
II.C.1—as well as other resources—e.g., land or nonhuman capital, 
savings, etc.  In so far as, given environmental, technological, cultural 
and market—hence, social—conditions, these enable A to achieve a 
greater number of desired aims in a greater variety of ways, they too 
will be assets.  And they will augment A’s holding of that more basic 
and less generative asset that is just his “unskilled” labor.  Assets, then, 
clearly come in many shapes, and with varying degrees of “assetness,” 
as conferrers of practical autonomy.  And they seem to come in many 
more shapes and gradations today than they did in the past.  The modern 
EEOR or American OS is capable in principle of affording its citizens a 
great deal more practical independence than the CR or the CL polities 
of the past were able to afford.174 
One distinctive quality of modern assets is that many of them 
provide the means of generating not just income, as did assets in the 
past, but more assets—more “hard,” or accumulated assets.175  Call this, 
echoing the penultimate paragraph up, the “generativity” of some assets.  
In general, the more kinds or quantities of additional asset that a 
particular form of asset can produce, the more “generative” it is.  A 
machine tool, for example, used in the production of other tools—a sort 
of “second order,” “ur-” or “meta-tool”—will in this sense be more 
generative than a non-machine tool, at least if we hold the generated 
income constant.  Land, which ultimately yields many kinds of assets 
indeed, might be called the most generative of—“the mother of all”—
assets.  But in light of possible market and liquidity restraints as well as 
other factors we will discuss below, this thought must be ringed with 
caveats. 
We can define “wealth” in the EEOR along the lines just sketched 
as either of two magnitudes of assets.  More kinds or qualities of assets 
translate into more wealth, and so does a greater quantity of any 
particular kind of asset.  Wealth, then—the total of accumulated 
assets—will by definition be the fungible or portative, as it were 
“fluidic,” material correlate of EEOR agency itself.  More wealth means 
 
 174 The critical role of assets in affording practical freedom is well laid out in, among other 
places, AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 108 (1999).  See also DASGUPTA, supra 
note 137.  Sen’s and Dasgupta’s work focuses on “developing” economies, but the lessons are 
readily extended to “developed” economies—particularly to their less developed sectors. 
 175 More on the problematic but nonetheless critical notion of “hardness” below. 
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more options, which in turn means more agency.  And wealth that 
markets or other mechanisms diffuse throughout the polity in keeping 
with the EOP is wealth that realizes responsible agency.176 
But there is more to be said about wealth.  Wealth, at the level of 
abstraction adopted by some economists, is either what can be expected 
with reasonable certainty in the future to be, or is already, accumulated.  
At the lower level of abstraction employed by other economists, 
however, a level which proves to be salient for OS purposes, wealth is 
only that which is—not what in future might be—accumulated.  
Pursuant to the endowment effect and cognate heuristics documented by 
experimental economists, wealth that one holds appears to be “worth” 
more than wealth that one “might” or “will” hold.177  And that effect 
seems to be rooted in more than risk-aversion or diminishing marginal 
utility.178  The distinction, as thus far stated, of course remains very 
crude.  For, like the behavioralists themselves, we have not yet defined 
“holding,” which in turn we shall see to be inflected both by physical 
characteristics and by legal protection.  We will do that inflecting 
below.  Suffice it for the moment simply to have flagged the broad 
distinction.  More accumulated wealth is more wealth. 
There are two metrics related to and in addition to the simple 
partative-magnitudinal metric along which wealth can vary that are of 
particular interest to citizens of the EEOR or American OS: the security 
of wealth and the liquidity of wealth.  The former, we soon shall see, 
bears upon accumulation.  The latter, “liquidity,” refers to the rapidity 
with which an asset of one form can be transformed, through trading 
activity, into an asset of another form—most commonly the “purest,” 
most abstract form of “pure purchasing power,” namely money—
 
 176 Again, please see Parts II.A through II.C, supra, on agency, responsible agency and the 
equal opportunity principle.  And see Part III.B, infra, for more on the EOP’s expression in 
law. 
 177 I will not here distinguish between endowment effects, loss-aversion or willingness-to-
accept/willingness-to-pay gaps.  Nor will I distinguish between these and the more clearly 
conceptually distinct, though nonetheless empirically entangled, phenomena of status quo bias, 
commission/omission disparity or disposition effects.  There is of course a vast and growing 
literature on these and cognate subjects.  Useful surveys include Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The 
Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion, and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 193 (1991); Richard 
H. Thaler, Mental Accounting Matters, in ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS (Colin F. 
Camerer et al. eds., 2004); and Colin F. Camerer, Individual Decision Making, in HANDBOOK OF 
EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 587, 665-70 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995) 
(“Endowment Effects and Buying-Selling Price Gaps”).  Fuller collections of seminal work 
include JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. 
eds., 1982); CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000); 
QUASI-RATIONAL ECONOMICS (Richard H. Thaler ed., 1991); ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL 
FINANCE (Richard H. Thaler ed., 1993); ADVANCES IN BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS, supra, op. 
cit.;HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS, supra, op. cit.  A popular-audience-targeted 
treatment of these phenomena is RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER’S CURSE (1992). 
 178 See Matthew Rabin, Risk-Aversion and Expected-Utility Theory: A Calibration Theorem, 
68 ECONOMETRICA 1281 (2000). 
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without diminishing the rate of exchange at which it can be so 
transformed by dint of the transformative transaction itself.179  The less 
liquid an asset is, the smaller the number of exchange transactions in 
which it can be employed within a given span of time, hence the more 
restricted the sphere of choice opened by the asset to its owner.  Greater 
liquidity means greater disposability at greater rates of time and 
exchange.  And greater disposability at greater such rates in effect 
means more asset, more choice.  The more liquid an asset, then, the 
more “generative,” in a sense, it will be.  For liquidity is an asset’s 
capacity to bring—to exchange for—other assets.  It should be noted in 
this connection, however, that the relation between liquidity and 
generativity entails that land and real estate are not always as generative 
as they might be thought to be.  They might be generative in their yields 
of additional resources that spring from or are buried within them, while 
not being so generative of such resources as might be, in a more liquid 
market, exchangeable for them.  This proves significant to the sequel’s 
treatment of “homesteading” and “capital homesteading.” 
It is also helpful to note in this connection that the less “deep” or 
“thick” the market is for a particular asset—that is, the fewer parties 
there are who desire and are willing to exchange for the asset (hence, 
who regard it as an asset)—the less liquid (thus less generative) it will 
be.  We therefore find that the wealth represented by, or again as it were 
the “degree of assetness” of, an asset—hence, the increment of 
autonomy that the asset confers—will generally ride in significant 
measure upon the desires of persons other than the asset’s owner.  And 
it will ride upon other factors—legal, physical, etc.—that affect the rate 
of transformability of one asset into another.  Thus, although assets free 
one person partly from the wills of other individuals who might 
“unduly” coerce her in the absence of her asset-owning, they do not free 
persons altogether from the desires of those who make up the 
community.  Rather, just as would have been expected in view of the 
discussion at Part II, they conduce to responsible liberty—liberty that 
takes account of the liberty of others—not unchecked libertinism. 
Turning from liquidity to security, the “security” of an asset refers 
to its durability and reliability through time as an expander of choice for 
its owner.180  Security is therefore both a legal and a physical-cum-
financial category.  The physical-financial aspect of security requires 
little comment.  An asset that rapidly depreciates is less “asset-like.”  It 
 
 179 See, e.g., MARTIN SHUBIK, 1 THE THEORY OF MONEY AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 399-
427 (2000); see also JAMES TOBIN, MONEY, CREDIT, AND CAPITAL 12-14 (1998) (emphasizing, 
however, only the temporal rate at which the asset can be converted to cash). 
 180 Durability is related to, but nonetheless distinct from, Tobin’s “predictability.”  See TOBIN, 
supra note 179, at 16-20, 23-26.  “Predictability” refers to the degree to which an asset’s cash 
value at future dates can be accurately anticipated.  Id. 
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confers less autonomy.  Along the physical-financial durability metric, 
then, land might again be thought the “mother of all assets,” not only 
owing to its earlier noted generativity, but owing to its regenerativity or 
value-retentivity.  Real estate is one of the comparatively small number 
of assets which in most localities does not unambiguously and 
inexorably depreciate, at least not for protracted periods, but tends 
rather in most cases to appreciate over time.181  As will be discussed 
presently, it happens that real estate and buried stores enjoy, at least 
within the American legal tradition, a special form of legal security as 
well. 
The legal aspect of assets’ security is more interesting and 
practically variable than the physical.  My assets are secure only to the 
extent, not merely that they do not rapidly depreciate, but also that the 
law—and thus my fellow citizens—protect me from uncompensated 
seizures.182  In so far as the law “entitles” me to possession and to 
disposition of an asset, the latter is more secure, and thus more solidly 
or reliably “asset-like,” more valuable, conferring of more wealth and 
more autonomy as the EEOR understands such terms.  And of course 
such entitlement, if it is to be a practical rather than merely a formal 
reality, must be practically vindicable and enforceable. 
It of course cannot be said, in view of the foregoing, that 
entitlement is an all-or-nothing affair—either as a practical or as a 
formal matter.  The variability of legal security as a practical matter is a 
function of that aforementioned vindicability and enforceability.  The 
degree to which the law secures the possession and disposition of assets 
as a formal matter is more complicated.  To begin with, there is the 
familiar observation that legal ownership constitutes a “bundle of 
rights.”  The owner of property under American law generally, though 
not exceptionlessly, holds the right to exclusive use and enjoyment 
thereof, to alienate the property freely, and to considerable extent to 
subdivide it both spatially and temporally.  On the one hand, bundling 
bears directly upon choice and autonomy—more sticks, more choices—
but the matter of subdivision in particular reveals that the bundling of 
property rights is bound up also with transformability and liquidity as 
discussed above. 
In the civil law tradition, for example, where property types and 
relations are strictly limited by the numerus clausus principle and 
unamendable by contract, entitlements are limited to certain coarse-
 
 181 See George Sternlieb & James W. Hughes, The Evolution of Housing and Its Social 
Compact, in FEDERAL HOUSING POLICY AND PROGRAMS 143 (J. Paul Mitchell ed., 1985) 
(emphasizing housing’s role as “safe haven” against ravages of inflation as much as from “the 
elements”). 
 182 My fellow citizens might also protect me by agreeing to pool risk with me and thus insure.  
More on this form of joint-indemnification below. 
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grained forms.  One cannot easily, if at all, sell a “watch for a day” or a 
“half-ownership of a home.”183  What we above called the “abstraction 
effect,” then, is by definition less developed and less honored in such 
jurisdictions.  Asset types are thereby limited, asset markets therefore 
less complete, and autonomy—the sphere of choice—accordingly is 
limited as well, at least in theory.184  In common law jurisdictions, 
where contract, property and tort are more fluidic and thought to be 
more facilitative of private ordering, and where assets therefore may be 
subdivided into more finely grained spatio-temporal “slices,” assets are 
in principle more liquid, asset markets more complete, and choices and 
autonomy—as well, therefore, at least in theory, as wealth and 
welfare—are for that reason greater.185  The legal security of an asset’s 
liquidity itself, then, is in part a function of the legal system’s degree, 
optimal or suboptimal, of accommodatingness—i.e., the degree to 
which the law honors the abstraction effect by recognizing, facilitating, 
and protecting autonomous asset-delimiting and exchange decisions 
hence private ordering, consistently with the need to economize on 
information costs.186  The same observation, duly modified, will hold of 
the law’s role in facilitating securitization and contingent claims 
transactions, more on which below. 
We therefore see that law secures autonomy in at least two ways, 
both mediated through the parceling of and transacting around assets: 
first, by protecting autonomy-enhancing asset-ownership itself; and 
second, by recognizing, facilitating and enforcing autonomously agreed 
parcelings and delimitings of assets and transactions that derive in part 
from title to them.  The latter is not only to protect the choices involved 
in those parcelings and transactions themselves.  It is also to enhance or 
 
 183 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of 
Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1 (2000); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry 
E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface (Draft 10/28/00, on file with Yale Center for Law, 
Economics & Organization); Henry E. Smith, Two Dimensions of Property Rights (Draft 3/31/00, 
on file with Northwestern University School of Law). 
 184 But see Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property: Form, Context, and Audience, 55 
STAN. L. REV. 1105 (2003), on the role that such limitations might, under some circumstances, 
play in facilitating liquidity and choice by economizing on the information costs that afflict 
markets in ownable goods; see also JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND (2000), and ELSTER, 
ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS, supra note 120, on circumstances under which constraining choice 
might enhance autonomy. 
Analogy with language seems particularly apt.  The latter dramatically extends the range of 
thoughts and objects of thought that one can entertain, hence, in a sense, one’s cognitive 
autonomy.  More property types mean more autonomy just as more vocabulary means more 
thought.  But some coherent set of rules bounding and governing these matters—the structuring 
of language by definitions and grammar, the delimitation and vindication of property-holding and 
-exchange by law—also are required lest autonomy degenerate into a cacophonous and 
incoherent heteronomy. 
 185 With the caveat mentioned in the previous note.  On the relations among such market 
completeness, choice, autonomy and welfare, see, again, Parts II.C-D, supra. 
 186 See supra note 184. 
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optimize asset-liquidity, which itself increases the degree to which 
asset-ownership enhances autonomy.187  The law, then, as public 
facilitation of private ordering pursuant to the abstraction effect, can, by 
optimizing the security and liquidity of asset-holding, be seen yet again 
to amount to public action facilitative of private EEOR liberty.  That, of 
course, once again is how the EEOR itself, and hence the American OS, 
should be viewed—public action in support of private liberty. 
Beyond the abstraction effect—the legal bundling and parceling of 
entitlements—and consequent liquidity considerations, the law’s formal 
securing of effective ownership must be viewed along a simpler metric.  
This one might be called the basic “hardness” of entitlement, in both 
property and contract form, within the doctrines and protections of the 
law.  “Hardness,” like the notions of “accumulation” and “wealth” 
mentioned above, is a rather open-ended and elusive concept, bearing 
no distinct or singulary status in either legal or financial theory.  But it 
nonetheless appears to capture something now well documented in the 
literature of behavioral and experimental economics.  What we are after 
here is reminiscent of, though analytically distinguishable from, both 
material durability and practical legal enforceability.  It is the formal 
legal analogue to these, and even reminiscent, in a manner, of liquidity 
again.  The fact is that American law traditionally has recognized and 
protected some forms of property and other entitlements (e.g., contract 
rights) longer than, and continues to treat some as in a puzzling sense 
“more fundamental” than, certain others.  It also offers differing forms 
of protection—differing forms and degrees of entitlement—with 
variable implications for autonomy.  And these differing forms and 
degrees appear both to reflect and to perpetuate certain psychological 
attitudes toward these differing forms of entitlement. 
A few examples familiar to lawyers help flesh the point out and 
give it concrete expression.  In a still celebrated article,188 Professor 
Reich suggested years ago that the welfare state had ushered in a “new 
[form of] property” which should be recognized as such both in order to 
maintain citizens’ independence from government and to vindicate 
constitutional values.  Entitlements conferred by statute, Reich argued, 
even if entitlements to nothing more than conditional income-streams, 
were entitlements conferred by law.  Such entitlements accordingly 
warranted the status of property—protected by constitutional due 
 
 187 Tobin also singles out what he terms an asset’s “divisibility” as a fundamental attribute.  
He limits his discussion, however, to fractional unit sizes, as it were along a single dimension—
that of simple quantity.  See TOBIN, supra note 179, at 15. 
 188 Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964); see also Charles A. Reich, 
Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245 (1965); 
Frank I. Michelman, Forward: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 
HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969); William H. Simon, Rights and Redistribution in the Welfare System, 38 
STAN. L. REV. 1431 (1986). 
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process rights against state-expropriation or encroachment.  They were 
owned, just like anything else to which the law attached title.  The 
United States Supreme Court of course soon agreed in large measure, in 
effect constitutionalizing Reich’s argument in Goldberg v. Kelly.189  
“Entitlement” could be like title. 
Even in the Reich and Goldberg era, however, there were limits on 
the linkages between the ownership of “older” and of “newer” 
property.190  Due process protected individuals against capricious case-
by-case denials by administrative bodies of legislatively conferred 
entitlements.  But it did not protect the entire class of such recipients 
from wholesale repeal of the entitling program itself.191  Nor were 
welfare or social security checks, like title to land or other “old” 
property, assignable.192  As if to underscore the point, all it took was a 
new appointment or two to the Court and a few short months before the 
new property came once again to look like less than property at all.193  
Moreover, a few appointments more and another fifteen years saw even 
non-welfare check government entitlements looking less secure, while 
more traditional entitlements grew even more secure—though in a 
“cognizable stake” rather than “secure from takings” sense—than they 
had been in previous decades.  The allusion here, of course, is to 
Supreme Court justiciability doctrine since the later 1980s.  It has 
almost come to seem that very “old”—traditional common law—
property is as it were “more owned,” so far as the federal courts are 
concerned, as a public law matter.194  In so far as this is the case, assets 
of long American-legal pedigree—ideally, traceable to ancient common 
law vindicability—might be expected to be more formal-legally secure 
than others.  They are more “owned,” precisely because they are more 
“concrete,” or “hard.”195 
 
 189 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
 190 See, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 484 (1970) (now the Burger Court, 
upholding a Maryland regulation having the effect of holding maximum AFDC grant below the 
established needs of some families; observing that “here we deal with state regulation in the 
social and economic field, not affecting freedoms guaranteed by the Bill of Rights”). 
 191 See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960). 
 192 See Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Bd., 409 U.S. 413 (1972); see also 42 U.S.C. § 407 
(2000). 
 193 See note infra 190. 
 194 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) [hereinafter Lujan II]; Lujan v. 
Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990).  One might have thought that an Article III “case” 
would be presented any time that a cause of action had accrued, that causes of action in turn 
accrued with injuries, and that injuries in turn were defined by law—including, then, by statute.  
Yet by requiring that a very special and ill-defined kind of injury—“concrete and particularized” 
(see Lujan II, 504 U.S. at 560)—be suffered before access could be had to the federal courts, the 
Supreme Court began in the 1980s to appear to hold that those forms of injury, thus those forms 
of right or entitlement cognizable in 1787, would be the most readily vindicated in the federal 
courts today.    
 195 If we add to this consideration the fact that the U.S. Supreme Court’s “takings” 
jurisprudence under the 5th Amendment appears to be bringing greater security to “old” property 
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Another example, this one from private rather than public law, is a 
bit less dramatic but no less important.  In another celebrated article a 
decade less venerable than Reich’s, Professors Calabresi and Melamed 
seminally distinguished between “property rules” and “liability 
rules.”196  The distinction is drawn in terms of the form of specific legal 
vindication afforded a legal entitlement.  Property protection, of course, 
is such as requires any taker of another’s entitlement to pay a price set 
by the holder.  Liability protection is such as requires the taker to pay a 
price determined by the law itself, broadly conceived—e.g., by legal 
doctrine or by a trial court’s application of a broadly stated legal 
standard, which might but need not incorporate a market’s valuation of 
the entitlement in question.  Assets that are “property,” in this sense, 
accordingly are more “asset-like”—conferring of more choice—than are 
assets, such as contractual rights, that are vindicated by “mere” liability 
rules.  For they permit the holder to determine price.  But both, of 
course, are assets to a greater degree than are “mere” government 
“entitlements” per Reich, at least legally speaking.197 
A critical fact, in this connection, is that the law affords most 
protection—confers most “assetness”—upon precisely those assets that 
we will see tend to be appreciated by holders as more asset-like—
“hard,” “accumulated” assets.198  Property rules, for example, typically 
protect holders of physical or otherwise accumulated objects and 
capital, even though of course such objects might be variously divided 
along spatio-temporal lines.  Liability rules, in turn, protect rights to 
performance (contract) or rights to be free of “performance” (tort).  And 
 
even against democratically decided actions by the state, traditional assets definitely look to be 
increasingly “asset-like” along the legal security metric relative to more newfangled entitlements.  
They are the assets that “nobody can take away from you.”  Hence they are the assets most 
“owned.”  More on this infra, Part III.B.3. 
 196 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 92 (1972). 
 197 As a practical matter, of course, a government entitlement might nonetheless be more 
secure in some instances once we take into account the law’s other realms that bear upon the 
security of a contractual entitlement.  The federal government—at least up to now—does not go 
bankrupt, for example. 
 198 I must emphasize here again that what I am calling an asset’s “hardness” is not an 
altogether satisfactory, or even indeed ultimately theoretically intelligible, concept.  The fact that 
now proliferating intellectual property forms are “hard” in the requisite sense makes that plain.  
“Hardness” is an attribute that appears to be grounded in pre-theoretic intuitions—in endowment 
heuristics—rather than in any coherent theory.  It is tempting to place the emphasis on 
“accumulated” rather than “hard,” in as much as it appears to be the perception of the asset’s 
being as it were a fait accompli—something that one now possesses—rather than its tangibility 
that underwrites the perception that one is now “endowed” with it.  But even here we have not 
found a satisfactory interpretation, for many financial assets—accounts receivable and bond 
instruments, for example—are both presently held and yet little more than claims on future 
income streams.  Hence my earlier remark, atop page 164, that “hardness” is an “open-ended and 
elusive concept, bearing no distinct or singulary status in either legal or financial theory.”  A 
consequence, I fear, of pretheoretic endowment psychology itself—a psychology that seems to 
find expression, as I argue here, in legal doctrine itself.  
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due process rights, so far as entitlement is concerned, at best protect 
rights to be free of certain forms of state expropriation of originally 
state-conferred or commonlaw-recognized entitlement.  The more 
venerable the provenance and traditional the form of an entitlement, 
then, the “harder” and more protected by the law it seems to be.  The 
“endowment effect,” in a sense, appears to be enshrined in as well as 
enhanced or perpetuated by the law itself. 
 
2.     In Citizen-Psychology 
 
Responsible liberty is not merely a theoretical ideal or legal value.  
It is a lived reality, a reality in relation to which the EEOR’s ideals and 
laws are understood.  The American OS as EEOR, then, will take 
account of real citizen-psychology in legally defining, vindicating, and 
fostering the spread of the ownership of autonomy-conferring assets. 
As it happens, a vast amount of recent empirical research supports 
the long-held American intuition that asset-owning, in the senses 
elaborated in Part III.A.1, conduces to the rich form of responsible 
agency elaborated in Part II.  Owning spawns thoughtful, hopeful, 
forward-looking, active, participative, healthy, educated, confident, 
secure-feeling, achieving, creative, civically and familially engaged, 
productive and responsible citizens.  The same research might partly 
explain, and in turn be explained by, the law’s affording greater 
protection to “old,” “hard” property than to “new” property, and to 
property than to contractual and other entitlements.  For it seems that 
“accumulated” and “hard-owned”—i.e., fully property-law-protected—
wealth produces the autonomy-enriching effects more starkly than does 
unaccumulated “income”—either of the liability rule-protected form, 
the “government entitlement” form, or any other form.  Assets in the 
EEOR or American OS, that is to say, are more like “stocks” than 
“flows.” 
One dramatic, though perhaps, in view of the endowment heuristic, 
ironic effect of accumulated wealth-holding on individual psychology is 
its inducing an orientation toward the future, and a consequent attitude 
of control thereover.  Those who hold accumulated assets take present 
choices specifically with an eye toward affecting their long-term future 
environments.  They “invest.”  They take responsibility for the future, 
and they regard the future as in a sense more real, more concrete.  Those 
who do not hold wealth tend to orient choices only to the present or 
very near future.199  These effects have been observed even when 
 
 199 The causality, one might expect, should run both ways.  An “investment mentality” would 
seem more likely to result in asset-accumulation than would a profligate, “live for the moment” 
mentality.  Studies controlling for the bidirectional causal effect have found nonetheless that 
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controlling for differential income-flows as between those who have 
accumulated and those who have not, and when controlling for the 
obvious causative role that an antecedent propensity to save presumably 
would have played in accumulating in the first place.200  Asset-holding 
carries with it an investing, future-affecting and caretaking mentality, 
which in turn fosters an attitude of autonomy—the sense that one is not 
merely a passive object of fate and future, but a part-controller of the 
same.201 
Asset-holding also broadens the range of choices that people 
actually do make—and over time, therefore, that they actively seek out 
or work to ensure that they will face.  One illustrative example here is a 
long-observed difference in behavior between participants in defined 
benefit and defined contribution pension plans.202  Both are well settled 
legal entitlements that enjoy due process protection, though defined 
contribution plans technically enjoy property protection while defined 
benefit plans enjoy more contract-like protection.203  The latter also, 
through vesting and drawing rules (forms of contingency), more tightly 
constrain rights of action.  They also, by definition, entitle their owners 
merely to “flows,” not to “stocks.”  And accumulated funds are 
controlled by fiduciaries rather than by the merely passive, 
“beneficially” owning pensioners.  Such defined benefit pensioners, it 
has (unsurprisingly) been established, report feeling more dependent 
upon the firms for which they labor.  And they retire at a single 
prescribed age.204  Participants in defined contribution plans, by 
 
asset-holding itself fosters investment attitudes that lead to more asset-holding.  See Gautam N. 
Yadama & Michael Sherraden, Effects of Assets on Attitudes and Behaviors: Advance Test of a 
Social Policy Proposal, Working Paper No. 95-2, Center for Social Development (1995); 
Deborah Page-Adams & Michael Sherraden, What We Know About Effects of Asset Holding: 
Implications for Research on Asset-Based Anti-Poverty Initiatives, Working Paper No. 96-1, 
Center for Social Development (1996); S. Beverly et al., A Framework of Asset-Accumulation 
Stages and Strategies, Working Paper No. 01-1, Center for Social Development (2001); Amanda 
Moore McBride et al., The Effects of Individual Development Account Programs: Perceptions of 
Participants, Working Paper No. 03-06, Center for Social Development (2003); Michael 
Sherraden et al., Overcoming Poverty: Supported Saving as a Household Development Strategy, 
Working Paper No. 04-13, Center for Social Development (2004); see also Sherraden, supra note 
5, at 151-57.   
 200 See sources cited supra note 199. 
 201 See sources cited supra note 199. 
 202 Defined benefit plans guarantee a payment stream to beneficiaries, while the assets from 
which those payments are derived remain under the control of the pension fund manager.  
Defined contribution plans involve facilitation and (in many but not all cases) supplementation of 
beneficiary savings in their own accounts.  See generally JOHN H. LANGBEIN & BRUCE A. WOLK, 
PENSION AND EMPLOYEE BENEFIT LAW 42-55 (3d ed. 2000); E. PHILIP DAVIS, PENSION FUNDS: 
RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY AND CAPITAL MARKETS, AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
230-44 (1995); PENSIONS IN THE U.S. ECONOMY 139-60 (Zvi Bodie et al. eds., 1988). 
 203 It is not clear that property rules and liability rules diverge, however, when the property in 
question is monetary. 
 204 See Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L. J. 451 (2004); 
James Stock & David A. Wise, The Pension Inducement to Retire: An Option Value Analysis, 
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contrast, are both more likely to retire before the age of 60 and, perhaps 
more surprisingly, after the age of 65 than are participants in defined 
benefit plans.205  And they report stronger perceptions of control and 
autonomy.  Once again, there is nothing particularly shocking in this.  
Those who legally possess more—and less conditioned—individual 
control over assets simply face, trivially, more options than other 
people.  And they tend to exercise those options.  This in turn develops 
a more broadly-sweeping “menu mentality,” which in turn assists in 
developing an autonomous—discriminating and evaluating—
personality, the personality of an American EEOR citizen-agent.206 
One particularly salient type of choice-making and choice-seeking 
attitude that asset-holding tends to support, a type especially valued by 
the CR tradition, is that of civic engagement and political and economic 
participation.  Social scientists and political theorists alike repeatedly 
have observed that materially independent people, because they need 
not obey the naked, non-reason-mediated wills of others for their 
sustenance, must be persuaded by those others to do what those others 
wish.  They thus come to be treated as rational, autonomous deciders,207 
and not surprisingly come to regard themselves as such.  In 
consequence, as empirical work confirms, they become more involved 
in their communities, in clubs and boards and organizations than do 
non-owners—in effect transforming their physical capital into social 
capital.208  (They “bowl alone” less than do others.209)  Relatedly, 
owners are more energetically approached for support by those who 
seek positions of political and other forms of leadership, a variation on 
the “need to persuade” theme noted just above.210  Commensurately, 
owners are more active participants in democratic political processes.211  
This tendency is reinforced, of course, by the owners’ holding of 
intelligible stakes in the socioeconomic-cum-political system, and in 
 
NBER Working Paper No. 2660 (1988). 
 205 See Stock & Wise, supra note 204. 
 206 See sources cited supra note 199. 
 207 At any rate, as people who must be deceived or manipulated rather than simply ordered 
about. 
 208 See, e.g., C. WRIGHT MILLS, WHITE COLLAR: THE AMERICAN MIDDLE CLASSES (1951); 
GABRIEL KOLKO, WEALTH AND POWER IN AMERICA (1962); G. WILLIAM DOMHOFF, THE 
HIGHER CIRCLES: THE OWNING CLASS IN AMERICA (1970); Anthony F. Shorrocks, UK Wealth 
Distribution: Current Evidence and Future Prospects, in GROWTH, ACCUMULATION, AND 
UNPRODUCTIVE ACTIVITY 29 (Edward N. Wolff ed., 1987); Denis Kessler & André Masson, 
Personal Wealth Distribution in France: Cross-Sectional Evidence and Extensions, in GROWTH, 
ACCUMULATION, AND UNPRODUCTIVE ACTIVITY, supra, at 141 (Edward Wolff ed., 1987); see 
also sources cited supra note 199. 
 209 The allusion is of course to PUTNAM, supra note 83.  The claim, of course, is not that 
insufficient stakeholding is the only cause of “bowling alone.”  It is only that stakeholding 
constitutes a countervailing influence. 
 210 See sources cited supra notes 199, 208. 
 211 See sources cited supra notes 199, 208. 
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society at large as community leaders, etc.  Owners accordingly 
perceive themselves both as more influential and as more called upon to 
wield influence as responsible “owners” of their polities, economies and 
social systems.212  They become precisely those responsible, 
autonomous, politically and socially participative freeholders 
envisioned by CR ideology from the time of its earliest formulations.  
They also tend, of course, to become responsibly autonomous life-
planners and life-builders of the kind envisaged by CL.213  In doing so, 
they act productively in the way valued by PC. 
Beyond economic, political and civic engagement, asset-holding 
also has been found empirically to correlate with familial engagement 
and cohesion.  This correlation could have been anticipated after earlier 
studies linking family strife and dissolution with the pressures wrought 
by poverty.214  But what newer studies show is that owned and 
accumulated assets bear a more pronounced countervailing effect than 
do income-flows, even when controlling for income-differentials 
between those who hold accumulated assets and those who do not.215  In 
light of the observations made just above, again this will not surprise.  
In so far as accumulated assets conduce to engagement and a sense of 
responsibility, and in so far as they conduce to a sense of security and 
general well being, they can be expected to foster healthy relations with 
intimates. 
Telescoping from political, civic and familial well being to 
individual well being, accumulated asset-owning correlates with 
superior cognitive function, academic achievement, emotional 
adjustment and physical health among both adults and children.216  
Again, these findings are robust when controlling for differential 
income-flows among those who do and those who do not hold 
 
 212 William Simon makes a similar point as a conceptual rather than as a social-psychological 
matter.  See Simon, supra note 23, at 1350-88; sources cited supra note 208; see also McBride, 
supra note 199.   
 213 See sources cited supra notes 199, 208; see also A.M. McBride et al., Civic Engagement 
Among Low-Income and Low-Wealth Families: In Their Words, Working Paper No. 04-14, 
Center for Social Development (2004). 
 214 On that correlation, see, e.g., ROBERT HOCKETT, CHAKA’S WINDOWS: WORKS AND DAYS 
IN THE LIFE OF A HOMELESS ENTREPRENEUR (unpublished manuscript on file with the author); 
ELLIOT LIEBOW, TALLY’S CORNER: A STUDY OF NEGRO STREETCORNER MEN (1967); DANIEL 
PATRICK MOYNIHAN, FAMILY AND NATION (1965). 
 215 See McBride, supra note 199; Sherraden et al., supra note 199; McBride et al., supra note 
213. 
 216 See T.R. Williams, The Impacts of Household Wealth on Child Development, Working 
Paper No. 04-07, Center for Social Development (2004); A.M. McBride et al., Asset Building: 
Increasing Capacity for Performance Measurement and Effects, Working Paper No. 04-12, 
Center for Social Development (2004); Deborah Page-Adams et al., Assets, Health, and Well-
Being: Neighborhoods, Families, Children and Youth, Working Paper No. 01-9, Center for Social 
Development (2001); Sherraden et al., supra note 199; McBride et al., supra note 199. 
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accumulated assets.217  And of course, where children are the subjects of 
study, superior cognitive function cannot be claimed to be the cause of 
the familial asset-holding.218  Asset-owning in the senses elaborated in 
Part III.A.1, then, appears from quite an early stage, at quite a “micro”-
oriented level of observation, to conduce to the development of healthy 
citizen-agents of the kind extolled by the American EEOR. 
It bears notice in this connection that the effects here observed to 
correlate with asset-holding are empirically observed in other 
jurisdictions, outside of the U.S., as well as in the U.S.  The endowment 
effect is not confined to American holding.  What we should expect of 
ownership in the American OS, then, might not be entirely contingent 
upon that OS’s being American.  There might be “universal” appeal to 
an OS, or at least universal “Western” appeal.219  Studies of attitudes 
and self-reported welfare in Sweden, for example, where all have been 
entitled to impressive magnitudes of state-provided welfare payment 
streams for many decades,220 indicate that many people suffer from a 
sense of disempowerment and childlike dependence upon choices made 
by others—in this case, state functionaries.221  The source of these 
feelings is said to be the lack of personal control over the expenditures 
made upon each subject’s behalf—even with the payment streams quite 
customarily secure, and even when more or less the same expenditure 
choices would have been made by the subjects themselves had they 
directed them.222  Also at work here, evidently, is the implicit 
knowledge that those who give—in this case, state functionaries—could 
in theory take away, both corroborating Reich’s claims and suggesting 
that pre-welfare state forms of property rights are such forms as most 
conduce to an independent EEOR citizenry. 
Cross-national studies also suggest that, even after controlling for 
income and education levels, citizens who own and control accumulated 
assets tend more highly to value initiative and self-directedness on the 
part of themselves and their children, to be more flexible and creative, 
and to be more chance- or risk-welcoming intellectually—corroborating 
a “wealth effect,” cognate with the endowment effect, oft-observed by 
 
 217 See sources cited supra note 216. 
 218 Though of course it might be for parents.  More study is required here, controlling for 
causation in the other direction.  A reasonable working hypothesis would be that among adults 
causality proceeds in both directions. 
 219 World Bank and other international civil servants speculate on the prospects of “ownership 
society”-like proposals in the developing economies in CURING WORLD POVERTY: THE NEW 
ROLE OF PROPERTY (John H. Miller ed., 1994). 
 220 See generally JONAS PONTUSSON, THE LIMITS OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY: INVESTMENT 
POLITICS IN SWEDEN (1992). 
 221 See HUGH HECLO & HENRIK MADSEN, POLICY AND POLITICS IN SWEDEN (1987); Tony 
Horwitz, Welfare Stagnation Besets Smug Sweden, WALL ST. J., April 5, 1990, at A15. 
 222 See sources cited supra note 221.  The reports of defined benefit pensioners discussed 
supra, notes 202-205 and accompanying text, come back to mind. 
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behavioral economists.223  This suggests, again, that owner-citizens are 
likely ultimately to prove more productive, hence more of the PC-
appreciable type.  It might, again, be thought that causality here could 
run the other way—that people with such attributes simply tend to 
become the owners of accumulated and legally protected assets in the 
relatively developed countries where they reside.  There is strong 
evidence, however, that at least in certain environments such attitudes 
do not themselves alone bring differences in income or in wealth.224 
Much, of course, remains to be done in empirically mapping these 
correlations and their causal directions.  But the substantial results that 
we find confirm our intuitions.  And as a matter of common sense it 
would seem reasonable to hypothesize a symbiosis in any event: Secure, 
accumulated, and personally controlled—owned—assets encourage a 
sense of independence and capacity to choose and change the future, 
while such attitudes in turn prove in large part to be self-fulfilling, 
resulting in accumulations of yet further wealth.  With actual 
responsibility comes a “responsible personality.”225  And responsible 
persons make for agent-citizens of the sort envisaged by and celebrated 
in American self-understanding—the self-understanding of inhabitants 
of the productive equal-rights republic—the EEOR or American OS. 
 
3.     In Sum, Working With the Abstraction & Endowment Effects 
 
The observations elaborated in Parts III.A.1 and III.A.2 
recommend some basic policy parameters, or what might be called 
strategic considerations bearing upon how best to implement an 
American OS.  The EEOR which is the American OS is interested in 
ownership as a means of facilitating the successful and responsible 
happiness-pursuit of independent, though it is also interested in 
interdependent, citizen-agents.  That, along with exogenously given 
citizen-psychology and the only gradually, incrementally changing 
nature of the exogenously given American legal tradition, suggests that 
some pathways are clearer than others in delimiting assets and optimally 
promoting their widespread ownership. 
First, an American OS will recognize and foster ownership of the 
greatest variety of choice-enhancing resources and opportunities 
 
 223 See Melvin Kohn et al., Position in the Class Structure and Psychological Functioning in 
the United States, Japan, and Poland, 95 AM. J. SOC. 964-1008 (1990). 
 224 Id. 
 225 See JEREMY WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 310-13 (1988); and Gregory S. 
Alexander, Pensioners in America: The Economic Triumph and Political Limitations of Passive 
Ownership, in A FOURTH WAY?: PRIVATIZATION, PROPERTY, AND THE EMERGENCE OF NEW 
MARKET ECONOMIES 33, 42-43 (Gregory S. Alexander ed., 1994). 
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possible.226  Innovative parcelings of assets along material, temporal, 
and even contingency lines (so as to handle risk in addition to 
opportunity)—generally effected now by contract—should be 
facilitated.  These are rooted in the “abstraction effect” noted above.  
And they have the effect of enhancing asset-generativity, hence agent 
autonomy.  Where possible, such privately ordered asset-determination 
should be more fully secured by law.  This might counsel affording 
something more like property protection even to some contractual 
rights, e.g., by permitting liquidated damages clauses in contracts, at 
least where contracting parties do not manifest unequal bargaining 
power.227   
Second and relatedly, the American OS will facilitate and foster 
the spread of markets in which such spatio-temporal and contingency 
parceling and trading of parcels is effected.  This is one aspect of 
facilitating such parceling itself, and additionally is one aspect of 
“completing” that critically important market mechanism serving at the 
heart of the EEOR/American OS described at Part II.C.  But it also, 
more directly to the point of this Part, has the effect of enhancing asset-
liquidity per the terms of III.A.1, which again enhances agent-citizen 
autonomy. 
Third, the American OS will do such as it can to foster the spread 
of “durable,” “accumulated” and legally secure assets among its 
citizenry.  For, as we saw, those assets are in a sense determined both by 
law and by owner-psychology, “more owned” than other assets; they 
afford more legally vindicated autonomy, and are maximally correlated 
with the attitudes, practices, and other indicia of ownership catalogued 
above.  And they therefore conduce more strongly toward that practical 
and experienced autonomy that characterizes the American EEOR’s 
agent-citizens.  Those three features—durability, accumulatedness and 
legal security—are for their parts, as discussed at III.A.1, not practically 
orthogonal, even if analytically distinct.  For legal security in the 
American legal tradition appears to ride pragmatically in part upon 
durability itself—the vintage form of property, so to speak.  And the 
empirical correlations between citizens’ agent-psychology on the one 
hand and “accumulated” asset-holding on the other might in turn stem 
partly from the implicit knowledge that one owns more legally-securely 
what one physically possesses.  In any event, these interrelations 
 
 226 “Possible” here of course presumably will be bounded by information and transacting 
costs.  See notes supra 183-84 and accompanying text. 
 227 I say “might” here because full assessment of the advisability of doing this would require 
much more discussion that I can embark upon here—indeed a full grappling with the extensive 
literature on the good sense of liability over property rules in many contexts.  I hope that I may be 
forgiven, then, for confining myself here to doing no more than highlighting the possible interest 
of an American OS in revisiting some of the classic discussions inititiated by Calabresi & 
Melamed.  
  
74 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 27:1 
themselves yield a provisional policy prescription.  First, as advised per 
the first strategic counsel regarding the abstraction effect, we should 
“propertize” even liability-rule-protected and government entitlements.  
Second, to the degree that we do not believe that we can do that owing 
to the “endowment effect” that is the only gradually changing American 
law itself, we should work to foster the spread of “hard” or 
“accumulable” assets—the kind already enjoying property rule 
protection.  Such are those as will foster the ongoing mentality of EEOR 
agent-citizens. 
 In connection with the “propertization” counsel, we should 
perhaps, before moving on, dispel one possible doubt rooted in the 
EEOR principle as to the desirability of “propertizing” contract rights 
and tort immunities.   
 Recall that the EEOR values not merely agency, but responsible 
agency.  And responsible agency entails equal agency, at least in the 
sense that it requires that the responsible agency’s material correlate—
access to ethically exogenous resources and risk—be equitably spread.  
But we also noted that the only way to render the notion of “equal 
spread” of heterogeneous goods and ills that are not separately 
equalized (ad seriatim, as it were, good by good and ill by ill) over 
agents intelligible is to index through the operation of complete and 
neutral markets, which amount to democratic determinations of the 
relative worths of heterogeneous goods and ills, by citizens endowed 
with equal “votes” in those markets.  This might seem to suggest, then, 
that the appropriate remedy for violation of a legal right is the (complete 
and neutral) market—the social, or “true”—valuation of that right, not 
the right-holder’s possibly idiosyncratic—or deliberately exaggerated—
valuation.  And that, in turn, would suggest vindication of the right by 
liability rules of a particular kind, rather than by property rules: victims 
would be limited to court-determined recoveries, and courts in turn 
would be limited to market-determined amounts.  All remedies, in 
effect, would be like “takings” remedies, requiring “just” compensation 
defined as (complete and neutral) market value compensation.   
 Notwithstanding the initial “bite” of this objection, the preferred 
EEOR path is nonetheless to favor practicable propertization, at least in 
respect of contract rights, and in a sense to be explained, in respect of 
tort immunities as well.  The reason is rooted in that crucial distinction, 
described in Part II, between ethically exogenous and ethically 
endogenous holdings.  That distinction in the present context is 
isomorphic to the ex–ante/ex-post distinction vis-a-vis the operation of 
complete and neutral markets.  If, and only if, holdings of ethically 
exogenous resources have been equalized over citizens prior to their 
entering complete and neutral markets, and if their holdings after entry 
into those markets are traceable to those equalized initial holdings and 
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their trading activity in those markets, then their holdings are consistent 
with the requirement of boundedly responsible, hence equal, agency.  
They hold what they ought to hold, and the social valuation—market 
value—of those holdings is of no further ethical interest to us.  The 
social valuation of agents’ assets is ethically interesting only prior to 
our agents’ entry into the market, when we are seeking to determine 
what everyone ought to start out with—hence how much they are to be 
compensated when victimized by hard luck, by the workings of blind 
fate.  After we have done that, post-market-entry holdings are ethically 
endogenized.  People have what they deserve, and are viewed as being 
ethically entitled to it.  There is no further public salience to what it is 
that what they have is “worth,” at least not so long as it is held.   
 Given that posture, the question then becomes, how should 
legally entitled ethical deserts be valued and compensated if and when 
they are subsequently violated or taken (rather than denied at the outset, 
ex ante), not by hard luck—by blind fate—but by voluntary entitlement-
violative behavior by a transgressor.  The first part of the question 
seems to be easily answered:  Since legitimate transfers of title take 
place by voluntary exchange at prices mutually agreed by transferors 
and transferees paid by the latter, the legitimizing—correcting—of an 
involuntary “exchange” likewise should involve exaction of a price 
from the transferee.  In effect, the taker has performed one part of an 
involuntary transaction, and she owes back her part of the “bargain.”228  
Her part of the bargain, in turn, is what the wronged party “would” have 
charged—at a minimum, her reservation price prior to transacting—in 
exchange for what was taken.  This general guideline constrains our 
answer to the second question. 
 The second question, which concerns the amount that should be 
exacted of the transgressor, is a bit more complicated, but not much.  
Begin with the case of contract, in which transacting as such is 
voluntary, and only the subsequent history of the transaction might 
possibly turn out to be involuntary in some respect.  If all of the 
generally required predicates of fairness (i.e., equal opportunity)—
competence on the part of both parties, rough transparency and rough 
parity of bargaining power—attend the initial agreement, there seems 
no reason not to view the parties’ joint—bargained—valuation of the 
transaction and the cost of breach as the ethically salient one, and thus 
as the appropriate answer to the counterfactual “would have charged” 
question.  For the charge has in fact been agreed, ex ante.  Responsible 
agency and equal opportunity among citizens are not implicated, let 
alone offended, by whatever valuation the parties jointly place upon the 
 
228 Where she has taken more than she can pay, even out of what she has taken, the overage in 
effect becomes a case of hard luck—ethically exogenous—so society is the appropriate 
compensator.  The overage is as it were an “act of God.” 
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terms of their autonomous transaction.  Since autonomy here does not 
require limitation by responsibility (apart from the mutual responsibility 
of the two contracting parties) in the transaction, there seems no reason 
not to afford autonomy maximal vindication through propertization of 
the contractual entitlement.  Arguably specific performance, therefore, 
and certainly stipulated damages, should be enforceable in the 
American OS.  That is the appropriate legal expression given the 
EEOR’s constitutive value of responsible agency in the context of 
contracting.   
 The case of tort is somewhat more difficult, but again, not very 
much.  The added difficulty is simply an empirical/informational one 
bearing upon administrability, not a principled one bearing upon 
conceivability or appropriate guiding ideals.  The question is, how do 
we know, or determine, what the wronged party in a tort case “would” 
have charged or paid in order to relinquish or insure her entitlement to 
immunity from harm?  And, given the difficulty of satisfactorily 
answering that question—a difficulty of which the tort victim herself is 
aware—might there not be a danger that the victim will exaggerate ex 
post what she claims would have been her ex ante reservation price or 
guaranteed insurance payout?229   
 In view of such difficulties, there is a practical problem afflicting 
the administration of any “propertized” system of tort remedies, at least 
if the latter is to be taken to mean a system in which victims literally 
stipulate their own damages.  So while in principle the tort system is on 
the same footing as the contract system and thus should be propertized 
in respect of remedies (again especially, e.g., for such torts as 
conversion and nuisance), in practice the implementation of the 
principle requires limitation.230  The appropriate response of the 
American OS, then, would seem to be to select the most plausible proxy 
for actual reservation price or insurance policy.  The question becomes, 
what is it most likely that the victim actually would have charged, or 
would have insured for?  This might involve the gathering of statistical 
data from which average—hence most likely—amounts are derived; 
these amounts can then be suitably adjusted in view of special features 
of the victim that we should think reasonably would have led to a 
reservation price or insured value greater than or lower than that 
average—e.g., a particular sentimental attachment to the house in which 
 
229 An analogous difficulty, of course, arises in the eminent domain and benefit tax contexts of 
contemporary American property law—viz., the “holdout” problem presented by owners’ 
capacity to overstate what their condemned property “really” is worth to them, and the “free-
rider” problem presented by their capacity to understate what their shares in some tax-financed 
appurtenant public good, e.g. a school, a park, a sewer system or police force, are worth to them.  
See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 196, at 883. 
230 Again, analogous contexts arise, now in contract, where transaction costs are thought to 
render actual contracting infeasible.    
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one was born or the heirloom handed down to her, or a particular 
physical or psychical weakness or vulnerability suffered by the victim.  
To some degree, tort law appears already to do this, as, for example, in 
such doctrines that “the tortfeasor takes the victim as he finds him,” 
operationalized in the “thin skull rule”.231   
 This is of course not the place to forge a full doctrine of 
appropriate tort liability and compensation.  The point is, rather, that, in 
so far as the American OS might propertize much of contract in the 
interest of EEOR autonomy that does not offend ethically salient 
equality, so it might quasi-propertize tort doctrine by forging it 
consciously with a view to simulating, in the remedies that it affords, 
the set of reservation prices or insurance amounts that potential tort 
victims plausibly would have decided upon in advance had they been 
able, as they are in the case of voluntary, contractual relations, to 
stipulate damages ex ante.232   
 The replacement of liability rules by property or quasi-property 
(property-simulating) rules might appear to amount to favoring the CR 
and CL agency tradition over the PC “efficiency” tradition in law.  For 
it is of course notoriously argued that tort and contract law are in 
various respects more Kaldor-Hicks efficient, or “wealth-maximizing,” 
than they would be were they to involve property rather than liability 
rules,233 and that such property law entitlement-limitations as adverse 
possession, the “doctrine of waste,” and the rule against perpetuities 
themselves in turn are more efficient than would be their contraries.   
 It of course can be, and has been, contested whether such claims 
are empirically correct.  In so far as those contesting claims are viable, 
the possible tension between CR and CL propertization on the one hand 
and PC liability rule retention on the other is dissipated.  But we need 
not rely on any particular outcome in the dueling empirical claims of 
Posnerians and anti-Posnerians about the efficiency or otherwise of the 
common law as currently constituted.  For in so far as the PC tradition 
has extolled GDP-maximization, it never has done so as more than a 
general, rough and ready background norm routinely trumpable by more 
carefully delineated and compelling specific aims.  Those aims 
frequently involve some form of fairness—such as racially- and/or 
gender-neutral access to income-earning opportunity or physical 
 
231 See, e.g., Poole v. Copland, Inc., 348 N.C. 260 (1998).  
232 Actually it wouldn’t be reservation price but bargained price.  But this is even more fanciful 
to “simulate—who “bargains” to be a tort victim—than the case of reservation price, so I leave it 
there.  On my use of “might” here, please see note 227, supra. 
233 The justification offered, for example, of the doctrine of “efficient breach” in the law of 
contract.  See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Contract Remedies, Renegotiation, and the Theory of 
Efficient Breach, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 629 (1988); see also Daniel Friedmann, The Efficient 
Breach Fallacy, 18 J. LEG. STUD. 1 (1989); see generally ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, 
LAW AND ECONOMICS 289 (1988).  
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capacity-neutral access to public spaces—and certainly may involve the 
constitutive CR and CL values of boundedly responsible agency or 
autonomy, values which PC itself, in so far as its maximization norm is 
ethically intelligible only when reconciled with its fairness norm as 
observed above, permits full latitude. 
We shall return to these broad policy guidelines, in consolidated 
and catalogued form employed here, when we turn in the sequel to fully 
elaborated programs by which we may more fully realize the American 
OS.  What is more interesting for immediate purposes is how these very 
general American OS-prescribed policy directions interact with the 
constraints placed upon the EEOR’s understanding of asset and 
ownership by its other guiding value.  For the EEOR, recall, extols not 
merely liberty, but liberty understood by reference to the equal 
opportunity principle. 
 
B.     Ownership & Responsibility 
 
It is the qualifier “responsible” prefixed to “liberty” that occasions 
most challenge to the law’s fortifying agency by delimiting, vindicating 
and promoting asset-ownership.  In particular, the problem arises 
between vindicating and promoting.  Theoretically, the problem is 
readily surmountable.  Such was one upshot of Part II.B’s elaboration of 
responsible liberty as equal opportunity.  To “vindicate” is simply to 
“promote” ownership no more and no less than recommended by the 
EOP.  Even practically the problem is containable and largely soluble.  
Such was one upshot of Parts II.B through II.D.  Part II as a whole, 
then, was in part the working of a theoretic and in part the working of a 
practical, workable “settlement” of the autonomy/externality “boundary 
dispute” that we observed at Part I in earlier times to have plagued the 
three American political traditions’ attempts to settle upon workable 
principles of ownership delimitation and vindication. 
This Subpart traces the implications which that settlement bears for 
American law’s delimiting and vindicating ownership.  As in the 
previous Subpart, we find here that endowment effects—again, both in 
the path-dependent features of the American legal tradition and as 
aspects of empirical ownership-psychology—delimit the boundaries of 
the practicable.  Or at any rate they recommend some means of 
vindicating ownership in keeping with the EOP as more frictionless 
than others. 
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1.     Once Again in Theory 
 
The general ends entailed by the EEOR’s aim to vindicate 
responsible ownership are easiest to characterize.  At the highest level 
of abstraction, the goal is to realize ownership in keeping with the EOP.  
That is the principle of ownership spread recommended by the 
American CR, CL and PC traditions, all now synthesized into that 
overlapping consensus here called the EEOR—the “ideal type” of a 
distinctively American OS. 
Realizing the EOP, we saw in Part II.B, in turn requires that we 
work to equalize holdings of ethically exogenous opportunity across 
owner-citizens, and that we honor unequal holdings of ethically 
endogenous opportunities and resources—holdings traceable to 
responsible choice.  That goal, in turn, sometimes gives rise to a 
“tracing problem,” in turn resulting at times in a “boundary dispute,” 
both also discussed in Part II.  Those difficulties, for their parts, we saw 
to be recalcitrant to a “complete,” “definitive” solution.  On the other 
hand, however, we also saw that it is possible to confine the problem to 
a much narrower sphere of “hard cases”—Sorites-reminiscent cases in 
which we are uncertain as to how free the will was, and how much of 
the end product of will’s exercise is attributable to it, and how much is 
attributable to mere luck—than has hitherto been thought.  One reason 
is that there is a broad terrain of readily measurable opportunity and 
resource endowment that we all can agree to be ethically exogenous.  
The other reason is that a properly constructed market mechanism 
enables us to sidestep the comparability and commensurability 
challenges that render the tracing problem in non-market circumstances 
less tractable. 
But all of this has been at the level of theory.  What remains to be 
done is to draw a preliminary bead on what it will mean to realize the 
theory in policy.  It is here that the matter of exogenous opportunity 
spreading becomes poignant, for boosting the holdings of the EOP-
unjustifiably underendowed requires that we diminish holdings—either 
present or future holdings—of the EOP-unjustifiably overendowed.  
And that sets the stage for conflict, even after we have agreed upon a 
practicable range of unambiguously exogenous endowments and a fair 
and efficient asset-distribution mechanism per Parts II.C and D, above.  
For self-interest, on the parts both of those who stand to gain and of 
those who stand to lose through a reapportionment, has a way of 
clouding over the clarity with which we perceive even the most clear-
cut of cases. 
In order to deal with this problem, I once again endeavor to grapple 
in a bit more detail with the constraints within which our efforts to 
realize theory in policy must operate.  As in the previous Subpart, those 
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constraints are both psychological and legal in nature.  But happily, we 
shall see, the endowment heuristics observed in Part III.A offer 
opportunity as well as constraint here.  We can exploit, that is, the 
present/future divide noted several subsections up.  And the 
“endowment” which is our law offers a great deal of leeway as well. 
 
2.     Using the Heuristics Wisely 
 
Qualifying the nouns “liberty,” “agency,” “autonomy” and 
“ownership” with the adjective “responsible” finds policy and legal 
expression in two practically related but distinct sides of the opportunity 
and resource allocation process.  Call them the “endowing” (or 
“giving”) and the “delimiting” (or “taking”) sides.  In so far as we 
circumscribe the prerogatives of ownership in keeping with the equal 
liberty or equal opportunity principles, we work from the “delimiting” 
side, and might superficially appear to be interfering with liberty or 
objectionably confiscating what is owned.  In so far as we act 
collectively to promote wider ownership of ethically exogenous 
resource and opportunity by more agent-citizens in keeping with the 
EOP, we work from the “endowing” side and might superficially appear 
to be interfering with responsibility, simply giving unearned 
“handouts.”  When the “unearned handouts” appear to be subsidized by 
the (superficially) seeming “takings,” dangers to the perceived 
legitimacy of ownership-promoting action are at their most pronounced. 
Public delimitation and promoting of ownership in keeping with 
the EOP will do well as a strategic matter, then, to take account of 
ownership psychology in defining and fostering responsible ownership, 
just as we noted at Part III.A.2 that it should do in defining that which is 
owned.  This is simply a matter of prudence, or, say, avoidable-cost 
avoidance.  Law and policy that accommodate owner-psychology are 
law and policy that are likely to enjoy the widest possible and longest 
enduring public support.  Such support or its lack are experienced at all 
“levels” of the policy-making and -implementing process—the public 
deliberating, legislating, agency-implementing, adjudicating, and 
private-conforming levels. 
The principal feature of ownership-psychology that operates here 
has already been encountered.  It is the endowment effect seen at III.A 
to result in a perceived difference between “hard,” “accumulated” 
wealth on the one hand, “soft,” “merely entitled” or liability-rule-
protected future “income” on the other.234  Moreover, when attention 
turns from ownership to responsible ownership, the endowment effect 
 
 234 See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text. 
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appears to interact in “feedback” fashion with the Part III.A abstraction 
effect as well.  In other words, limitations upon the use and enjoyment 
or alienability of what one already owns—removing sticks from the 
bundle, so to speak—is itself seen as a “taking” of the endowment. 
The practical and strategic consequence of the endowment 
heuristic, both standing alone and in infusing the abstraction effect, is 
two-fold.  And again it operates at both the “taking” and the 
“endowing” sides of the opportunity-allocation process.  From the 
“taking” side, limitations on future growth in or bundling of asset-
holdings by those who are over-endowed by EOP lights are likely to 
face less opposition than “confiscations” of what already is held.  From 
the “endowing” side, endowing that takes the form of “refraining from 
[perceived] taking,” or of conferring more abstraction rights, is likely to 
face less opposition—appear less like a “handout” or “giveaway”—than 
will endowing that looks on the surface more like an outright grant.  
The policy-optimal strategy, then, in view of owner-psychology, will be 
the opposite of that earlier-noted least optimal strategy—the “taking and 
giving.”  It will be the “channeling of new [and perceivedly exogenous] 
wealth” to, and the “refraining from taking or restricting of wealth” 
from, those who by EOP lights are presently opportunity-
underendowed. 
A classic case of “refraining” in recent years is the earned income 
tax credit, or “EITC,” a program that has enjoyed widespread support 
even among “conservatives.”235  Its success stands in instructive 
contrast to the unpopularity of “negative income tax” (NIT) proposals 
of the past, surprisingly proposed by other “conservatives” of a 
Friedmanite cast, which were perceived more as “givings” than is EITC, 
notwithstanding their orthodox finance-theoretic equivalence.236  
Suggested cases of the “channeling of the new,” for their part, were 
noted at Part III.B.1.  And such programs are further elaborated in 
considerable detail in the sequel.  For present purposes it suffices 
simply to flag these two strategies.  To some extent, they already find 
expression, from time to time, both in law and in policy.  But there is 
much more room here for policy-design, a fact which the sequel 
exploits. 
We should take note of a manner of “paradox” here, however.  
Apart from the endowment heuristic, one other psychological effect 
wrought by asset-holding that we noted at Part III.A.2 is its tendency to 
induce in the holder a propensity to view the future as more concrete—
the future itself, then, as more “endowed.”  Might it be, then, that 
“taking from the future” rather than from what is already accumulated, 
 
 235 See Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 32 (2000). 
 236 See MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 75-85, 161-76 (1962); James Tobin 
et al., Is a Negative Income Tax Practical?, 77 YALE L. J. 1, 6 (1967). 
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per the previous paragraph, faces some manner of “natural limit” 
induced by the success of ownership-promotion itself? 
Two considerations would seem to mitigate any such challenge 
that might arise in this connection.  The first consideration is that the 
endowment effect still presumably would dominate—the “hardness” of 
accumulated assets would be greater than that of the “hardening” 
future—in light both (a) of those accumulated assets’ causal role in that 
“hardening” of the future and (b) of the greater degree of certainty, as a 
matter of law, of risk-attitude and perhaps metaphysics, attaching to 
what is had than to what is expected.  The second consideration, 
dovetailing with the just-noted matter of risk-attitude, is that the 
diminishing marginal utility of wealth also presumably would continue 
to operate here, meaning that prospective future gains would continue, 
as it were by definition, to be less salient to those who do not realize 
those gains than are presently possessed increments of the same amount. 
Two other strategies are more incremental in nature than the 
“rechannelling” and “refraining” strategies.  Again they fall one each on 
the “endowing” and “delimiting” sides of asset-allocation.  On the 
endowing side, the strategy is to condition collective endowing of the 
underendowed upon recipients’ acting in some manner that can be 
easily characterized either as “earning” the perceived “handouts” or as 
being otherwise deserving of them on some ground explicitly tied to the 
endowed item’s ethical exogeneity.  Requiring some manner of 
service—e.g., military or community service—as consideration for 
receipt then, or requiring that recipients use endowed funds only for 
education or medicine or productive investment, is a strategy that both 
should be and increasingly already can be seen at work.  We find it, for 
example, in IRAs, Individual Development Accounts, proposed tax-
favored “private health accounts,” “education accounts,” and other 
programs that the sequel considers under the rubric of “Piecemeal 
Asset-Accumulation Programs.”  In essence, the endowment itself is 
delimited in these cases in a manner commensurate with delimitation of 
the prerogatives of the already endowed by the “responsible”—hence, 
equal exogeneity, unequal endogeneity—qualifier. 
On the “taking” side, the incremental approach is simply to refrain 
from “confiscating” all of the attributes of the overage held by the 
overendowed, and to skim what is skimmed from the overage off of the 
less tactile “sticks” in that “bundle” of rights which is ownership.  
Hence, one does not confiscate the property but instead restricts its use 
or alienability, or taxes its use or alienability, or guarantees others some 
rights—easements—in its use.  Familiar examples are the estate tax, the 
imposition of public access rights to the electromagnetic spectrum, and 
community reinvestment requirements placed upon depository 
institutions.  This line of strategy takes us more squarely to the other, 
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non-psychological parameters within which ownership-facilitation must 
operate.  Those are the legal ones. 
 
3.     Using the Legal Endowment 
 
As with “asset”-defining, ownership-delimiting subjects policy to 
some of the path-dependent features of American law.  As it happens, 
however, path-dependence here proves helpful for purposes of 
ownership-promotion in vindication of the EOP.  For the law appears to 
incorporate within its constitutional and property doctrines the same 
heuristics, rational or irrational, that characterize the psychology of 
ownership.  That means that the law permits precisely those strategies 
of ownership-delimitation in keeping with responsible agency that were 
just observed in Part III.B.2 to be prudent.  Barring any radical 
departures from established precedent by an activist bench or extremist 
legislature, then, the facilitation of responsible ownership in keeping 
with the values of the American OS should be legally free to proceed 
along the lines sketched just above in Part III.B.2. 
The standard forms that ownership-delimitation takes in American 
law are, of course, essentially of three types—restrictions on use and 
enjoyment, restrictions on alienability, and limited expropriation, the 
latter generally in the form of licensing fees or taxes.237  The courts 
impose few if any limitations upon legislatures’ powers to employ these 
methods. 
Restrictions on use and enjoyment are widely accepted, with some 
limited exceptions, noted below.  And few citizens seem to regard them 
as threatening the United States’ status as a property-protecting polity.  
That acceptance probably reflects implicit acceptance of the responsible 
ownership principle and, with it, recognition of the danger of 
illegitimate cost-externalization by owners.   
Restrictions upon alienability similarly appear to be widely upheld 
by the courts and accepted by the public, though we will see that there is 
sometimes more controversy here.  Prohibitions on vote-selling, self-
indenture, prostitution, organ-sale and child-sale are familiar, and 
scarcely controversial, cases in point.  Few seem to regard them as 
serious threats to U.S. status as a property-protective polity.238 
 
 237 These are restrictions apart from limitations on security-provision of the sort observed at 
Part III.A.1.  The latter do not much come into play when we speak of ownership-delimiting in 
keeping with the EOP.  They figure more into what sort should be increased among the 
underendowed. 
 238 Milton Friedman noted long ago that the ability to sell “shares” in one’s self or one’s future 
earnings would facilitate borrowing for education (human capital expansion projects).  See 
FRIEDMAN, supra note 236, at 85-107 (1962).  But fewer people appear to have taken that 
suggestion to heart even than have supported the proposal of Landes & Posner, supra note 160. 
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One long-standing form of restriction upon asset-alienability in the 
U.S. dovetails with the other principal form of ownership-delimitation, 
namely the taxation of gifts and inheritances—which are themselves 
forms of wealth-alienation.  Like other forms of limited and incremental 
expropriation—e.g., property-, income-, and sales-taxation—estate and 
gift taxation has not tended to be seen as threatening the U.S.’s status as 
a property-protecting polity, although there are of course some fringe 
elements who continue to argue that the income tax, since its 1913 
inception, has been unconstitutional.  Indeed, estate-taxation and 
progressive income-taxation have widely been viewed and justified, in 
CL terms, as means of partly rectifying perceived injustices in the 
distribution of ethically exogenous endowments.  And they have been 
seen in CR terms as means of preserving the long-term health of the 
republic by preventing republic-threatening aggregations of financial 
and consequent political power.  Such arguments are still regarded as 
mainstream.  Taxation also has, of course, long enjoyed a special degree 
of deference by courts.239 
Two relatively recent exceptions to these long American traditions 
of ownership-delimitation warrant special notice, however.  The first 
such departure is the so-called “regulatory takings” doctrine, which 
represents a potential—though only a potential—threat to the 
incrementalist form of ownership-delimitation in keeping with the 
responsible ownership principle recommended above.  The familiar 
foundational idea here is that since the Takings Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution requires that public authorities 
award just compensation to those from whom property is fully 
expropriated pursuant to the power of eminent domain, regulations 
which have the effect of merely diminishing the market value of 
property—public access rights or easements, for example—should be 
regarded as partial takings also giving rise to a duty to compensate.  
Initially the courts were less than hospitable to this orthodox-financially 
fair argument, perhaps again revealing that the law is more concerned 
with “hard” accumulated assets than with “speculative” future value, or 
perhaps simply recognizing that the underlying assets—the airwaves, 
access to the ocean, etc.—are ethically exogenous endowments 
belonging residually to the public.  But in recent years some courts have 
shown greater receptivity to the doctrine.240 
That the argument is orthodox-financially fair of course does not 
 
 239 The classic decision holding legislatures’ taxing authority to be plenary is of course 
Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40 (1934). 
 240 See Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 810 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Seawall 
Associates v. City of New York, 542 N.E.2d 1059 (N.Y.), cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 500 (1989).  But 
see Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988); Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 
(1992). 
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entail that the regulatory takings doctrine promotes fairness.  For 
example, applied so as to dictate “compensation” to one who purchases 
land in full knowledge either that the underlying asset is unambiguously 
ethically exogenous, hence public, or that a regulation is impending, and 
who thus presumptively purchases the land at a discount in view of that 
common knowledge, the regulatory takings doctrine would in fact 
dictate a “giving.” 
But the real threat posed by the regulatory takings doctrine is 
distinct from that.  The doctrine as currently articulated and evolved by 
the courts does not seem to have any purchase on the sorts of 
ownership-delimitation strategies that are in keeping with the EOP 
advocated in the previous few Subparts.  The principle underlying the 
doctrine, however, which is simply that, heuristics notwithstanding, an 
incremental delimitation of ownership is a diminishment of ownership, 
is of course generalizable.  And it has been generalized by some 
advocates, even to the point of declaring many forms of taxation itself 
to constitute unconstitutional “takings.”241  And here the problem is that 
what is trivially true as a matter of rudimentary finance nonetheless is 
deeply out of synch with the American value of equal opportunity.  For 
it entirely—entirely—ignores the fairness or otherwise of the baseline 
wealth-distribution from which taxation proceeds.242  Even taxation of 
what all would agree to be an overage held by one person by way of 
ethically exogenous opportunity endowment therefore is viewed, by this 
argument, as prohibited by the U.S. Constitution.  The polity is thus 
constitutionally debarred from living up to its own equal opportunity 
ideals,243 themselves enshrined in the Constitution.  That means that the 
longstanding American tradition of valuing and vindicating equal 
opportunity is inimical to America’s own Constitution.  Even to state 
this proposition is, of course, in effect to refute it.  And happily the 
courts have agreed.  But the argument has gained some purchase in 
some fringe policy circles, from whom also has emanated the second 
rudimentary departure from the American tradition of responsible 
ownership. 
The second exception to the American tradition of responsible 
ownership has made its appearance not in the courts, but in the 
legislatures and in policy debates.  Both for this reason and by virtue of 
its even shakier ethical foundations, this movement is more easily 
dispatched than was the first.  It is the movement, on the part of some 
self-described “conservative” pundits and politicians, to curtail or even 
 
 241 See EPSTEIN, supra note 78. 
 242 Hence the market that it would rely upon to value the “taken” increment is not “neutral” in 
the terms of Part II.C.  Even Nozick at least paid lip-service to the importance of the baseline 
question, in his Paretian version of the Lockean proviso.  See NOZICK, supra note 78, at 178-82. 
 243 See U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 2. 
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eliminate estate and gift taxation, which they label “death” taxation, and 
to lessen the degree of progressivity found in the income tax—a change 
that they call “simplification.”  This movement simply has no basis in 
fairness or in any other American value—CR, CL or PC.  It is nothing 
more than a naked grab for the long end of ethically exogenous 
opportunity inequity by those who have fared well in the birth lottery.  
By exploiting the degree to which the U.S. now falls short of its original 
republican, deliberative democratic ideals—deciding matters of public 
import as it currently does by crude Pavlovian association via 
relentlessly repetitive and reinforcing televisual images, slogans and 
soundbites—the proponents of these changes deceive those who are too 
time-taxed by their wage-occupations or numbed by vulgar Imperial 
Rome-reminiscent entertainments to conduct their own investigations, 
into thinking that the changes will enable these same people to “keep 
[their] own money.”244  And so they enjoy some success in the short 
term.  But as publicly provided public goods are scaled-back in the 
wake of consequent public fiscal deficits, it appears unlikely that this 
conjure will continue to succeed.  It is nonetheless up to all of us, 
however, to ensure that it does not.  That takes us to the present 
Article’s conclusion and sequel. 
 
C.     From Constraints to Strategies to Schema: 
Programmatic Entailments 
 
The constraints elaborated through this Part do not block or 
prevent our realizing the core EEOR values discussed at Part II.  They 
simply counsel that some means of operationalizing our EEOR are 
likely both to operationalize it more fully, and to occasion less friction, 
than others.  They recommend, then, some broad classes of 
implementary strategy over others.  They tell us that to realize the 
EEOR fully we should indeed act to make of ourselves an OS—a polity 
in which core material opportunity endowments of the kind elaborated 
at Part II are both widely spread and vindicated by property rules.  And 
in order to effect that spread, they tell us, we should work, so far as 
possible and in exchange for perceivedly “deserving” behavior, to 
channel perceivedly “new” resources to, while refraining from 
perceived “taking” from, our underendowed, “rather than” perceivedly 
 
 244 The claim that “it’s your money,” of course, is either flatly false or vacuous.  It is false in 
so far as what’s “yours” is a function of legal entitlement and the law does not already entitle you 
to it.  It is vacuous in so far as the law already confers title.  What these people mean to say is that 
they want to make it your money.  That is, they want to make $300 your money, in return for your 
forgoing public services, if you belong to the middle class; and they want to make thousands, 
millions or billions of dollars of your money if you are antecedently wealthy. 
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“taking” already accumulated resources from our already fulsomely 
endowed.   
Where we publicly hold vast accumulated material resources, such 
as land, the aforementioned strategy is easily employed.  We simply 
offer up the vast public tracts, in smaller but adequately independence-
conferring-sized tracts, to such underendowed citizens as are prepared 
to work hard to render the tracts productive.  Such, of course, was the 
method of the nineteenth and early twentieth century Homestead Acts, 
which are discussed in the sequel.  Where, on the other hand, we are 
lacking in such an already accumulated asset as land, the method of 
nineteenth and early twentieth century style “Homesteading” is not 
available to us.  The “new” resource which we must channel then is not 
already accumulated, left over from the past, but is to be accumulated, 
reasonably expected to come to fruition in the future in significant part 
through the diligent efforts of our beneficiaries themselves.  In such 
case the method of past Homesteading gives way to the method of 
future financial engineering; for finance is the act of facilitating future 
accumulation.  Our constraints for the foreseeable future, then, as we 
now shall see, recommend a strategy of financially engineering our OS 
into being.        
 
IV.     THE CORE AS PROGRAM: CREDIT INSURANCE, DEBT 
SECURITIZATION & TAX POLICY AS PREFERRED MEANS 
OF OWNERSHIP-SPREADING 
 
The core American values elaborated at Part II suggest a broad 
spread of ethically exogenous material opportunity and risk over the 
boundedly responsible agents who constitute our citizenry.  And they 
counsel that ethically endogenous resource holdings be left to fall where 
they may so long as complete and neutral markets constitute the 
mechanism by which they are allocated.  For such markets both 
appropriately commensurate agent-valued goods and services, and thus 
appropriately honor the responsible efforts whose fruits are valued by 
other agents. 
The constraints elaborated at Part III, for their part, counsel that 
some strategies which we might employ in seeking to realize the core 
values of Part II are likely to prove more effective than others.  For 
endowment psychology, along with our “legal endowment,” are such 
that the core values—in particular, that of agent autonomy—are more 
fully realized by some forms of legal entitlement than by others, while 
some means of vindicating core rights, in turn, are prereflectively 
experienced as more legitimate or less unobjectionable than others. 
In this Part we begin the process of translating values and 
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constraints into programs, in anticipation of the sequel.  For reasons that 
will be clear by the end of this Part, the preferred translation process, 
which I shall call generically “the Method,” makes use of financial 
engineering techniques that would not have been necessary, and 
probably would not have been feasible, prior to the early-mid twentieth 
century.   
In effect, then, we shall be schematizing the general form by which 
to modernize—to update to the present—those successful ownership-
spreading programs of the eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries which account in large part for many of our political, 
economic and societal successes up to the twenty-first century.  We 
shall be showing how, that is, to develop a contemporary American OS 
that both completes and is programmatically cognate and continuous 
with our OS-fragments of the past.  We will see these claims 
corroborated, then we draw specific programmatic conclusions, in the 
sequel. 
 
A.     From Values, Constraints & Strategy to Program 
 
Our constraints operate more poignantly on the ethically 
exogenous than on the ethically endogenous side of the material 
opportunity allocation problem.  On the ethically endogenous side, the 
only practical constraint is how to ensure that the complete and neutral 
market, which in so far as it is complete and neutral “automatically” 
allocates goods and ills fairly and efficiently, is to become and/or 
remain complete and neutral.  If for the moment we divide the neutrality 
problem into what we might call “entry” or “substantive” neutrality and 
“process” neutrality, and restrict ourselves to both the latter and 
completeness, then the completeness and neutrality conditions do not so 
much as implicate our Part III constraints.  Process neutrality is ensured 
by rules that guarantee fair play: contract rules requiring good faith, 
appropriate disclosure245 and rough parity of bargaining power between 
transacting parties, and antitrust rules that ensure rough parity of market 
power among competing parties.  And these process-fairness-promoting 
norms do not directly offend or even call to mind anyone’s pretheoretic 
experience of ownership.  Disputes about contract law’s shaping of 
bargaining or about antitrust law’s regulation of market-shares, that is to 
say, essentially take place at the margins of the subjects, and are about 
 
 245 I prescind here from how “good faith” and “appropriate” disclosure should be understood.  
It will not be surprising that I would not defend a “lease cost discloser” norm formulated without 
regard to the prospect of costs’—least or otherwise—being fairly apportioned.  But the question 
is sufficiently complex and ancillary to our present concerns as to warrant being set aside for 
treatment on another day.  
  
2005] OWNERSHIP SOCIETY  89 
the comparative effects of incrementally differing drawings of lines—
e.g., determining “how much” should be disclosed in contract 
negotiations, or how high the HHI should be before a market is deemed 
highly concentrated.  They are not about fundamental rights-implicating 
legitimacy. 
The same holds true of our efforts to complete markets.  Public 
efforts to complete markets are, in essence, efforts to “jump start” or 
facilitate the trading of goods or services that have not been widely 
traded hitherto, typically either because people simply have not thought 
to trade such goods or services—e.g., “pollution rights”—before, or 
because it has been thought, owing either to a lack of imagination or a 
lack of any set of legal forms or standards applicable over the 
jurisdiction in which the market is lacking, to be impossible.246  Efforts 
to make markets notwithstanding such obstacles might draw derisive 
hoots of “futility” or “folly” from the pessimistic or the unimaginative, 
but like process neutrality maintenance measures they do not typically 
offend anyone’s sense of rights-based propriety or ownership.   
A partial exception to that claim might be thought present in the 
case of objections to the “commodification”—the subjection to market 
trading—of some goods or services thought to be too much of the 
temple to be appropriately consigned to the money-changers.  Babies, 
blood and human organs, not to mention intimate activity, come to 
mind.247  But even here the objection seems to be rooted more in mores, 
aesthetics or communal propriety than in economic morals, ethics or 
individual propriation; no fundamental rights appear to be implicated.248  
And even were that not the case, our disputes over what should be 
commodified and what left out of the marketplace all would lie, again, 
at the margins of commodifiability.  We argue over babies, blood, 
human organs and the means by which they should be allocated, when 
scarce, to those lacking and seeking them, all while the overwhelmingly 
greater part of the goods and services that we value have long since 
been commodified.  So again, the appropriate means of allocating 
ethically endogenous goods and services—through complete and 
process-neutral markets—scarcely implicates Part III’s constraints. 
The one aspect of endogenous goods allocation that does implicate 
the constraints is what we just above called “substantive neutrality,” or 
“entry neutrality.”  But this, we now shall see, is of a piece with 
 
 246 Here an instructive case in point is that of mortgage insurance and securitization, 
considered at length in the sequel. 
 247 See Landes & Posner, supra note 160 (babies); RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT 
RELATIONSHIP (1970) (blood and organs); see generally Radin and other sources cited supra, 
note 159. 
 248 I recognize that these distinctions could be challenged.  The differences might well be 
matters more of degree than of kind.  But they nonetheless appear to be a critical feature of the 
rights-oriented American valuational episteme.  
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exogenous goods-allocation’s implication of our Part III constraints.  
For the entry-neutrality feature of those EEOR-preferred markets 
schematized in Part II is just the feature whereby agent-citizens entering 
those markets do so with equitably spread ethically exogenous 
holdings.249  So again, the Part III constraints operate only on the means 
by which we seek, pursuant to our EEOR ideals, to spread ethically 
exogenous opportunity widely.  They tie our hands as we consider 
means by which to equalize the spread of material opportunities which 
people enjoy or lack simply owing to luck—the good or ill fortune of 
happening to have been born with healthy or unhealthy genes, to 
wealthy or non-wealthy families, in regions with well financed or 
underfunded early education infrastructures, etc.  It is a matter of signal 
importance to the EEOR to develop means of surmounting such values-
offending disparities while recognizing the limits imposed upon us by 
the Part III constraints.  Can this be done?  
It is helpful in this context to remind ourselves that the constraints 
only constrain us.  For it happens that in spreading ethically exogenous 
resources widely we can conform to those aspects of endowment 
psychology and the legal endowment that define the treadable path of 
least resistance.  And we can do so without fundamentally 
compromising our core constitutive ideals.  The key, we shall see, is in 
finance—the means by which macro-economies have always grown.  
By rethinking the aims and methods of finance in a way that treats our 
infinitely valued individual citizens as microcosms, so to speak, of 
macro-economies, we can—and to some extent already do—spread 
ethically exogenous material opportunity widely through financial 
engineering techniques that make optimal accommodation with—
indeed, even employment of—our psychological and legal endowments 
themselves.  Financial engineering of a particular sort can give 
programmatic expression both to our constitutive EEOR ideals and to 
our laws and pre-theoretic proprietary sensibilities.  Here is how: 
 
B.     From Program to Finance 
 
“Finance,” both in popular usage and for our present purposes, 
broadly denotes the class of means by which something currently 
desired and not yet had may be paid for, even when it cannot be 
purchased outright.250  It therefore frequently connotes, more 
 
 249 This is, of course, a requirement of ethically cognizable equal bargaining power.  
 250 See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 630 (6th ed. 1990) (“As a verb, to supply with funds 
through the payment of cash or issuance of stocks, bonds, notes, or mortgages; to provide with 
capital or loan money as needed to carry on business”).  
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particularly, the act of borrowing as one such means.251  In this respect 
the word also connotes, from a more theoretical point of view, an inter-
temporal shifting of asset-use:252  One in effect trades future assets (call 
them Af) for present ones (Ap)—“borrows against the future”—
typically on the understanding that use of the borrowed asset (Ab) at 
present will yield more, in the long run,253 than will deferment of use or 
acquisition of the to-be-acquired, presently desired asset Ap until later.  
Often the future yield is what affords the means of paying for the 
present use of the borrowed asset Ab itself; use of the borrowed Ab is a 
critical component of what makes payment for the use of Ab possible.  
When that is the case, the project (or “investment”) which yields the 
future return, and which is rendered possible by borrowing itself, is 
popularly (if potentially misleadingly) said to be “self-financing,” “self-
amortizing” or “self-liquidating.”254  The investment that the project 
amounts to in such case has, at a minimum, “broken even,” hence is 
financially rational to have undertaken; one has not lost in the temporal 
aggregate through the inter-temporal shift. 
The best investments, a fortiori, are of course those that yield the 
highest returns—those that more than break even or more than simply 
“pay for themselves.”  They yield more than what has been sunken into 
them, even after costing interest and discounting returns by the 
prevailing market rate over the course of the project’s completion.  
Their net present values are not only positive, but are positively high.255  
From this point of view, post-secondary education, housing, and even 
many possible securities portfolios that one might finance by borrowing 
are good investments.  If, for example, the U.S. Department of 
Education (ED) is correct in estimating that a college degree now adds 
an average of about $1 million to one’s lifetime income, and if the 
 
 251 Id.   
 252 See, e.g., ZVI BODIE & ROBERT C. MERTON, FINANCE 2 (2000) (“Finance is the study of 
how people allocate scarce resources over time.”).  This is, of course, the way in which finance is 
treated in most theoretical finance texts, as well as in most standard microeconomics texts that 
devote attention to the subject.  See, e.g., ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC 
THEORY 732-81 (1995).  
 253 Typically the “long run” is defined, in orthodox theory, as the individual agent’s full life-
span, and that which is “yielded” and maximized by the intertemporal shift of assets is, of course, 
“utility.”  This is the operating template of the so-called “permanent income,” or “life-cycle” 
hypothesis that figures into most financial theory.  See, e.g., F. P. Ramsey, A Mathematical 
Theory of Saving, 38 ECON. J. 543 (1928); Truman Bewley, The Permanent Income Hypothesis: 
A Theoretical Formulation, 16 J. ECON. THEORY 252 (1977); BODIE & MERTON, supra note 252, 
at 146.    
 254 See, e.g., JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN ELLIOT GOODMAN, DICTIONARY OF FINANCE AND 
INVESTMENT TERMS 552 (5th ed. 1998).  
 255 “Discounting,” of course, is the process of converting future values to present values in 
view of the rate at which investing a present amount that yields interest grows toward that future 
value.  The barebones formalization is: FV = PV (1 + r)n, where r is the interest rate and n is the 
number of periods over which interest is calculated.  See, e.g., BODIE & MERTON, supra note 252, 
at 102-18. 
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average amount paid out of future income for such a degree, including 
interest charges but excluding room & board (which would have to be 
paid anyway), is $50 thousand,256 then, assuming an employment life of 
45 years, the discount rate would have to be about 7%—rather higher 
than the 4-5% that has prevailed for many years now—for the “project” 
to fall short of breaking even.257  And that is, of course, to ignore 
entirely the incalculable nonpecuniary benefits of a post-secondary 
education. 
Parallel observations hold true for home-ownership and, indeed, 
for the holding of a substantial, appreciating and/or dividend and 
interest yielding portfolio of securities—ownership shares in firms and 
in firm debt.  Homes in aggregate typically appreciate in value over the 
long run at a significantly higher rate than the discount rate.258  So, of 
course, does the value of a broad market-indexed stock portfolio.259  
Homes and stock portfolios accordingly would constitute good 
pecuniary investments in the long run, even if one had to borrow to 
finance their acquisition, provided that the borrowing rate were not 
inordinately high.  And the security and independence, or at the very 
least the “cushion” thereby conferred, both in actual fact and as a matter 
of “wealth effect”-inflected perception, probably are priceless for most 
people.  It would, then, constitute a great advantage for those lacking in 
such assets to be able to finance their acquisition by borrowing to 
purchase them.  Their ownership would yield sufficient long-run 
income as to amortize the debt well before the death of the typical 
purchaser or the asset’s depreciation to the vanishing point.  And that 
ownership would yield incalculably more to the holders and to the 
society of which they were members. 
Why, then, does the United States not constitute an “ownership 
society” already, with everybody directly owning a home, a substantial 
stock portfolio and at least a four-year post-secondary degree?  The 
answer is tripartite:  First, significant portions of our adult population do 
hold the first and last of these three basic, responsible-agency-
enhancing assets, while far fewer did before the 1940s in the first case 
and the 1970s in the third—the decades when we first took steps to 
spread, collectively, the owning of those fundamental assets broadly.260  
 
 256 See About ED, http://www.ed.gov/about/landing.jhtml (last visited Sept. 25, 2005).  
 257 Per the formula given at note 255, supra, $1M ≅ $.05M (1 + .07)45.  I have of course left 
out income forgone over the course of the education, and have abstracted from the compounding 
rate by assuming interest to accrue only once per year, but the essential result is not thereby 
significantly changed. 
 258 That, of course, is one reason for the popularity of real estate investment trusts—REITs—
as investment vehicles.  See, e.g., BURTON MALKIEL, A RANDOM WALK DOWN WALL STREET 
284, 307 (3d ed. 2003).   
 259 The now classic source is JEREMY SIEGEL, STOCKS FOR THE LONG RUN 51 (2d ed. 1998).  
See also MALKIEL, supra note 258, passim.    
 260 See Hockett, supra note 3.  
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Second, we have not as yet worked publicly to spread substantial direct 
owning of the second asset type—securities—and it shows: Hard capital 
is the last remaining of the three chief assets—homes, business capital, 
and human capital—that confer the kind of productive, life-building 
autonomy, prized both by and in the agent-citizens who jointly 
constitute the EEOR, that is not yet widely held directly.261  And third, 
absent public action of this sort, things are more than likely to remain 
this way, just as would have been the case with homes and higher 
education absent our concerted efforts from the 1940s and the 1970s 
on—as we shall see. 
But why is that?  What is the “concerted effort” to which I refer, 
and why would it be necessary to facilitation of the spread of ownership 
of those three “fundamental assets”?  The answer is, again, finance.  In 
order for investments such as those in homes, in educations or in stocks 
to make pecuniary sense, again, their discounted long-run yields must 
exceed the costs, including opportunity costs, of their financing.  The 
rate that one pays for the use of the money that one invests in them—the 
interest rate—must accordingly be low enough.  But in order for the rate 
to be low enough, and indeed, even for it to be less than “infinitely” 
high—i.e., for lendable funds to be forthcoming at all—those who have 
the funds to lend must not perceive the loans to be too risky.  The 
lender’s calculus, that is, largely mirrors the borrower’s, though it is 
even more severe:  She will discount the returns on her loans—the 
interest that they yield—by the returns she could earn on alternative 
investments of her funds that bear similar risk-features to those 
attaching to the contemplated loan;262 and unlike the borrower, she will 
not allow the nonpecuniary benefits derived (by the borrower) from the 
credit-purchased asset to compensate for added increments of cost.  The 
lower the risk attaching to the would-be asset-purchaser’s loan, then, the 
more attractive that investment to the lender. 
Typically, as many of us have experienced, a lender will mitigate 
or lessen risk by taking a security interest in some asset already owned 
by the borrower; she demands collateral.  There is one source of the 
venerable adage that “it takes money to make money.”  Financing 
typically is available to those who, in a sense (though only in a sense), 
have least need of it: those who hold loanable funds, and those who own 
 
 261 See id.  A partial—though rather limited—exception here is the ESOP.  See id.  By 
employing the term “directly” I intend to distinguish “beneficial ownership” through defined 
benefit retirement pensions. 
 262 This is of course simply a trivial entailment of the risk-reward trade-off familiar to 
portfolio theory.  Portfolio efficiency consists in maximizing returns given a specific risk-profile, 
or minimizing risk given a specific returns-profile.  See Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. 
FIN. 77 (1952).  See generally HARRY MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO SELECTION: EFFICIENT 
DIVERSIFICATION OF INVESTMENTS 52 (1959). 
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already-accumulated, collateralizable assets.263  In effect, finance 
performs as little more than a temporary liquidation service in such a 
world, a means by which to transform one’s hard, accumulated assets 
temporarily into immediately usable cash; the financier acts as a large-
scale, non-custodial pawn-broker. 
But here lies also a key to the means of breaking what some have 
called this “tyranny of collateral” or “closed circuit of finance.”264  For 
collateral is not the only means of mitigating lender risk.  Indeed, it is 
an exceedingly crude such means.  It might indeed be likened to a 100% 
reserve or capitalization requirement imposed upon a depository 
institution; precious little economic growth would ever occur under 
such circumstances.265  If measures can be taken to weed out projects 
that are unlikely to succeed, and if at the same time likely failure rates 
over a broad swathe of investments can be statistically determined—
rather in the manner that banks carefully evaluate prospective loan 
prospects and reserve and capital ratios respectively are keyed to the 
rates at which depositors actually tend to spend from or withdraw their 
deposits and assets tend to carry sundry forms of risk—then we can 
both minimize and pool risk of default, and provide against the latter 
with less than 100% collateralization.  We can require borrowers simply 
to cover pro rata shares of aggregated, pooled default risk—i.e., we can 
 
 263 Of course those with accumulated assets have need of financing too.  The point here is 
simply that those without already accumulated assets often have even more need of financing—in 
order to accumulate in the first place.  
 264 See, e.g., Raghuram G. Rajan, Insiders and Outsiders: The Choice Between Informed and 
Arm’s-Length Debt, 47 J. FIN. 1367 (1992); Luigi Zingales, Survival of the Fittest or the Fattest? 
Exit and Financing in the Trucking Industry, 53 J. FIN. 905 (1998); Raghuram G. Rajan & Luigi 
Zingales, Financial Dependence and Growth, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 559 (1998); Raghuram G. 
Rajan & Luigi Zingales, The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development in the 20th 
Century, 52 J. FIN. ECON. 336 (2003); see generally RAGHURAM G. RAJAN & LUIGI ZINGALES, 
SAVING CAPITALISM FROM THE CAPITALISTS: UNLEASHING THE POWER OF FINANCIAL 
MARKETS TO CREATE WEALTH AND SPREAD OPPORTUNITY (2003).    
 265 Regulatory authorities impose fractional reserve requirements upon depository institutions 
in order to ensure the availability of sufficient cash to cover depositor withdrawal needs and avoid 
destructive “bank-runs.”  It happens that very low such rates are required in order to effect that 
task, freeing up the remainder of deposits to lend and thus fuel economic growth.  The 
development of “reserve systems” that facilitate inter-bank lending and thus the pooling of risk of 
inadequate reserves at any one institution has of course freed up even more deposited funds for 
credit-extension.   
  The US Federal Reserve’s reserve requirements are promulgated as Regulation D, at 12 
C.F.R. Pt. 204, per the authorization of 12 U.S.C. § 461(b)(1)-(4).  On the mechanics of reserve 
requirements, see, e.g., ROSS CRANSTON, PRINCIPLES OF BANKING LAW 127-29 (1997).  On the 
troubled history of fractional reserves until the modern era—specifically the difficulty, prior to 
the advent of sophisticated statistical predictive methods as means of calculating fractional 
reserve needs, of finding the golden mean between growth-stiflingly excessive reserves and 
systemic risk-incurring inadequate reserves—see, e.g., MONEY: A HISTORY 162-92 (Jonathan 
Williams ed., 1997).  A remarkable formal treatment is found in 1 MARTIN SHUBIK, THE THEORY 
OF MONEY AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 259 (1999). 
  The capital adequacy regime is grounded primarily in 12 USC §§ 1464(t), 1831o, and 
3907. 
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move from collateralization to default insurance. 
We can then enhance the boost thereby given the pool of loanable 
funds by taking another step:  Closely associated with perceptions of 
and aversions to risk, of course, are the desire and demand for 
liquidity266—the capacity to withdraw from an investment, such as a 
loan is, as readily as one enters into it.  If, then, not only default risk, but 
debt obligations themselves (i.e., rights to repayment) can be pooled, 
and shares in the pool then sold as resaleable securities, we shall in 
effect have “completed” the market for OS-valued capital financing 
debt by “securitizing” it and allowing such risk as attaches to the 
securities to flow toward its most willing and efficient bearers; and we 
shall thereby have optimized the volume of such financing available.267 
Such measures, we shall see, constitute precisely the means by 
which we have, as a society, spread the ownership of homes and post-
secondary degrees so much more broadly than they were spread prior to 
the late twentieth century.  And they are means that we have yet, thus 
far, to attempt in the spreading of that one form of asset that rivals 
homes and human capital in importance to agent-citizens of an efficient 
equal-opportunity republic: business capital. 
 
C.     Public/Private Acquisition-Finance as “Method”:Conditional 
Credit-Insurance, Securitization & Tax-Subsidy  
 
Here, then, is the basic schema, which we shall find recurring in 
the most significant, albeit fragmentary, modern American OS 
programs and proposals thus far pursued, advocated, or both: First, 
society, acting collectively through its elected government, acts to 
optimize the amount of capital available for lending to those lacking in 
assets by those possessed of assets, by itself directly affording the 
security typically afforded by security interests in collateral.  In effect, 
we insure lenders against borrower default—either directly, by actually 
administering the insurance program, or indirectly, by serving as 
 
 266 See, of course, J. Tobin, Liquidity Preference as Behavior Toward Risk, 25 REV. ECON. 
STUD. 25 (1958).  The insight derives famously from JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL 
THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND MONEY (1936).  
 267 “Securitization” has grown rapidly in the last decade to constitute both the fastest growing 
and one of the largest of securities markets.  See, e.g., FRANK J. FABOZZI ET AL., FOUNDATIONS 
OF FINANCIAL MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS 435-97 (2d ed. 1998).  It seems to be inadequately 
appreciated that all of this began with, and continues to this day to be largely driven by, the 
activities of “government sponsored enterprises” (GSEs) like Fannie Mae, more on which infra, 
Part V.  See, e.g., Leland C. Brendsel, Securitization’s Role in Housing Finance: The Special 
Contributions of the Government-Sponsored Enterprises, in A PRIMER ON SECURITIZATION 17-
29 (Leon T. Kendall & Michael J. Fishman eds., 2000) [hereinafter SECURITIZATION]; Lewis S. 
Ranieri, The Origins of Securitization, Sources of Its Growth, and Its Future Potential, in 
SECURITIZATION, supra, at 31-43.  
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guarantor, as reinsurer, or as guarantor-insurer for non-public or quasi-
public agencies that serve as first lines of lender assurance.  (The initial 
lenders themselves are, of course, nongovernmental financial 
intermediaries—primarily depository institutions, which have enjoyed 
access to federal deposit insurance since the 1930s and have pooled 
liquidity-risk and consequent solvency-risk via the Federal Reserve 
System since 1913.268) 
In order to ensure the financial solvency of our efforts, we impose 
basic quality standards upon both our borrower-beneficiaries and the 
projects that they wish to finance through their debt: we require that the 
borrowers receive reliable incomes in the case of housing, or make 
satisfactory academic progress in the case of education; and we require 
that all receive financial counseling.  We also insist, of the homes and of 
the institutions affording higher education, that they meet basic quality 
standards tending to maximize the likelihood that the investments will 
indeed bear positive net present values.  We also, of course, might exact 
a small premium of our borrowers in order to cover the (now 
minimized) costs of administration and maintenance of the insurance 
fund.  Or we can cover the cost collectively in the case of the least 
advantaged among us.   
Where we have employed these strategies thus far, we shall see in 
the sequel, we actually have begun by affording the insurance directly, 
then gradually have receded into the background as secondary guarantor 
or reinsurer while private insurers or quasi-public guarantors, upon 
observing the successes of the government-run insurance programs, 
have stepped into the newly created market that previously had gone 
unimagined or been thought infeasible.269  The ultimate full faith and 
credit of our society’s organ of collective action—our reliable and 
enduring, bond-issuing and bond-honoring government—proves to be 
enough; the administering can devolve to others. 
Second, we “jump start” the development of a secondary market in 
the resultantly burgeoning number of low-risk debt obligations that 
follow on the success of the first set of initiatives.  That is, once many 
lenders step in to assist in financing the acquisition of basic EEOR-
valued assets in response to our public initiative to eliminate their risk, 
 
 268 On the origins of the Federal Reserve System in Congressional response to the financial 
downturn of 1907, and of federal deposit insurance in response to the bank panic of the early 
1930s, see, e.g., ALLAN H. MELTZER, A HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE, VOLUME 1: 1913-
1951 (2003); see also JONATHAN R. MACEY ET AL., BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 11-27 (3d 
ed. 2001); HOWELL E. JACKSON & EDWARD L. SYMONS, JR., REGULATION OF FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS 27-45 (1999).  
 269 We will see in the sequel that this was precisely the case in respect of mortgage insurance.  
We will also see that the significant trend in the direction of securitization currently underway 
began with the federally created secondary mortgage market-maker—i.e., securitizer—Fannie 
Mae.  See again note 264, supra, and sources cited therein.  
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we commence the pooling and securitizing of the consequently 
proliferating debt obligations.  We are aided in doing so by success in 
the first initiative itself.  For one thing, the growth in debt obligations 
following on the provision of insurance or guaranty results in debt 
enough to pool efficiently.  For another, the fact that so large a portion 
of the total pool of debt is associated with the insurance or guaranty 
program itself, coupled with our imposition of quality standards as a 
condition on enjoyment of the benefit of the program, results in the 
development of a standard debt-contract/promissory-note form, and that 
homogeneity of form itself facilitates the efficient bundling and 
securitizing. 
Third, we might, though we need not, publicly subsidize, directly 
or indirectly, the interest payments made by program beneficiaries on 
the debt.  We can do so either by paying the interest directly, or we can 
render such payments tax deductible.  That latter, we will see, has 
proved to be the preferred means in our American OS-in-the-making, 
particularly for the middle class; while direct subsidy often has figured 
into such programs as these that operate for the poor.  And this, we shall 
see further, probably owes to the same endowment heuristics that render 
this “financial engineering” mode of asset-spreading the tried and true 
contemporary method in our society thus far. 
Before turning to the specific ways in which this method meshes 
with those endowment heuristics and other constraints, it might be well 
to schematize the method pictorially.270  Figure 1 does so:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 270 I will describe this abstract scheme more fully in the sequel to this article, which will 
address specific programs. 
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Figure 1: General Form of Credit Insurance- & Debt Securitization-
Based Ownership-Spreading Programs 
 
 
* Guarantor and Securitizer begin as public or quasi-public entities, then subsequently privatize. 
 
As we shall see in the sequel, variations on precisely this picture 
figure into the most successful—though thus far only fragmentary (i.e., 
single asset spreading)—contemporary American OS programs thus far 
implemented.  They also figure into the most interesting-looking such 
programs not yet tried.  It is worth asking why this might be so. 
 
D.     The Method, Our Values & Our Constraints 
 
The fundamental reason for the Method’s success, I suggest, is that 
it gives elegant and comprehensive programmatic expression to the 
values and constraints elaborated at Parts II and III.  Recall, first, those 
values and constraints: they are that an enduring American OS should, 
first, work to foster the broadly equitable spread of ethically exogenous 
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assets—material opportunities—while allowing ethically endogenous 
such assets to remain with their producers.  The American OS should, 
second, seek so far as possible to favor the spread of assets that are 
maximally vindicable by property rules—rules that afford maximal 
space to agent autonomy, as consistent with the equal ethically 
exogenous autonomy of others.  In so far as equalizing ethically 
exogenous asset-owning involves special solicitude for the exogenously 
underendowed, the American OS acts most prudently by, third: (a) 
channeling perceivedly “new” resources to the underendowed rather 
than overtly “taking” already existing resources from the already fully 
endowed; (b) conditioning that channeling of perceivedly new resources 
to the underendowed upon the latter’s exercise of responsible, 
productively virtuous effort—in effect ethically endogenizing the “new” 
resources—and (c) so far as possible, refraining from perceived 
“taking” rather than engaging in outright “giving.” 
Now note how the Method meets precisely these criteria:  First, 
decent homes and educations—those assets which, we shall see, have 
been spread thus far by means of the Method—are perceived by 
American EEOR sensibilities as basic minima.  They are “core 
endowments,” per Part II, to which all young Americans just starting 
out in life are believed to deserve access.  At least provided that such 
persons as lack such assets lack them in owing to hard luck rather than 
through any fault of their own, we hold that they ought, at the very least, 
to have them.271  The same, as we noted at Part II.B.3, can be said of 
access to productive non-human capital.  But as yet we have not worked 
to foster its spread save in piecemeal fashion.   
Second, homes are as property-like as assets get in American law; 
they are fully property rule protected.  Education, for its part, is in effect 
property rule protected.  For not only can it not be taken, once had, from 
its possessor at a price below what the rightful possessor demands; it 
cannot be taken from the possessor at all, but can only be rented, at a 
reservation price set by the possessor.272  Securities portfolios, too, are 
 
 271 The “no fault” proviso presumably accounts for our willingness, for example, to disqualify 
convicted drug offenders from access to federally assisted higher education finance.  See 12 
U.S.C. § 43(A).  (I don’t here purport to endorse or condemn that policy, only to root it ultimately 
in the view held by most that one can become ethically responsible, as one grows older, for one’s 
lack of education.)  
 272 Ellerman argues that it can—that it is in effect partial slavery when one works for hire, 
alienating a portion of one’s self and one’s education.  See DAVID P. ELLERMAN, PROPERTY & 
CONTRACT IN ECONOMICS: THE CASE FOR ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY (1992); see also DAVID P. 
ELLERMAN, THE DEMOCRATIC WORKER-OWNED FIRM (1990); JAROSLAV VANEK, THE 
GENERAL THEORY OF LABOR-MANAGED ECONOMIES (1970).  I will not address that argument 
here, confining myself instead to noting that, at least in theory, in the absence of chattel slavery 
the hirer must still pay the reservation price of the laborer; hence the human capital is property 
rule protected.  That is not, of course, by any means to deny that reservation price will be EEOR-
objectionably low in a substantially non-neutral market—i.e., a market in which some 
participants lack equal access to ethically exogenous endowments, including business capital and 
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property rule protected, even if of course for most of us a security, being 
fungible, is just worth its market value.273   
Third, the financial engineering schema—the Method—channels 
perceivedly “new” resources to the underendowed.  To begin with, 
housing and education are not taken from some and given to others.  
But more to the point, the credit extended for purchase of homes and 
higher education—encouraged though it be by public action—is not, 
pursuant to endowment psychology, perceived as taking and 
redistributing, even if in orthodox finance-theoretic terms all credit that 
flows in one direction does so at the opportunity cost of other directions.  
It just is not perceived in the same way that outright taxing and 
redistributing would be.   
Moreover, the channeling of the credit is conditioned upon 
recipients’ responsibly diligent behavior; recipients must work to 
amortize their debts, in addition, of course, to working to maintain the 
value of the home or complete the education.  In the case of the one 
successful business capital-spreading program to make (partial) use of 
the Method—the ESOP—the same is true of the employee 
beneficiaries, who must labor for the firm that sponsors the plan. 
Finally, in so far as interest on the loans facilitated by the Method 
is subsidized, it typically is subsidized by tax deduction rather than 
direct payment.  It is a refraining from “taking,” rather than a “giving.”  
The one exception here only confirms the rule:  Direct subsidy of 
interest payments often figures into use of the Method in financing 
asset-acquisition by the (means-tested) least advantaged members of 
society—those who, to EEOR values, are perceived as warranting 
special solicitude.274 
 
 
 
productive networks.  But that problem—the problem of entry non-neutrality—afflicts the 
reservation price charged for parting with any property held by the desperately underendowed, 
not just labor.  If Essau had as much right to eat from the family porridge pot as Jacob, and paid 
Jacob his birthright for lunch because desperately hungry after laboring for the family while 
Jacob illegitimately controlled access to the family larder, then the price he charged for parting 
with the birthright was EEOR-illegitimately low.  The contract between him and his brother 
would not be enforceable in the courts. 
 273 Meaning that property rule and liability rule typically do not diverge in such cases.  It 
might still be property rule protected if we wish, however.  If, for example, before the company 
went public one had been attached to her UPS stock for sentimental or familial reasons—say, 
because generations of her family had worked for UPS and received stock therein pursuant to the 
company’s egalitarian ESOP plan—she no doubt could have insisted upon replacement of the 
stock itself by one who had tortiously converted it, rather than settling for estimated market value.   
 274 We shall see this claim corroborated in the sequel.  Federal ownership-facilitation 
programs employing “the Method” allow the better-off to deduct interest payments for tax 
calculation purposes, while directly supplying interest payments on behalf of the apparently 
faultless working poor.    
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E.     Why the Method is Modern: Our Values, Our Constraints & Our 
Resources, Past, Present & Future 
 
Before we conclude with our preview of the sequel’s application of 
the theory developed in this Article to our programmatic history, it is 
worth briefly considering why what I am calling “the Method” 
characterizes only modern American OS programs and proposals.  After 
all, haven’t there been ownership-spreading programs in the past as 
well?  Why would they not have employed the same methods, if those 
methods purport to give the fullest financial expression to the Part III 
constraints?  There appear to be two answers, one having to do with 
feasibility, the other with necessity. 
The feasibility answer is that it is much easier to make use of the 
financial system now, and to securitize and create secondary markets 
now, than it would have been until comparatively recently.  Indeed, as 
noted before there was no centrally managed or regulated system of 
depository institutions until 1913, nor was there deposit insurance until 
1932.  The deepening of the securities markets to the point of rendering 
large-scale securitization of retail debt obligations feasible, in turn, has 
been critically facilitated by the development of advanced computing 
and communications technologies since the 1970s. 
The necessity answer probably is the more important one: Until the 
early twentieth century there already was a “new,” quite material 
resource, abundant and both legally and perceivedly publicly owned, 
that could be channeled especially toward the underendowed without 
running afoul of endowment heuristics.  That resource was federal land.  
Though the land was, emphatically, of course taken from the indigenous 
inhabitants of North America, those inhabitants were not citizens and 
could not vote; they were “conquered.”275  The same holds of such 
Spaniards, French and English loyalists as were dispossessed pursuant 
to eighteenth and nineteenth century wars.276  The resulting land was 
viewed as, and legally treated as, publicly owned U.S. federal land.   
It was precisely this land that was distributed by the federal 
 
 275 Distribution, to the underendowed, of territory acquired by conquest was the classic means 
by which ancient republics maintained rough equity in the allocation of ethically exogenous 
productive resources over their citizenries.  See, e.g., Simon, supra note 23, at 1335-40.  Even if 
the native inhabitants of North America did not consider land individually propertizable any more 
than they considered air to be so, see Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), I trust 
that it is not controversial to observe that by individually propertizing it ourselves through 
conferral of fee simple rights upon European-descended American citizens, not to mention by 
ejecting tribes from territories over which they claimed longstanding tribal occupancy and control 
rights, and by designating less desirable and previously tribe-uninhabited lands as new tribal 
lands, we did indeed in an intelligible sense “take” land from its original inhabitants.   
 276 See, e.g., GEORGE DARGO, JEFFERSON’S LOUISIANA: POLITICS AND THE CLASH OF LEGAL 
TRADITIONS (1975); Elizabeth G. Brown, Legal Systems in Conflict: Orleans Territory 1804-
1812, 1 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 35 (1957); ELKINS & MCKITRICK, supra note 16, at 225-32.   
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government to the benefit of underendowed Americans up through the 
first twenty years of the twentieth century.  Such distributions were in 
one case direct, pursuant to the Homestead Acts, which afforded a broad 
distribution of the principal material resource out of which a great many 
if not most Americans of the time built prosperous lives; and in the 
other case indirect, pursuant to the Land-Grant Acts, which afforded 
land to fund the endowments of institutions of higher education—the 
“land grant” colleges and universities—open to all in order to supply the 
human capital that could optimally be conjoined to land capital in the 
building of productive precontemporary lives.  
It was, significantly, after the land ran out that the Method—the 
financial engineering method—was hit upon by fits and starts.  And it 
was, happily, precisely over this period that national markets grew 
sufficiently integrated, and technologies sufficiently sophisticated, as to 
render the Method fully feasible.  A critical purpose of this Article’s 
sequel, accordingly, will be to show the generalizability of the 
Method—particularly now as our markets grow yet more integrated and 
our technologies yet more sophisticated—in order to complete the 
modern American OS anticipated by the land grant programs of the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and begun in earnest by our 
now well established and continuing federal home and higher education 
finance programs.  The point, that is, will be to show how we might 
finally become that Jeffersonian republic that we were on our way 
toward becoming before the land ran out.      
 
CONCLUSION: FROM THEORETIC COHERENCE TO 
IMPLEMENTARY COHERENCE 
 
This Article has covered a fair bit of territory, though more 
remains to be covered before a coherent American OS can be 
implemented.  We have identified three political traditions—three broad 
national self-understandings—that mutually exhaust the normative 
space of American public policy-making.  We have identified a broad 
intersection of overlapping consensus among the three traditions, at 
least where ownership is concerned, synthesizing one self-
understanding that affords a normative conceptual coherence to our 
coming efforts to realize an “ownership society.”  And we have 
translated this self-understanding—the efficient equal-opportunity 
republic, constituted by agent-citizens endowed with equal opportunity, 
pursuing happiness responsibly and freely—into distinctively American 
legal and psychological terms of ownership and ownership-promotion. 
What remains to be done is to translate those legal and 
psychological terms of ownership and ownership-promotion into 
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detailed programs—programs that promote and protect ownership in 
keeping both (a) with the values of the EEOR, and (b) with the law and 
ownership psychology of American citizens.  Such is the task of the 
present Article’s sequel.  That sequel first reinterprets, under the aspect 
of the “core” vision distilled in Parts II and III of the present Article, 
past “ownership society” programs and proposals.  It shows a uniform 
ideological and financial engineering trajectory at work in all of them—
a trajectory that is more readily distilled now that the present Article’s 
work is completed.  The sequel then works to consummate that 
trajectory.  It does so by forging a cohesive package of proposals that is 
informed by the successes and failures of past programs and proposals 
as interpreted under the aspect of the theory worked out in the present 
Article.  It is a package that makes strategic use of the behavioral 
finance (endowment effect) and derivative finance (abstraction effect) 
lessons highlighted in Part III of the present Article, as well as of 
securitization finance lessons highlighted in the historical portions of 
the sequel itself.  The upshot is a fully specified and designed American 
OS that makes liberal use of the market mechanism described above in 
Part II and amounts to a practical realization of the EEOR sketched in 
that same Part. 
Both in summation of the present Article and in anticipation of the 
next, it is perhaps worth making explicit one fact that until now has 
been largely implicit.  It is that an “ownership society” is not simply a 
society in which some people own.  If that were the case, we would be 
inhabiting an OS already, and there would be no purpose save the 
purposes of chicanery in holding out “the ownership society” as an 
ideal.  An ownership society is not a society in which we are all “on our 
own.”  That would be, among other things, a society without law.  
Indeed it would indeed not be a “society” at all.  Nor is an ownership 
society a society in which armed force labeled public acts solely to 
protect the earlier expropriations exacted by select sectional interests 
that are private.  That would be a banana republic.  An American OS or 
EEOR, rather, is a community of citizen-agents who act jointly, under 
the rule of law, to promote and to protect the independence, equal 
liberties and equal opportunities, as manifest in ownership rights, of one 
another.  Precisely that vision, we have seen, is what animates our three 
traditions of self-understanding, at least where ownership is concerned.  
And precisely that vision, we shall see, is what inchoately has animated 
American OS programs and proposals until now.  That view now will 
animate, more choately, coherently and self-consciously than before, 
that package of programs laid out and proposed in the sequel as well. 
 
